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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation examines the reasons why states want to acquire non-
conventional weapons and analyzes interconnections between decisions on nuclear 
weapons (NW) on the one hand and chemical/biological weapons (CBW) on the other. 
Much of the literature on non-conventional weapons has tended to focus either on 
nuclear weapons or on CBW, with CBW often portrayed as the “poor man’s nuclear 
bomb.” While there is some truth in this, the interconnections between decisions to 
develop NW and decisions to develop CBW are more numerous, more varied and more 
nuanced. 
The dissertation examines non-conventional armament processes in the United 
Kingdom and Iraq. Using two disparate cases provides the analysis with a 
comprehensive data set, the lessons from which have formed the basis of the analysis. 
Having nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons for the purpose of use is not 
always a state’s ultimate goal and factors as wide-ranging as national prestige and the 
maintenance of international relationships are important in determining why some states 
decide to pursue NBC weapons. The case study findings have been synthesized into 
four key areas in which NBC linkages are particularly significant: strategic issues and 
strategic cultures; political considerations; economics and finances; and future 
challenges.  
The key finding is that there are interconnections that show how NW and CBW 
influence each other. For example, both the UK and Iraq showed that if nuclear 
weapons were not available, interest in CBW would increase. Conversely, possession of 
nuclear weapons does not necessarily rule out interest in acquiring CBW armament.  
Non-conventional weapons present a significant challenge to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. As this dissertation demonstrates, NBC weapons are 
linked on many levels and it is important to understand how CBW can and do influence 
policy on nuclear weapons and vice versa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The chief foundations on which all states rest,  
whether they are new, old, or mixed, are good laws and good arms…  
there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms,  
and where there are good arms there are bound to be good laws.1 
 - Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince 
 
Throughout history significant technological advances have occurred in the 
areas of weapons and armament, combat tactics and strategic doctrine. As Martin van 
Creveld explains: 
War is completely permeated by technology and governed by it. The 
causes that lead to wars, and the goals for which they are fought; the 
blows with which campaigns open, and the victories with which they 
(sometimes) end; the relationship between the armed forces and the 
societies that they serve; planning, preparation, execution, and 
evaluation; operations and intelligence and organization and supply; 
objectives and methods and capabilities and missions; command and 
leadership and strategy and tactics; even the very conceptual frameworks 
employed by our brains in order to think about war and its conduct – not 
one of these is immune to the impact that technology has had and does 
have and always will have.2  
The twentieth century ushered in a new era of modern military technology and 
improved war fighting capabilities. The First World War saw the introduction of aircraft 
combat tactics, armoured tanks and the submachine gun.3 Also during this time, 
advances in the chemical industry made the large-scale production of chemical warfare 
agents possible. L. F. Haber states, “the industrial-scale technology for making the gases 
and the means for delivering them did not exist until the very end of the nineteenth 
century.”4 The use of poison gas during the First World War was widespread with 
Germany at the leading edge of research and production of new and different types of 
chemical warfare agents, leaving Britain, France and Russia the difficult job of playing 
catch up. 
                                                
1 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, translated and edited by Robert M. Adams (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1992), 34. 
2 Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1989), 
1. 
3 Tim Travers, How the War Was Won: Factors that Led to Victory in World War One (Barnsley: Pen & 
Sword Military Classics, 2005), 35-36. 
4 L. F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), 15. 
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State interest in non-conventional weapons grew steadily throughout the 
interwar period, up to and including the Second World War when it became apparent 
that it would be scientifically possible to harness the power of the atom.5 Concerned that 
Germany may be attempting to unravel the mysteries of nuclear fission British interest 
in acquiring this technology increased. By the end of the Second World War research 
into nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons had become standard practice for 
a handful of states. In the aftermath of the bloodiest war in history, interest in the 
military application of science and technology was on the rise. History has shown that 
many states have been interested in acquiring these types of weapons for a multitude of 
reasons, which will be addressed in due course. 
Certain types of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as Falkenrath, 
Newman and Thayer explain, “often share three appalling characteristics; immense 
lethality, insofar as a single weapon can kill thousands of people; portability, which 
allows the weapons to be delivered against civilian populations and unprepared military 
forces; and accessibility, which means that they could fall into unfriendly hands, despite 
the best efforts at prevention.”6 Some of these weapons have been researched, 
developed or deployed during the twentieth century by a number of states including the 
United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), and the former Soviet Union (USSR).7 
Other states have tried and failed to acquire this technology despite their best efforts, 
some have considered programmes and some have voluntarily dismantled their military 
programmes.8 What continues to be of concern is the value that certain states still place 
on non-conventional weapons technology. Through a thorough understanding of past 
                                                
5 It was understood, at least for a while, that atomic energy could theoretically be used for military 
applications. This all changed with the Frisch-Peierls Memorandum on the Properties of a Radioactive 
“Super-bomb,” TNA AB 1/210.  
6 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 1. 
7 See Table 1. 
8 Sweden, Switzerland and South Africa are three states that gave up their respective quests for nuclear 
weapons for varying domestic or international concerns. For Sweden see Paul M. Cole, "Atomic 
Bombast: Nuclear Weapon Decision-Making in Sweden, 1946-72," Washington Quarterly, Volume 20, 
Number 2, (1997): 233-251; Jan Prawitz, “From Nuclear Option to Non-Nuclear Promotion: The Sweden 
Case,” Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Research Report 20, 1995. The history of the Swiss 
nuclear weapons programme is patchy and mostly in German, though some sources have been translated 
into English. See Jürg Stüssi-Lauterburg, “Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss Nuclear 
Armament,” Government of Switzerland Report, Federal Administration, Bern, April 1966, accessed 11 
May 2011, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Library/Swissdoc.html. For South Africa see, Helen E. 
Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005); Ronald W. Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987). 
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state programmes it is hoped that the reasons will become apparent and measures can be 
taken to prevent state-level acquisition of NBC weapons.  
 
Research Questions 
During the Cold War the majority of research on potential uses of NBC weapons 
was concentrated principally on the threat of nuclear confrontation between the US and 
USSR and their respective allies. The lack of study dealing with interconnections 
between NBC weapons has been compounded by the paucity of academic analyses that 
have historically centered on nuclear weapons development, chemical/biological 
weapons (CBW) development or an examination of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). I believe that an analysis of the interconnections between nuclear weapons 
(NW) and CBW is long overdue and necessary as the state-level acquisition of an NBC 
weapons capability presents the single most serious long-term security threat facing the 
advanced democracies of the West and their interests.  
While the literature on nuclear weapons is rich and plentiful, chemical and 
biological weapons have not been written about as extensively. Several authors have 
examined the subject from a development or proliferation perspective9 but the 
connections between NW on the one hand and CBW on the other and how they have 
influenced each other has been previously unexplored. This dissertation will endeavour 
to achieve this by utilizing a multiple case study format based on states that have either 
developed NBC weapons programmes or have attempted to. The idea is that by 
analyzing the conditions in the UK (1946-57) and Iraq (1980-95), one can see how these 
decisions were made in disparate cases. 
                                                
9 Brian Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1930-65 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Frank Barnaby, How Nuclear Weapons Spread (New York: Routledge, 
1993); Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy: 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964); Margaret 
Gowing and Lorna Arnold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952. 
Volume I, Policy Making (London: Macmillan, 1974); Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold, Independence 
and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, Volume II, Policy Execution (London: 
Macmillan, 1974); Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored 
Programs to Contemporary Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); L. F. Haber, The 
Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford University Press: 1986); Richard G. 
Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, The New World: 1939-1946 (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1962); Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of 
Biological Warfare (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999); Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the 
Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995); John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: 
The United States, Britain and the Military Atom (London: Macmillan, 1983); Jonathan B. Tucker, War of 
Nerves: Chemical Warfare From World War I to Al-Qaeda (New York: Pantheon, 2006); Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Volumes I to VI (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971-1975). 
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The central question that will be the focus of my dissertation is, why do states 
decide to acquire NBC weapons, and how have decisions to develop nuclear weapons 
and decisions to develop chemical and biological weapons, influenced each other? This 
type of question raises a number of smaller questions specifically related to its wording. 
What exactly is meant when referring to a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon? Why 
is there a need for a distinction between nuclear and chemical and biological? Why are 
chemical and biological weapons categorized together? These are important 
considerations and will be addressed in the appropriate sections.  
The primary research question is important as a considerable lack of awareness on 
chemical and biological warfare issues still exists. More specifically, how might 
ignorance of CBW armament dynamics affect decisions states will take regarding the 
development and acquisition of nuclear weapons including decisions against 
acquisition? Also, could the lack of impetus for CBW create a new set of problems 
related to the control of these types of weapons? With the entry into force of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1997 inauguration of the Organisation for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), security and proliferation concerns over 
chemical weapons have become much less significant.10 The belief is that with the 
creation of the CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which are 
disarmament treaties, these two types of weapons have been satisfactorily dealt with and 
the elements that are in place to help deal with control and governance aspects of CBW 
are effective. This, sadly, is not the case as chemical and biological weapons still 
present a host of security and proliferation concerns.11  
The difference with the nuclear weapons threat is that the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a treaty designed to limit the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to non-nuclear weapon states and allowing for the retention of nuclear 
weapons for the five recognized nuclear weapon states. Therefore it is of extreme 
                                                
10 J. P. Perry Robinson, “Scientists and Chemical Weapons Policies,” in Assessing the Threat of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction: The Role of Independent Scientists, ed. John L. Finney and Ivo !laus. (Amsterdam: 
IOS Press, 2010), 79-89; Donald A. Mahley, “The OPCW: Reflecting on the Model,” The CBW 
Conventions Bulletin, Issue 83/84 (July 2009): 1-4; Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical 
Warfare From World War I to Al-Qaeda (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 375-386; Oliver Thraenert and 
Jonathan B. Tucker, “Freeing the World of Chemical Weapons: The Chemical Weapons Convention at 
the Ten-Year Mark,” SWP Research Paper no.8 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2007), 
33.  
11 See Jonathan B. Tucker, “Verifying the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements,” Arms Control 
Today, January/February 2007, accessed 11 May 2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_01-
02/Tucker. 
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importance that awareness of CBW issues is not marginalized and relegated to the 
sidelines of international arms control negotiations.  
Each case of a state trying to acquire a nuclear, biological or chemical weapons 
capability is unique and must be treated as such. According to Joseph Cirincione: 
The decision to pursue or not pursue nuclear weapons is not as simple 
and clean cut as it might first appear. No single model can explain all of 
the different decisions made by distinct leaders in disparate states, each 
of which faces its own unique security threats, possesses its own national 
identity; and must contend with its own domestic political pressures.12 
This can be extended to include biological and chemical weapons as well. There is an 
array of reasons as to why these weapons are desirable and no single explanation can 
adequately provide an all-encompassing answer.13 As Scott Sagan explains, “Nuclear 
weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of national security; they are political 
objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles 
and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity.”14 For 
the UK the key policy decisions that led the British government to develop NBC weapons 
were different and were made in a contrasting fashion to Iraq. British decisions were 
pragmatic in nature and often made in response to perceived military threat, though other 
factors did exert some influence over the decisions taken. National prestige, domestic 
politics and the regional threats posed by Iran and Israel were the driving forces behind 
Iraq’s decision, under Saddam Hussein, to arm with non-conventional weapons.  
Using the UK and Iraq as case studies will enable this research project to better 
understand the how as well as the why aspect of the primary research question. These 
cases are different and in using them I will endeavour to illustrate the myriad reasons 
why states attempt to acquire NBC weapons and to demonstrate the interconnections 
between NW and CBW. Using the United Kingdom and Iraq as a basis, I will 
synthesize and further elaborate upon these interconnections using additional historical 
data, gathered during my research, in a concluding chapter. Prior to that, it is necessary 
to outline some key terms, concepts and definitions related to nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons.  
 
                                                
12 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 82. 
13 Chapter Five will provide an in-depth analysis of this phenomenon. 
14 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security, Volume 21, Number 3 (Winter 1996-97): 55. 
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NBC Weapons – Definitions and Terms 
 It is important when entering into an analysis of nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons that certain terms, concepts and definitions are clearly illustrated and their 
meanings understood. According to the United States Code15 (USC):  
The term “atomic weapon'' means any device utilizing atomic energy, 
exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where 
such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal 
purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a 
weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.16 
There are four traditional categories of nuclear weapons, pure fission, boosted, 
enhanced radiation and fusion.17 Pure fission weapons use fission-only reactions as a 
source of energy. Fission bombs operate by rapidly assembling a subcritical 
configuration of fissile material into one that is highly supercritical.18 The original 
atomic bombs designed, tested and deployed by the US in 1945 were pure fission 
weapons, albeit different bomb designs.  
A boosted weapon is essentially a fission weapon with a few grams of a 
deuterium and tritium gas mixture included in the fissile core.19 As the fission chain 
reaction begins, the deuterium and tritium gas mixture undergoes fusion, which results 
in the release of an intense burst of high-energy neutrons that causes another intense 
burst of fissions in the core.20 These weapons are very efficient, with a typical yield 
several times higher than ordinary fission weapons, which enables designers to reduce 
its overall size and weight.21 An enhanced radiation weapon, commonly referred to as a 
                                                
15 The United States Code is “a consolidation and codification by subject matter of the general and 
permanent laws of the United States.” It is prepared and published by the Office of the Law Revision 
Counsel of the US House of Representatives. “Office of the Law Revision Counsel.” US House of 
Representatives, accessed 27 April 2011, http://uscode.house.gov/. 
16 Atomic and nuclear are used interchangeably, but for the purpose of this dissertation nuclear will be the 
preferred taxonomy. “Title 42 – The Public Health and Welfare, Chapter 23 – Development and Control 
of Atomic Energy, Division A – Atomic Energy, Subchapter I – General Provisions, Section 2014 (d) – 
Definitions,” United States Code, accessed 7 September 2009, 
http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=435866265979+17+1+0&WAISacti
on=retrieve.  
17 “Nuclear Weapon Design.” Federation of American Scientists, accessed 8 September 2009, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm. 
18 Carey Sublette, “Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions - Section 1.0 Types of Nuclear 
Weapons, Version 2.16: 1 May 1998.” Nuclear Weapon Archive, accessed 8 September 2009, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq1.html.  
19 Lorna Arnold describes two different ways of boosting fission weapons – core boosting and tamper 
boosting. See Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 86-87. 
20 “Types of Nuclear Weapons – Fission Weapons.” CTBTO Preparatory Commission, accessed 5 June 
2010, http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/types-of-nuclear-weapons/page-4/?textonly=1.  
21 David Albright and Theodore B. Taylor, “A Little Tritium Goes a Long Way,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, Volume 44, Number 1 (January/February 1988): 39. 
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neutron bomb, has an output in which neutrons and X-rays are made to constitute a 
substantial portion of the total energy released.22  
The most powerful type of weapon is a fusion or thermonuclear weapon. The 
Teller-Ulam design, or the classical ‘Super’ was, according to Lorna Arnold: 
a tank or pipe full of liquid deuterium (deuterium is a gas at normal 
temperatures) with an atomic bomb on one end. This bomb would be a 
large, powerful uranium gun (not an implosion device) with an unheard-
of yield, several hundred kilotons. Some tritium would have to be added 
to the deuterium at the atom bomb end of the pipe since, it was generally 
agreed, a propagating reaction in deuterium alone would be impossible at 
the temperatures achievable. A flood of neutrons from the atomic bomb 
explosion would initiate the thermonuclear reactions. The whole 
assembly might yield 40 megatons but the yield was theoretically 
unlimited.23 
As Arnold explains, since there is no critical mass for the fusion process, extremely 
large yields are possible. On 30 October 1961 the USSR tested Tsar Bomba over 
Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Sea. Codenamed Ivan by its Soviet developers, it had a 
yield of 50 megatons (Mt), making it the largest device ever tested.24 
Chemical weapons (CW) use toxic chemicals to cause death, temporary 
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans and animals through chemical action on 
life processes. In the sense of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, "chemical 
weapons" means the following, together or separately: 
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and 
quantities are consistent with such purposes; 
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other 
harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in 
subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment 
of such munitions and devices; 
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection 
with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph 
(b).25 
There are a number of different classifications of chemical weapons, including lung 
irritants, vesicants, blood gases and nerve agents. The First World War saw the initial 
                                                
22 “Nuclear Weapon Design.” Federation of American Scientists, accessed 8 September 2009, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm. 
23 Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, 13. 
24 Gerard DeGroot, The Bomb: A History of Hell on Earth (London: Pimlico, 2005), 253-255. 
25 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), Article II, Definitions and Criteria.” 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, accessed 10 September 2009, 
http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-ii-definitions-and-criteria/. 
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large-scale use of toxic chemicals as weapons. A brief history of chemical weapons and 
chemical warfare will be addressed in Chapter Three. 
Biological weapons26 (BW) affect life and life processes through the infectivity 
or toxicity of microbial or other pathogens. For effectiveness, the pathogens may need 
special processing in order to “weaponize” them. This procedure is the transformation 
of pathogens to a state of inherent stabilization, which is necessary in order for the 
agents to be able to withstand the introduction of an alien environment, such as the trip 
from the laboratory to the production facility or a flight into the earth’s stratosphere. 
Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention states that: 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any 
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or 
retain:  
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin 
or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such 
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.27  
 
Chemical and biological weapons are frequently referred to in a similar context 
and grouped together in one category, CBW, even though these two types of weapons 
have different characteristics and different potential as weapons. Compared with 
biological weapons, many chemical weapons have a tactical battlefield application and 
are effective over a localized area. The Iraqi army successfully used chemical weapons 
as a force multiplier in its eight-year war with neighbouring Iran in order to counter the 
massed human wave attacks the Iranians were launching through Iraq’s southern 
marshes.28 The delayed effects of certain biological weapons and their vulnerability to 
weather make them inapt to tactical military objectives.29 Biological agents can impede 
the mobilization of opposing forces as well as be an effective tool for creating fear and 
panic in a civilian population.30 Catherine Jefferson believes that chemical and 
                                                
26 There are some differences as to what constitutes a biological agent and a biological weapon. Without 
getting into too much detail regarding the weaponization process as it is beyond the scope of this project, 
the term biological weapons will be used, while taking into consideration the technical differences 
between the terms. 
27 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.” The Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention Website, accessed 27 July 2010, http://www.opbw.org/. 
28 See Chapter 4, pages 124-130. 
29 This does not include toxins, some of which are fast acting in their effects.  
30 Richard Danzig and Pamela B. Berkowsky, “Why Should We Be Concerned About Biological 
Warfare?” in Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat, ed. Joshua Lederberg. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2001), 10. 
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biological weapons should be seen as part of a spectrum rather than as distinct 
categories. She argues that, “Though certain characteristics of BW (such as incubation 
period and contagiousness) may distinguish it from CW, sharp technical distinctions 
become more problematic when considering grey areas such as toxins (chemicals 
derived from organisms).”31 Julian Robinson believes that it is important to recognize 
what features CW and BW have in common and what security risks they pose.32 The 
category of CW and the category of BW both include types of weapons that have the 
capacity to create mass-casualties, instill fear and terror in a civilian population, disrupt 
an opposing force’s mobilization and logistical efforts and they work by affecting basic 
life processes.33 As Robinson explains: 
The mechanisms of toxicity and infectivity that characterize CBW are 
the mechanisms through which we can, if we are so minded, exploit for 
weapons purposes that most impressive feature of today’s science -- its 
accelerating understanding of the processes of life. As we comprehend 
more and more of how life works at the molecular level, so too may we 
be able to learn to manipulate life at the molecular level.34 
 
Although the terms NBC weapons and WMD are often used interchangeably, for 
the purpose of this dissertation the term NBC is preferred as opposed to the blanket term 
WMD.35 Though the term WMD has been around for over seventy years36 it has 
reached the apex of popularity over the past few decades. One of the problems with the 
term WMD has to be the many different interpretations as to what constitutes WMD. In 
Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction, Seth Carus highlights over forty different 
definitions of WMD, many of which are used by various institutions within the US 
government and other international organizations.37 While a universally agreed upon 
definition of WMD does not exist, there are many examples that attempt to define this 
                                                
31 Catherine Jefferson, “The Chemical and Biological Weapons Taboo: Nature, Norms and International 
Law” (DPhil diss., University of Sussex, 2009), 12-13. 
32 Julian Robinson, “Bringing the CBW Conventions Closer Together,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, 
Issue 80 (September 2008): 1. 
33 Chemical and biological weapons might also be developed for purposes of incapacitation. For further 
information on this issue see Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril? ed. Alan M. 
Pearson, Marie Isabelle Chevrier and Mark Wheelis. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007). 
34 Robinson, “Bringing the CBW Conventions Closer Together,” 1. 
35 “NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Facts and Way Ahead. Press 
Release (95) 124, 29 November 1995.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), accessed 9 
September 2009, http//www.nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-124.htm. 
36 The first use of the term "weapons of mass destruction” is thought to be by Cosmo Gordon Lang, 
Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1937 in reference to the aerial bombardment of Guernica, Spain. 
"Archbishop's Appeal," Times, 28 December 1937, 9. 
37 W. Seth Carus, “Defining ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’,” Occasional Paper no.4, Center for the 
Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Washington, DC, January 2006. 
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particular concept. The August 1948 United Nations Commission for Conventional 
Armaments states that: 
Weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic 
explosive weapons, radio active material weapons, lethal chemical and 
biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which 
have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the 
atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.38 
The definition of WMD currently used by the US military is:  
Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being 
used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of 
mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, 
and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or 
propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part 
of the weapon.”39 
A UK House of Lords European Committee Report from 2004-05 defines WMD as, 
“nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons – irrespective of particular characteristics, 
potency and possible application.”40 An anomalous definition is used in the United 
States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, which 
states that: 
A WMD is any device, material, or substance used in a manner, in a 
quantity or type, or under circumstances evidencing an intent to cause 
death or serious injury to persons or significant damage to property.41 
This definition is somewhat more problematic as the claim could be made that the 
crudely fashioned steel machetes used in the mass killing of 800 000 Rwandan Hutus 
and Tutsis were weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately some official international 
uses of the term WMD are simpler and straightforward. The WMD Branch of the 
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs defines WMD as “nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons.”42 
                                                
38 “United Nations Security Council Resolutions – 1947, Resolution 18: Armaments: Regulation and 
Reduction Of.” United Nations, accessed 21 December 2009, 
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1947/scres47.htm. 
39 This definition is also used by the Central Intelligence Agency in its assessment of Iraq’s proscribed 
weapons programmes. “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, 30 
September 2004;” “Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 2004,” US Department of 
Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Staff Publication 1-02, accessed 27 August 2009, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
40 House of Lords, European Committee, Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The 
EU Contribution, 13th Report of Session 2004-05, 5 April 2005, 7. 
41 United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, January 2001, 
B-5.  
42 “Mission Statement, WMD Branch of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.” 
United Nations, accessed 9 September 2009, http//:disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd. 
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 One of the main issues with using WMD is it “tends to blur the distinctive 
attributes of, and differences among, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.”43 
Weapons in these categories vary significantly in terms of their potential lethality as 
well as the difficulty in actually developing or otherwise obtaining operational 
capabilities.44 Dunn, Lavoy and Sagan suggest that, “Ignoring the differences between 
these weapons, for example, can encourage analysts to ignore how adversaries might 
use biological or chemical weapons in ways that fall below the threshold at which they 
would fear a nuclear response.”45 As Carus explains:  
NBC weapons represent a group of weapons that the international 
community accepts as particularly abhorrent. This distinguishes them 
from other weapons, such as conventional munitions, that could cause 
massive death and destruction but that the international community 
traditionally accepted as routinely usable instruments of armed conflict.46 
As mentioned, NATO and elements of the US government prefer to use the NBC 
acronym. While WMD may be a commonly used term in media47 (and other) circles, for 
the purposes of this dissertation NBC will be used in describing these three types of 
weapons. 
 
Dissertation Structure 
 This dissertation comprises five chapters plus introductory and concluding 
sections. Chapter One deals with theory. The bureaucratic politics decision-making 
model will help to shape the theoretical underpinnings of this research project. This 
particular model de-emphasizes the idea of the unitary actor and promotes the 
importance of multiple actors. These actors or players tend not to focus on a single 
strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems and according to their 
various conceptions of national security, organizational, domestic and personal interests. 
Since my research project is looking at how NBC weapons policy is formed and how 
decisions are made and the subsequent mutual influences they have had, bureaucratic 
politics provides a useful foundation.  
                                                
43 John F. Reichert, “Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: A Neglected Challenge,” Strategic Forum, 
Number 187 (December 2001): 2. 
44 Fred W. Schreier, WMD Proliferation: Reforming the Security to Meet the Threat (Washington: 
Potomac Books, 2009), 3. 
45 Lewis A. Dunn, Peter R. Lavoy and Scott D. Sagan, “Conclusions: Planning the Unthinkable,” in 
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, ed. 
Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 240. 
46 Carus, “Defining ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’”, 8. 
47 See Ibid. for New York Times analysis. 
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Chapter Two is the methodology section of the dissertation. This will include a 
detailed look at the benefits of multiple versus single cases, actual case study selection 
criteria, and justifications for each individual case study chosen as well as a discussion 
of methods used to test the empirical cases, which in this instance is a process tracing 
methodology. 
Chapter Three is the first of the two historical case studies – this one is on the 
United Kingdom from 1946-57. Looking back at the origins of the British NBC 
programmes will be helpful as it can assist in pinpointing key shifts in thinking about 
these types of weapons. For example, in July 1947, the UK Defence Research Policy 
Committee (DRPC) recommended to the Attlee government that, “research on chemical 
and biological weapons should be given priority effectively equal to that given to the 
study of atomic weapons.”48 What was happening at this time to elicit this type of 
response from the DRPC? By looking at past events, one can hope to gain a level of 
insight as well as context regarding the environment in which these decisions were 
made with the expectation of better understanding any substantial connections between 
nuclear weapons and CBW acquisition. 
Chapter Four begins with a look at the history of Iraq’s NBC weapons 
programmes up to 1995. The focus of analysis will be from 1980 to 1995, which covers 
the significant episodes in Iraq’s quest for NBC weapons – the bombing of the Osirak 
reactor in 1981, the Iran-Iraq War, Operation Desert Storm and the formation of the 
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). This particular end date is significant 
as it was when a large deposit of documents was found at a property belonging to 
Hussein Kamel, related to its prohibited weapons programmes. This “discovery” was 
followed by further disclosures by Iraq concerning the production of VX nerve agent 
and work done on the development of a nuclear weapon. The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of regime decision-making as well as Iraq’s rationale for developing NBC 
weapons programmes. Competing interests were a key factor in Iraq’s quest for NBC 
weapons. Though the regime had a great deal of money to dedicate to each programme, 
its level of scientific “talent” was limited, meaning that the best and brightest scientists 
and technical personnel were in great demand. Though Iraq’s decision-making methods 
were far more idiosyncratic and less formalized than in the UK and other western states, 
                                                
48 Defence Research Policy Committee, Final Version of a Paper on Future of Defence Research Policy, 
30 July 1947. TNA DEFE 10/19. 
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this case study provides us with an excellent example of how NBC related decisions 
were made in an authoritarian regime. 
The fifth chapter draws out the key connections between nuclear weapons on the 
one hand and CBW on the other, using the UK and Iraq case studies as a basis for 
analysis, as well as drawing on additional historical data gathered during my research. 
The reasons why states want to pursue NBC armament are broad and each state has 
differing criteria for wanting to possess non-conventional weapons. Issues as wide-
ranging as national/international prestige, addressing national defence or regional 
security matters, strategic concerns, economic aspects, military utility and the 
maintenance of important international relationships or agreements are all causal 
factors. Also included will be a brief look at a few key issues that may present problems 
in preventing state-level acquisition of NBC weapons. Though not a comprehensive 
analysis, it will provide a preliminary look inside a potentially significant set of future 
challenges. 
 
Summary 
 Many states have been interested in acquiring nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons, for a multitude of reasons. Some have been successful – some have not. The 
British case study provides a good example of a stable, western, democratic state’s 
decision-making processes and rationale in light of NBC weapons policy. The Iraq 
study offers a look at how an authoritarian dictatorship makes NBC weapons decisions 
in a developing nation – primarily by using fear, terror and intimidation as tools of 
implementation. Both of these cases provide a looking-glass view of other states and 
their interest in acquiring NBC weapons. Iraq is especially portentous today, as there 
seems to be no shortage of interest in the supposed “civilian” nuclear energy 
programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as the weapons programmes of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). By using these historical case studies, 
the intention is to provide a better understanding of why some states decide to develop 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and how CBW may or do influence policy on 
nuclear weapons. History has much to teach us and the lessons here need to be 
understood in order to prevent any future international security crises from arising out 
of this complex issue. 
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TABLE 1. NBC STATE WEAPONS PROGRAMMES – PAST AND PRESENT49 
   
Nuclear weapons Biological weapons Chemical weapons 
 
Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
Egypt 
France 
India 
Iraq 
Israel 
Libya 
North Korea 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Romania 
South Africa 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
United Kingdom 
USA 
USSR/Russia 
Yugoslavia 
 
 
 
 
Canada 
Egypt 
France 
Germany 
Hungary 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
North Korea 
South Africa 
United Kingdom 
USA 
USSR/Russia 
 
 
Australia 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
France 
Germany 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Libya 
Netherlands 
North Korea 
Romania 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Syria 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
USA 
USSR/Russia 
Yugoslavia 
 
 
KEY: STATES IN BOLD HAVE OR HAD A PROGRAMME IN EACH OF THE THREE AREAS
                                                
49 This list details programmes of acquisition begun but often not completed. The states on this list have 
had, at one time or another, either some form of research programme into NBC technology or a weapons 
development programme. What is meant by a state “programme” is a complex issue and there are 
different interpretations that can be utilized. For a look into the problems of state “programmes” and 
“possession” see Julian Perry Robinson, “Chemical Weapons Proliferation: The Problem in Perspective,” 
in Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferation: With Implications for the Asia/Pacific Region, ed. 
Trevor Findlay. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 19-36. Information for biological and chemical weapons 
compiled from the Sussex Harvard Information Bank, University of Sussex. On the nuclear side, George 
Perkovich, Jessica T. Matthews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B. Wolfsthal, Universal 
Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2007), 20; Richard 
Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 
70-71; US Department of Defense, The Militarily Critical Technologies List Part II: Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Technologies (Washington: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, February 1998), Section 5, 9. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THEORY 
The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have 
become, as it were, confused and entangled.1 
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War 
 
Theory, as nineteenth century Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz 
stated, “need not be a positive doctrine, a sort of manual for action.”2 Theory should be 
something to help guide the research, but not overshadow it.3 For the purpose of this 
research project, the use of theory is to provide a set of “guiding principles” to be used 
in the collection and analysis of data and not as a rigid framework set up to organize the 
sum of the research. Clausewitz also wrote that, “It (theory) is an analytical investigation 
leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience…. it leads to 
thorough familiarity with it.”4 In this case, the use of theory will also help frame the 
research questions in an appropriate context. This is important as one of the biggest 
challenges faced by a researcher is the identification of theoretical constructs relevant to 
their research. In fact, there are few theoretical constructs that have not been censured 
for their “conservative bias, neglect to change and its consequent reification of the status 
quo.”5 Fortunately there is no right or wrong answer when it comes to selecting a 
theoretical approach – there are only choices. According to Morton Kaplan, “Political 
scientists and theorists cannot reason without generalization and, where matters are 
complex, the web of reasoning logically takes the form of a theory.”6  
This research project draws on the fields of International Relations (IR), 
diplomatic history and strategic thought and choosing a suitable theoretical approach that 
reflects the interdisciplinary nature of the project is exigent. According to Julie Thompson 
Klein, “educators, researchers and practitioners have all turned to interdisciplinary work 
                                                
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 132.  
2 Ibid., 141. 
3 Theory is taken to mean, “any mental construct that orders phenomena or inquiry into them.” Harry 
Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Handbook of Political Science, Volume 7, ed. 
F. J. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby. (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 86. 
4 Clausewitz, On War, 141. 
5 R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 113. 
6 Morton A. Kaplan, “Problems of Theory Building and Theory Confirmation in International Politics,” in 
The International System: Theoretical Essays, ed. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), 6. 
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in order to accomplish a range of objectives including the need to answer complex 
questions; to address broad issues; and to solve problems that are beyond the scope of any 
one discipline.”7 Interdisciplinary research can lead researchers in different disciplines 
to, “meet at the interfaces and frontiers of those disciplines and even to cross frontiers to 
form new disciplines.”8 Each of IR theory, diplomatic history and strategic thought will 
help to provide insight into the final analysis of the stated research questions. These 
academic fields share a few commonalities between them. First, diplomatic historians and 
IR theorists share the objective of trying to uncover and understand their common 
history.9 Second, they both share a universal commitment to objective evidence in 
regard to subject matter.10 Third, they both share a focus on people and the ways they 
organize their affairs, or nonreplicable phenomena.11 Fourth, political events have, as a 
rule, provided the substance for historical synthesis, which in turn necessitates some 
level of theoretical analysis.12 Finally, the use of structured, focused comparison – or 
what is called process tracing in IR and historical explanation (narrative) in history – 
provides an analogous methodology that bridges the disciplines.13  
Selecting a theory that is able to satisfy requirements arising from either 
discipline has resulted in the adoption of certain elements of more than one theoretical 
framework. First, the bureaucratic politics model of decision-making will be drawn on 
to help inform the analysis developed throughout this research project.14 Elements of 
historical analysis and strategic thinking will also factor into the overall analysis of how 
and why governments make decisions vis-à-vis nuclear, biological and chemical 
                                                
7 Julie Thompson Klein, Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1990), 11. 
8 Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research 
(Washington: The National Academies Press, 2004), 16. 
9 Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, “History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look,” International 
Security, Volume 20, Number 1 (Summer 1995): 5-6. 
10 Stephen H. Haber, David M. Kennedy, and Stephen D. Krasner, “Brothers Under the Skin: Diplomatic 
History and International Relations,” International Security, Volume 22, Number 1 (Summer 1997): 34. 
11 John L. Gaddis, “History, Theory, and Common Ground,” International Security, Volume 22, Number 
1 (Summer 1997): 82. 
12 Ian S. Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: multiple Historical Records and the 
Problem of Selection Bias,” The American Political Science Review, Volume 90, Number 3 (September 
1996): 605. 
13 Alexander L. George, “Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for Political Science and History,” 
International Security, Volume 22, Number 1 (Summer 1997): 47. 
14 In his 1971 book Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison employs 
the term governmental politics as opposed to bureaucratic politics. This can be a little bit confusing to the 
reader as Allison and Morton H. Halperin used the latter term in their influential paper, “Bureaucratic 
Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics, Volume 24 (Spring 1972), as does 
Halperin in his book, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1974). 
Though the 1999 edition is the one used throughout this chapter, I have endeavoured to use bureaucratic 
as opposed to governmental wherever possible. 
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weapons. In this case, how a decision or set of decisions lead to the formation of policy 
related to the particular weapons system. Strategic thinking, or simply strategy, is, 
according to Bernard Brodie, “a how to do it study – a guide for accomplishing something 
and doing it efficiently.”15 Decisions about NBC weapons are rarely made in isolation and 
a number of causal factors exist as to why states want these types of weapons. Strategic 
thinking can help to provide context and background into the conditions in which these 
types of decisions were made. 
 
Bureaucratic Politics 
In Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971), Graham 
Allison remarked that in thinking about problems of foreign affairs, “professional 
analysts as well as ordinary citizens proceed in a straightforward, informal, 
nontheoretical fashion.”16 According to Allison, “most analysts explain and predict 
behaviour of national governments in terms of a rational actor model.”17 In the rational 
actor model, the rational decision problem is reduced to a simple matter of selecting 
among a set of given alternatives, each of which has a given set of consequences: the 
agent selects the alternative whose consequences are preferred in terms of the agent’s 
utility function which ranks each set of consequences in order of preference.18 Hollis 
and Smith believe that a rational actor model in international politics is, “more basic 
than a theory about states pursuing national interests.”19 The rational actor has universal 
appeal. In many circumstances it appears to provide a logical explanation of a particular 
event or set of events. Often there is a straightforward conclusion to the issues posed by 
a particular case study. In these instances the rational actor model would provide a 
sufficient explanation.20 In Essence of Decision, Allison uses three different conceptual 
decision-making models, which are: (a) rational actor, (b) organizational behaviour and 
(c) bureaucratic politics; in his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. All three models 
provide a different explanation of some of President John Kennedy’s decisions during 
                                                
15 Bernard Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” Foreign Policy, Number 5 (Winter 1971-
72): 151. 
16 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New 
York: Longman, 1999), 3-4. 
17 Ibid., 4. 
18 Ibid., 17. 
19 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, “Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making,” British 
Journal of Political Science, Volume 16, Number 3 (July 1986): 272. 
20 See Appendix 1: A Typology of Policymaking. 
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the 1962 crisis. However, for the purpose of this research project the one that is of the 
most interest is bureaucratic politics.21  
To start, the bureaucratic politics model sees no unitary actor, but rather many 
actors as players – players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse 
intra-national problems.22 These players choose in terms of no consistent set of strategic 
objectives, but rather according to various conceptions of national security, 
organizational, domestic and personal interests. Players make governmental decisions 
not by a single rational choice, but by pulling and hauling.23 As I. M. Destler explains:  
Bureaucratic politics is the process by which people inside a government 
bargain with one another on complex public policy questions. Its 
existence does not connote impropriety, though such may be present. Nor 
is it caused by political parties and elections, though both influence the 
process in important ways. Rather, bureaucratic politics arises from two 
inescapable conditions. One is that no single official possesses either the 
power, or the wisdom, or the time to decide all-important executive 
branch policy issues himself. The second is that officials who have 
influence inevitably differ in how they would like these issues to be 
resolved.24 
 
A person’s stance on an issue derives from their own personal experiences, their career 
pattern and their position in the bureaucracy.25 This is reflected by Martin Hollis and 
Steve Smith when they state, “where you stand would depend both on where you sit and 
on how you think.”26 Government interaction can, as a result, be understood as a 
bargaining game with the outcomes resulting from competition.  
 Typically governments are not monolithic in their outlook or in their decision-
making processes. Rather, each individual involved in the process is, in his or her own 
right, “a player in a central competitive game.”27 This is where the rational actor model 
and the bureaucratic politics model differ. According to Allison:  
The rational actor model simplifies and obscures the persistently 
neglected fact of bureaucracy as the “maker” of government policy is not 
one calculating decision-maker, but rather a conglomerate of large 
organizations and political actors who differ substantially about what 
                                                
21 Essence of Decision was first published in 1971, and in 1972, Allison joined with Halperin to formalize 
the Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm, which was published in the spring edition of World Politics. Allison 
and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 40-79. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 I. M. Destler, Presidents Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 52. 
25 Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institute, 
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their government should do on an particular issue and who compete in 
attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the actions of their 
government.28  
 
Decisions have less to do with consequences than with compromises. Richard Neustadt, 
in Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from 
Roosevelt to Reagan, demonstrated that, “the power of our highest official is basically 
just ‘the power to persuade,’ and that the ‘power to persuade is the power to bargain’.”29 
This highlights the need for the President to work very hard building support within the 
government for what he/she wants to accomplish.  
 The number of individuals involved in the early days of forming nuclear 
weapons policy was very small and within this group there were different opinions as to 
why the UK should develop nuclear weapons. National defence, prestige and economics 
were all factors in the decision to go for nuclear weapons, but the path in getting there 
was difficult and many compromises had to be made. Clearly, there is room for different 
programmes pursuing principles important to specific segments of society. However, 
when one reaches the political-military field, the case for “pluralism” becomes weaker 
and the need for central control more urgent.30 
 As Allison explains: 
The nature of foreign policy problems permits fundamental disagreement 
among reasonable people about how to solve them. Because most players 
participate in policy-making by virtue of their role, it is natural that each 
feels special responsibility to call attention to the ramifications of an 
issue for his or her domain.31 
This environment necessitates that government decisions and actions result from a 
political process. Policy flows from a combination of large organizations and political 
actors who differ substantially on any particular issue and who compete to advance their 
own personal and organizational interests as they try to influence decisions.32  
 Decisions on national security and foreign policy questions are made differently 
in western democratic states as opposed to military dictatorships, communist states and 
other types of authoritarian regimes. Typically, this can be a process of getting one’s 
government, “officially and actually committed to some bargaining strategy or tactic, 
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and this involves getting the approval of those officials whose approval is needed, 
officially and actually.”33 According to Allison, a number of causal factors must be 
taken into account in explaining results of group decision-making. These factors can be 
categorized into seven separate headings, which are: (1) higher quality decisions; (2) the 
agency problem: principles, agents and players; (3) participants: who plays? (4) decision 
rules; (5) framing issues and setting agendas; (6) groupthink; and (7) complexity of joint 
decisions and actions.34 
 For his purpose, Allison contrasts Allied policy-making with that of Nazi 
Germany during the Second World War. He shows how the Roosevelt administration 
and the Churchill government adopted systems of committees that produced 
increasingly high quality, durable judgments. The formation in the UK of the 
Bacteriological Warfare Subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence is an 
example of this. Following a study by the Medical Research Council (MRC) that the 
government asked for in 1934, this subcommittee was set up in November 1936, by the 
Minister for the Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, to, “report on the 
practicability of the introduction of bacteriological warfare and to make 
recommendations as to the countermeasures which should be taken to deal with such an 
eventuality.”35 Similar steps were also taken on 10 April 1940 with the first meeting of 
the Maud Committee, which was tasked with the job of developing a research 
programme on isotope separation and fast fission.36  
Committees played a large part in the formation of NBC weapons policy 
decisions in the UK during the postwar period whereas in Nazi Germany there existed 
no analogous system of delegated authority to committee decision-making, as power 
rested primarily with Adolf Hitler. In fact, as Ian Kershaw explains, “Hitler chaired no 
formal committee after the first years of the regime.”37 As a result key decisions were 
made by autonomous organizations or directly by Hitler himself. According to John 
Cornwell, “In the absence of a rationalized, centralized executive, science and 
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technology in the Third Reich were at the whim of competing warlords and commercial 
and bureaucratic fiefdoms.”38 This invariably led to a lack of overall direction and 
cohesion amongst Germany’s military science and technology and weapons-
development communities. 
 Iraq provides us with another interesting study of how NBC weapons decisions 
were made. According to the final report of The Iraq Survey Group: 
The former Regime was Saddam, and he was the one person who made 
important decisions. It was his assessment of the utility of various policy 
options that was determinant. It was Saddam’s calculations of risk and 
timing that mattered.39 
There was no real notion of an organized set of committees or any sort of inter-agency 
process. Their decision-making was very nebulous with information getting stove-piped 
upwards.40 Iraq under Saddam had all the formal decision-making structures and staff of 
a modern state, president, national assembly, judiciary, civil service, but these organs 
did not help formulate or direct national strategic policy. Our ability to understand how 
decisions were made in Iraq is problematic when looking at it from one particular 
perspective. They simply did not have any formalized process in making NBC 
weapons-related decisions.41 
 At first glance, Iraq and bureaucratic politics would seem to be an unusual 
combination. As Marc Trachtenberg explains, “In order to resolve a problem, one often 
has to resort to indirect reasoning – to inferences drawn from what one has learned 
about the bigger picture.”42 It is from analyzing this bigger picture that a more thorough 
understanding of the situation can develop. Bureaucratic politics can help shape the 
types of questions raised and also establish some form of cogency when looking at the 
Iraq case. As Brad Roberts explains, “When you have a situation that does not seem to 
follow the archetypal blueprint of governmental decision-making, or there are things 
that happened that the rational actor model does not explain, then possibly the 
bureaucratic politics model might be able to provide improved insight.”43 Former 
UNSCOM Deputy Executive Chairman Robert Gallucci thinks that the strengths of 
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bureaucratic politics is its ability to help explain a particular phenomenon that does not 
have a perfectly adequate, rational explanation.44 Decision-making in Iraq during this 
particular time period was anything but rational. Consequently, the rational actor model 
is inadequate when trying to explain the nuances of NBC weapons decision-making 
within Iraq.   
Theories gain strength through empirical testing and the bureaucratic politics 
model is no different. According to David Welch, students of international politics have 
largely failed to build upon and test the theory at what he calls the “intra-governmental 
level of analysis.”45 While there have been attempts to test the model, the body of 
literature is not very big.46 Though as valuable as it may be, testing the bureaucratic 
politics model falls outside the boundaries of this research project.47 
Like many other theoretical tools, the bureaucratic politics model does not 
always provide an ideal explanation of the evidence presented. It is however, a useful 
tool in helping to better understand the nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
decision-making processes in Britain and Iraq, though not the only interpretative tool 
used throughout the dissertation. 
 
Historical Analysis 
Historical analysis helps provide context for theory. Historians, according to 
Jack Levy, “describe, explain, and interpret individual events or a series of events, 
whereas political scientists generalize about the relationships between variables and 
construct law-like statements about social behaviour.”48 As Dennis Kavanagh states: 
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We rely on historians to tell us about the causes, events and immediate 
effects of the French Revolution, of the 1832 Reform Act, of the 1914-18 
war and so on, but we also rely on them to give meaning to the past.49  
History exists not simply as a tool for proving or disproving theory, but as a way of 
being able to understand how past events can affect future problems. Too many research 
projects have become saturated with what Albert Hirschman has referred to as 
“compulsive and mindless theorizing.”50 While theory can help frame research 
questions and direct the thrust of the research, it is no substitute for empirical evidence. 
As Haber, Kennedy and Krasner explain, “truth resides ultimately in the facts, though 
theory laden they may be.”51  
History has long been criticized as being more of a tool for research as opposed 
to a structured theoretical framework. Richard Rosecrance believes one criticism that 
can be leveled is that “historical data do not comprise a fixed, integrated body of 
knowledge, that they are merely facts.”52 More recently, history has come under heavy 
criticism for having, “a largely descriptive purpose.”53 Historians tend to construct 
narrative-based explanations rather than theory-based explanations. Historians also 
study the past rather than focus on the present, “they seek to understand single unique 
events rather than generalize about classes of events and they tend to prefer complex 
multi-causal explanations as opposed to mono-causal explanations.”54 
Having hypotheses and conclusions that are generalizable is important but one 
must not forget that in constructing the narrative for an historical case study, 
generalizations are either quite incidental to their primary task of describing and 
explaining a series of events or episodes, implicitly rather than explicitly, or they are 
restricted to generalizations about a well-defined period of time.55 Generalizations 
create an appearance of authoritative knowledge on behalf of the theorist and as we 
have seen, the failure to predict some of the major events of the twentieth century have 
left theorists wondering if there is more they can do to accurately predict the outcome of 
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future events to the benefit of this type of theory.56 It is here where historical analysis 
can provide insight and as Edward Ingram states: 
The historian’s description is a form of analysis (it explains); likewise, 
narrative (which has nothing to do with chronology) is applied theory, an 
analytical test of a proposition: each presupposes the other and, without 
the other, neither can be carried out.57 
 
The ability to have generalizable conclusions is of paramount importance within 
the study of theory. John Gaddis argues that, “visions of any future have to proceed 
from the awareness of some kind of past, otherwise there can be no conceptual frame of 
reference.”58 Gaddis also states that, “Unlike history, (political science) theory seems to 
assume that simple mechanisms drive human events, and that if we can only discover 
what they are, we can use them to make predictions.”59 While it is crucial to have a 
theory in place to help direct the overall research project, the question of what can be 
learned from the lessons of the past to help understand why modern states want to 
acquire NBC weapons is the desired endgame. Alexander George believes that in order 
to accomplish this, one must convert what he calls “the lessons of history” into a 
comprehensive theory that encompasses the activity or situation in question.60 He goes 
on to state that this can be accomplished through intellectual cooperation between 
historians and political scientists in order to contribute to the development of policy-
related theory.61 
 
Strategic Thought 
In the 1950s, strategy emerged within the United States as a new field with 
intellectual qualities distinct to that of (diplomatic) history and political science.62 In his 
influential book The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling wrote, “Strategy analyzes and 
explains the maze of actions and reactions as more or less advantageous moves in a game 
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of interdependent conflict.”63 He goes on to state that strategic behaviour seeks to 
influence another actor’s choice by working on his expectations of how his behaviour is 
related to one’s own.64 The strategy of pure conflict, or game theory, defined as a game in 
which, though the element of conflict provides the dramatic interest, mutual dependence 
is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of collaboration or mutual 
accommodation, has provided significant insight and advice.65 Duncan Snidal believes 
that the real power of game theory, for both empirical and theoretical purposes, emerges 
when it is used to generate new findings and understandings rather than to reconstruct 
individual situations.66 Schelling states, “game theory is concerned with situations – 
games of strategy as opposed to games of skill or games of chance – in which the best 
course of action for each participant depends on what he expects the other participants to 
do.”67 
Strategy is influenced by one’s own strategic doctrine, which, according to Fritz 
Ermarth, consists of, “a set of operative beliefs, values, and assertions that in a 
significant way guides official behaviour with respect to strategic research and 
development, weapons choice, forces and operational plans.”68 Strategic theory, as 
Clausewitz explains, “must study the engagement in terms of its possible results and of 
the moral and psychological forces that largely determine its course.”69 The concept of 
strategic culture has undergone resurgence of late.70 According to Kerry Kartchner, “it 
has become essential to better understand the reasons; incentives; and rationales for 
acquiring, proliferating and employing weapons of mass destruction by diverse actors 
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under circumstances that differ significantly from those for which previous analytical 
constructs now seem inadequate or irrelevant.”71 
As an example, by the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union replaced 
Germany as the predominant security threat to the West. Though the USSR had been a 
full partner during the war, the Allies understood very little about how it operated and 
what its thoughts on strategic issues were.72 Fritz Ermarth writes: 
Traditional Russian strategic culture – that of Imperial Russia from its 
emergence as a state in the middle of the last millennium through most of 
the existence of the Soviet Union into the late 1980s – has been one of 
the most martial and militarized such cultures in history, rivaling, if not 
exceeding, those of Prussia, Imperial and Nazi Germany, and Imperial 
Japan in this respect.73  
 
Relations with the Soviet Union would undergo a restructuring in the late postwar 
period. In 1961 the USA and USSR concluded negotiations on an agreement designed 
to create a framework for future disarmament talks. The main provisions of The Joint 
Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations were, according to 
Charles Price:  
the elimination of all national military establishments, leaving only 
lightly armed militia for internal police purposes; the endowing of the 
UN with the proper authority to settle disputes peacefully and with a 
peace force able to deter any illegal use of force internationally; and the 
establishment of an International Disarmament Organization with the 
necessary capabilities, including the right of unrestricted access for on-
site inspection, to assure all nations that the agreement was adhered to.74  
 
More specifically, Article 3(b) called for the “elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, 
chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of 
the production of such weapons” while Article 3(c) referred to “the elimination of all 
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means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.”75 This would prove to be significant 
and as Marshall Shulman stated, “the relationship between the two countries was about 
to enter a new stage.”76 
Having an understanding of your adversaries’ decisions and expectations about 
their behaviours is paramount to gaining insight into decisions on nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons acquisition.77 Johnson, Kartchner and Larsen state: 
When a nation state or a group considers what its actions and policies are 
going to be regarding WMD, it faces a range of choices. It can renounce 
pursuing the acquisition of WMD, and submit to international standards 
and regimes of nonproliferation. Or, it can choose to pursue acquiring the 
technology to lay the basis for a future decision to develop nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons without actually proceeding to the 
manufacture of such weapons, but only to give it the option of doing so if 
circumstances change in the future.78  
The importance a plurality of states place on national defence and security cannot be 
overstated. How a state defines its national security concerns will likely have a 
discernable effect in regard to its views on non-conventional weapons technology.79 
 Closely related to this is the concept of deterrence or deterrence theory. Since the 
end of the Second World War the concept of deterrence has occupied a prominent place 
amongst strategic thinkers. Deterrence is a strategy by which governments threaten 
retaliation if attacked, such that aggressors are deterred if they do not wish to suffer 
great damage as a result of an aggressive action.80 According to Michael Quinlan, 
“deterrence works by displaying the prospect of costs in terms of values prized by the 
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deterree.”81 A general deterrence posture can be maintained through the threat of attack 
with nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, non-nuclear ordnance or 
overwhelming conventional military strength.  
The idea of deterrence is not new and it has been an important concept in criminal 
law for a long time.82 According to Bernard Brodie: 
The threat of war, open or implied has always been an instrument of 
diplomacy by which one state deterred another from doing something of 
a military or political nature, which the former did not wish the latter to 
do.83 
Within the larger concept of deterrence is immediate and general deterrence. Immediate 
deterrence refers to the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is 
seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in 
order to prevent it. Whereas general deterrence refers to adversaries who maintain 
armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near 
mounting an attack.84 The doctrine of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence characterized 
relations between the United States and the former Soviet Union from the early 1960s to 
the 1980s. Achen and Snidal claim that rational deterrence is very much an ideal-type 
explanation and that no sensible person pretends that it summarizes typical deterrence 
decision-making well, or that it exhausts what is to be said about one historical case.85 
Deterrence theory is an integral part of the realist concept of Realpolitik.86 I 
share the primary realist assumption that states are concerned principally with issues 
affecting their survival.87 More specifically, realists conclude that because conflict is an 
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effect of the anarchic structure of the international system, it is likely to continue in the 
future. According to Kenneth Waltz, “To achieve a favourable outcome from such a 
conflict a state has to rely on its own devices, the relative efficiency of which must be 
its constant concern.”88 John Mearsheimer believes that international relations, “is not a 
constant state of war, but it is a state of relentless security competition, with the 
possibility of war always in the background.”89 It is this conviction of the possibility, 
indeed, probability of war that drives states to develop the means of guaranteeing their 
own security by any means necessary, be it through nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons, conventional military strength, economic sanctions, political pressures, or any 
combination of the above. 
Since the end of the Cold War much of the West’s nuclear deterrent has been 
rendered obsolete. The massive stockpiles of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons 
were designed to deter the former Soviet Union and its allies. Questions arise as to what 
should constitute an effective modern deterrent against new and emergent threats. Are 
nuclear weapons still an effective, viable strategic deterrent? Can nuclear weapons, or 
possibly even CBW, deter rogue states and sub-state terrorist organizations? Although 
deterrence theory is valuable in helping explain particular variables, it unfortunately 
says very little about such matters as how and when states decide that their vital interests 
are at stake, when deterrence needs to be invoked and when a conflict can be avoided.90 
This raises the question of whether the concept of deterrence is outmoded and no longer 
of any real, tangible value. As Henry Kissinger explains, “Perhaps the basic problem of 
strategy in the nuclear age is how to establish a relationship between a policy of 
deterrence and a strategy for fighting a war in case deterrence fails.”91 Nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons have, and continue to play, a role in certain states’ 
perceptions of deterrence, defence and national security. 
 
Summary 
Historical case studies are valuable tools for identifying patterns of behaviour 
and establishing a causal chain of events that affect the international system. Proponents 
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of case study methodology argue that theoretical development through historical 
generalization provides a remedy to the ahistorical and overly abstract theory of rational 
deterrence. History yields rich insights into nuance and context that escape the simpler 
rational actor models and case studies are therefore essential if the understanding of 
deterrence is to be grounded in experience and not just in abstract analysis.92 According 
to J. Garry Clifford, “historians do not need models that predict perfectly…. they do not 
seek to build better theories or to propose more effective management techniques.”93 If 
one of the primary functions of historical research is to explain the present by increasing 
our understanding of the past, then a study focusing mainly on current society will not 
be sufficient.94  
Although the study of decision-making can yield important generalizations that 
not only explain a number of cases but also form the basis for further propositions, it 
still involves examination of details and analysis of idiosyncrasies.95 Having a malleable 
theoretical framework is important to an interdisciplinary project like this one. 
Examining NBC weapons-related decision-making processes in postwar Britain and 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq requires a multi-faceted theoretical approach. No single theory 
would provide a sufficient level of analysis, therefore aspects of different theoretical 
constructs – namely historical study and strategic theory – need to be incorporated into 
the overall theoretical approach along with the bureaucratic politics model of 
governmental decision-making. 
Analyses of case studies of this type are inherently valuable in attempting to 
forecast into the future. Michael Howard states that: 
Today most of us would argue that only a knowledge of the past enables 
us to fully understand the present, and that a failure to read the past 
correctly warps our capacity to act intelligently in the contemporary 
world.96 
 
By using these two case studies, the belief is that the analysis of historical events will 
provide a roadmap for future NBC security and proliferation concerns. Paul Gordon 
Lauren believes that historians and theorists are in a position to provide unique 
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contributions to policy-makers seeking to practice diplomacy.97 In other words, much 
can be learned from an analysis of this type, using an appropriate methodology and a 
well-defined theoretical approach.  
                                                
97 Paul Gordon Lauren, “Diplomacy: History, Theory, and Policy,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in 
History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren. (New York: Free Press, 1979), 11. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODS 
It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those 
who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which 
(human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, 
be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of 
an immediate public, but was done to last for ever.1 
- Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 
 
In order to address the specific research questions and hypotheses that I am 
proposing, case studies are an appropriate methodological tool.2 As Stephen Van Evera 
explains: 
Specifically, case studies allow the test of predictions about the private 
speech and writings of policy actors. Often these predictions are singular 
to the theory that makes them; no other theory predicts the same thoughts 
or statements. The confirmation of such predictions strongly corroborates 
the test theory. Case studies are the best format for capturing such 
evidence. Hence case studies can supply quite decisive evidence for or 
against political theories.3  
 
Additionally, Bent Flyvbjerg believes that: 
For researchers, the closeness of the case study to real-life situations and 
its multiple wealth of details are important in two respects. First, it is 
important for the development of a nuanced view of reality, including the 
view that human behavior cannot be meaningfully understood as simply 
the rule-governed acts found at the lowest levels of the learning process 
and in much theory. Second, cases are important for researchers’ own 
learning processes in developing the skills needed to do good research. If 
researchers wish to develop their own skills to a high level, then 
concrete, context-dependent experience is just as central for them as to 
professionals learning any other specific skills.4 
 
One of the determining factors in deciding to employ a case study methodology 
involves the type of research questions asked. The central research question that will be 
                                                
1 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1954), Book One, 
Introduction, 48. 
2 A case can be defined as a phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on any 
pertinent variable. Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Handbook of 
Political Science, Volume 7, ed. F. J. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby. (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 
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Press, 1997), 54. 
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the focus of this dissertation is, why do states decide to acquire NBC weapons, and how 
have decisions to develop nuclear weapons and decisions to develop chemical and 
biological weapons, influenced each other? According to Robert Yin, “how and why 
questions are more explanatory and likely lead to the use of case studies, histories and 
experiments as the preferred research strategies.”5 It would seem that the how question 
provides a good opportunity in which to employ a case study methodology. 
Case studies offer three formats or methods for testing theories: controlled 
comparison, congruence procedures and process tracing.6 It is process tracing that is 
best suited to this research project. Process tracing is an approach in which the 
researcher examines the decision-making process by which case conditions are 
translated into case outcomes.7 The process tracing method attempts to identify the 
intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism, between an 
independent variable – or variables and the outcome of the dependent variable.8 In 
looking at how NBC weapons decisions were made in both the UK and Iraq and how 
that process evolved, process tracing would seem to be a particularly fitting approach. 
This is the case as “such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over 
time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence.”9 Van Evera states that, “a thorough 
process trace can provide a strong test of theory, which is preferred as it transmits more 
information than other tests.”10 According to Oisín Tansey, “process tracing provides a 
crucial method for the analysis of complex political phenomena”11 and this would 
include the decisions certain states make in opting to develop nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons programmes. 
There are some perceived weaknesses in using case studies as a methodological 
tool. Yin notes the traditional prejudice against the case study strategy and the disdain 
for the case study strategy held by many researchers.12 Randy Stoecker also notes the 
disrepute of case studies among sociologists, who see the case study as “barely better 
                                                
5 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: Sage, 1984), 18. 
6 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 56. 
7 Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision 
Making,” in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, ed. Robert Coulam and Richard 
Smith. (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1985), 35. 
8 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 206. 
9 Yin, Case Study Research, 18.  
10 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 65. 
11 Oisín Tansey, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling,” PS: 
Political Science and Politics, Volume 40, Number 4 (October 2007): 771. 
12 Yin, Case Study Research, 21-22. 
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than journalism.”13 Also, researchers will likely not know what their actual cases are 
until the data collection as well as the writing up of the results has been completed.14 
However the main criticisms of the case study method deal with the issue of 
generalization; so one must ask if the data collected can be generalized in any way? 
While there is no universal answer to this question, the careful selection of relevant 
cases, designed to provide the most accurate and reliable data set possible can help 
establish boundaries around the case. 
 
Single v. Multiple Cases 
During the initial design phase of a case study, the researcher must determine 
whether to use either single or multiple cases. While single case studies may have some 
advantages, they tend to provide a poor platform for identifying a theory’s “antecedent 
conditions, because most cases provide a backdrop of fairly uniform case conditions.”15 
By using multiple cases, the belief is that the data collected will provide for a more 
robust examination and analysis of the primary research question.  
When using multiple cases, each case is treated as a single case. Each of the 
case’s conclusions can then be used as information contributing to the whole study, but 
each case remains a single case. Yin believes that multiple case designs tend to provide 
evidence that is more compelling, which leads to the overall study being more 
“robust.”16 Since different types of states are interested in NBC weapons technology, 
using two somewhat disparate cases to examine the problem would help to provide a 
more in-depth analysis of the primary research questions. 
One of the problems of using a multiple case design would be that depending on 
the number of cases, it could be logistically difficult to conduct research in or on each of 
these cases. Fortunately being based in the UK has made it possible to access a wealth 
of documentary information located in key university collections and public archives. 
Access to important UN and other documents that deal with the Iraq programmes, were 
found mainly online. Choosing the UK and Iraq as a multiple case study project did not 
prove to be, as King, Keohane and Verba state, “too expensive or arduous to investigate 
                                                
13 Randy Stoecker, “Evaluating and Rethinking the Case Study,” Sociological Review, Volume 39 
(February 1991): 88. 
14 Charles C. Ragin, “Introduction: Cases of What is a Case?” in What is a Case? Exploring the 
Foundations of Social Inquiry, ed. Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 6. 
15 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 53. 
16 Yin, Case Study Research, 48. 
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more than a few observations.”17 Had more or possibly different cases been chosen, 
certain logistical problems might have arisen, however, this did not prove to be the case. 
 
Selection Criteria 
 One of the challenges inherent to a doctoral research project is determining 
whether to study cases that are unique in some way, or cases considered to be more 
typical. Given the limited number of cases that can be studied, cases may be chosen to 
replicate previous cases or extend emergent theory, or they may be chosen to fill 
theoretical categories and provide examples of polar types.18 According to Liphardt, 
“cases may be selected for analysis because of an interest in the case per se or because 
of an interest in theory building.”19 Out of the six different types of case studies that he 
describes, the one that is most relevant to this is what he terms a hypothesis-generating 
case study.20 He describes it in the following manner: 
Hypothesis-generating case studies start out with a more or less vague 
notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt to formulate definite 
hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases. 
Their objective is to develop theoretical generalizations in areas where 
no theory exists yet. Such case studies are of great theoretical value.21 
 
These types of case studies are intended to generate new hypothesis as opposed to 
testing established propositions, which means that they have the greatest value in terms 
of their contribution to theory. 
 In terms of selection criteria, some believe that investigators should select cases 
that best serve the purpose of their inquiry.22 Unfortunately, practitioners of case studies 
have yet to produce a comprehensive catalogue of possible case study research designs, 
or an inclusive list of case selection methods.23 As a result, the decision of which cases 
to examine tends to be highly individualistic and typically do not follow any stringent 
set of guidelines. The criterion for case study selection for this project did not adhere to 
                                                
17 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 217. 
18 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” Academy of Management 
Review, Volume 14, Number 4 (1989): 537. 
19 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political Science 
Review, Volume 65, Number 3 (September 1971): 691. 
20 The six types of case studies mentioned are: atheoretical, interpretative case studies, hypothesis-
generating case studies, theory-confirming case studies, theory-infirming case studies and deviant case 
studies. See Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.” 
21 Ibid., 692. 
22 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 78. 
23 Yin, Case Study Research, 27. 
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a strict set of guidelines or rules. Since the sample size was less than ten, random 
sampling would not have yielded suitable results, nor would it have helped lend strength 
to the overall analysis.24 
 It can be said that when the objective is to achieve the greatest possible amount of 
information on a given problem or phenomenon, “a representative case or a random 
sample may not be the most appropriate strategy as the typical or average case is often 
not the richest in information.”25 An extreme or critical case is one that deviates from 
established generalizations.26 These types of cases are intended to uncover relevant 
additional information or variables that had not been previously considered.27 As 
Flyvbjerg explains: 
Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they 
activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied. 
In addition, from both an understanding-oriented and an action-oriented 
perspective, it is often more important to clarify the deeper causes behind 
a given problem and its consequences than to describe the symptoms of 
the problem and how frequently they occur. 28 
Extreme cases can have great theoretical value especially when paired with a polar type. 
In order to provide the strongest possible data set, utilizing different cases such as Iraq 
and the United Kingdom is critical to the overall analysis of this research project. 
 
Justifications 
Deciding to use the UK and Iraq as the two case studies provides an interesting 
contrast between a western democracy and a totalitarian regime. This will prove to be 
useful in a number of ways. First, while states share some of the same reasons for 
wanting to develop NBC weapons, their intentions can be contrasting. Why do 
legitimate, powerful states want to develop and acquire these types of weapons? The 
UK did, but what can be learned from the British example that might be applicable 
today? Germany, Japan and Brazil are what can be called latent nuclear weapon states – 
meaning that they have the industrial capacity and the infrastructure to start up a nuclear 
weapons programme within a short period of time. Though all three are states parties to 
the NPT, what could persuade them to break the terms of the treaty and go down the 
                                                
24 Refer to Table 1 in the Introduction. 
25 Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings About Case Study Research,” 229. 
26 In this case the established generalizations refer to the more frequently utilized rational actor model of 
decision-making. See pages 17-22. 
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road towards acquiring a nuclear weapons capability? The same could be said for the 
CWC and the BWC. While it is far less likely that any of these democratic states would 
abandon these international treaties and regimes, the Soviet Union proceeded to break 
the terms of the BWC and paid little price for its actions.29 
Yet another reason is that the UK provides a good example of decision-making 
methods in a stable, postwar western democracy. The Second World War was the most 
destructive conflict in history. Loss of life exceeded 55 million and as Richard Overy 
explains, “destruction was wrought on a scale almost unimaginable fifty years later.”30 
Preventing another large-scale global conflict and protecting one’s population became a 
high priority in the postwar years. Interest in the military application of nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons technology was thought to provide Britain with a 
significant deterrent capability.  
Iraq on the other hand provides an excellent opportunity to study in-depth the 
reasons why an authoritarian regime might want to develop NBC weapons capabilities. 
Currently, states such as Iran and North Korea pose a considerable threat. North Korea, 
for example, announced the termination of the 1994 Agreed Framework31 between the 
US and itself, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in 
December 2002, and in January 2003 announced its intention to immediately withdraw 
from the NPT.32 The IAEA attempted to convince North Korea to reverse its course and, 
when this did not happen, reported further North Korean non-compliance over its NPT 
safeguards agreement to the United Nations Security Council on 12 February 2003. As 
of 2010, the Security Council has taken no action on this matter.33  
Iran has been accused of misrepresenting its nuclear energy ambitions. 
Maintaining that its programme is strictly for energy purposes, questions have arisen as 
to the validity of its claims.34 The international community saw this same thing before 
                                                
29 Michael Moodie, “The Soviet Union, Russia and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,” The 
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31 See, “INFCIRC/457, 2 November 1994.” International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 15 October 
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with the fledgling Iraqi programme in the 1980s and early 90s. It is my belief that by 
looking at the historical programmes of Saddam Hussein’s regime a wealth of 
information as to why certain states are interested in acquiring NBC weapons will be 
revealed. The same holds true for the UK case study as well, though it is less likely that 
western democracies will disregard their commitments to the relevant treaties and 
conventions and enter into new WMD research and development.  
The progression of non-conventional weapons development in most states 
typically follows the model of chemical first, then biological and then nuclear. The 
reasons for this are obvious – certain types of chemical weapons are the easiest to 
research, develop and weaponize. The processes required for the manufacture of 
mustard gas on a militarily significant scale are not that complex and well within the 
reach of many states.35 Some BW agents are more straightforward to grow and cultivate 
and the Iraqis had success in the production of Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium 
botulinum.36 Lastly, nuclear weapons are the most difficult and expensive of the three to 
develop. There are a number of states that have had some success with CBW, yet have 
not achieved a similar level of success with NW. Iraq is a prime example of this. The 7 
June 1981 bombing of the Tammuz-1 (Osirak) reactor by the Israeli Air Force 
prevented Iraq from pursuing the plutonium route of nuclear weapons design and forced 
them down the uranium enrichment route.37  
 There were a number of logistical considerations that helped influence the 
selection of Iraq and the UK as the two case studies. For the UK case, one of the most 
important reasons was the access to primary documents, potential interviewees and 
other relevant materials. There are many individuals located at universities, think tanks 
and government agencies in the UK that have tacit knowledge on some aspect of the 
British NBC weapons programme. Some of them, now retired, were actively involved 
in these programmes and knew many of the key individuals on a personal level. The 
National Archives, Kew, London (TNA) proved to be an immense repository of primary 
documents, as did other relevant collections located at universities across the UK. This 
helped make the decision to look at the UK a relatively straightforward one. 
 The case study on Iraq was chosen along similar lines. Many academics, 
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government officials, retired politicians, diplomats and former UN weapons inspectors 
have experience in dealing with the Iraqi programmes, a significant number of whom I 
have had access to. The majority of these individuals are situated in a few key areas, 
namely New York, NY and Washington, DC, with a few others located in European 
nations. Primary documentation detailing Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes can be 
found online, most of which has proven to be of great benefit to this research project. 
 
SOURCES 
The case study method can utilize multiple sources and techniques in the data 
collection process. The researcher determines in advance what evidence to gather and 
what analysis techniques to use with the data to answer the research questions. Tools to 
collect data can include surveys, interviews, documentation review, observation and 
even the collection of physical artifacts. The data gathered for this research project were 
of a strictly qualitative nature. 
 
Analysis of Official Documents and Other Primary Sources 
In order to test the hypotheses raised in this dissertation, primary sources 
including press releases, speeches, policy documents and official government 
documentation, produced by relevant experts and officials, have been utilized. There 
exists a wealth of information on the British NBC programmes at The National 
Archives. Of special note here are, Records created or inherited by the Air Ministry, the 
Royal Air Force, and related bodies (AIR), Records created or inherited by the Ministry 
of Aviation and successors, the Air Force Board, and related bodies (AVIA), Records of 
the Cabinet Office (CAB), Records created and inherited by the Foreign Office (FO), 
Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and predecessors (FCO), Records of 
the Ministry of Defence (DEFE), Records of the Atomic Weapons Establishment (ES), 
Records of the Prime Minister's Office (PREM), Records created and inherited by HM 
Treasury (T) and Records created or inherited by the War Office, Armed Forces, Judge 
Advocate General, and related bodies (WO). These files deal with issues concerning the 
decisions to begin, fund and implement the respective weapons programmes.38 The 
National Archives also has correspondence papers from the Prime Ministers Office 
(PMO) of each administration from 1916 until 1974. It is within this timeframe that 
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every major policy decision regarding the development of British NBC weapons 
programmes was undertaken. Having unlimited access to the Sussex Harvard 
Information Bank (SHIB) has proven to be an invaluable resource as it is the most 
comprehensive private collection of information relating to chemical and biological 
warfare issues in the United Kingdom.  
There are a number of key documents available that deal with Iraq’s proscribed 
weapons programmes. Numerous UNSCOM, United Nations Monitoring Verification 
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and IAEA documents exist from this period 
and many are available in the public domain.39 Another important resource is the Iraq 
Survey Group (ISG) report. The ISG was a fact-finding mission sent by the 
multinational force in Iraq after the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The 
ISG was tasked with the responsibility of finding Iraq’s suspected NBC weapons 
programmes. The final report is a comprehensive three-volume work, which details the 
history and development of Iraq’s NBC weapons programmes. Deficiencies in primary 
sources have been redressed by undertaking extensive interviews with relevant policy 
analysts, government officials, academics and scientific personnel. 
One of the major challenges of working with archival material is the issue of 
selective deposit.40 There may be substantial pieces of information that may or may not 
have been recorded and released for public consumption. This is of particular concern 
regarding personal correspondence between key officials in the decision-making 
process. Although data from primary sources can often provide a somewhat one-sided 
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12 of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1994/1151, 10 October 1994; Second Report of the Executive Chairman 
of UNSCOM, United Nations Security Council Report, S/23268, 4 December 1991; Tenth report of the 
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to 
paragraph 9 (b)(i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and paragraph 3 of resolution 699 (1991) on 
the activities of the Special Commission, S/1995/1038, 7 December 1995; Fourth report of the Executive 
Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)(i) 
of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), on the activities of the Special Commission, S/24844, 17 
December 1992. 
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perspective on a phenomenon, when examining the justification for a particular decision 
taken by a small number of key people, the rationales contained in primary sources, 
untainted by the interpretation of other scholars, are still vital as they provide this 
information in the most unrefined form that is available. Indeed, without these sources 
of data, one would be relegated solely to a mere rehashing of the thoughts of other 
authors. 
 
Analysis of Secondary Literature Sources 
At present, most of the literature deals with either nuclear weapons decisions or 
CBW decisions. Many experts and academics have chosen to focus their own research 
interests on one or the other, typically not both. As a result there is a shortage of 
relevant and current literature dealing with this particular issue. Due to the lack of 
relevant literature dealing with this topic, I began the process of undertaking a 
comprehensive literature review in October 2006. Due primarily to the originality of 
this research project, this literature review was a long, though informative process. 
Sources authored by Margaret Gowing, Lorna Arnold, John Simpson and Brian Balmer, 
relating to the development of the British NBC weapons programmes, has proven to be 
a valuable source of empirical information.41  Some of the key figures in the analysis of 
the Iraqi weapons programmes, such as Charles Duelfer, Tim Trevan, Scott Ritter and 
Rod Barton, have written extensively on the subject as well.42 
Despite the disadvantages of utilizing this form of data in certain kinds of 
research initiatives, the analysis and arguments of several leading scholars in the fields 
of NBC weapons policy must still form an important aspect of the research project. 
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Employing secondary literature sources in my analysis serves to both guide my research 
away from areas that have already been covered in great depth and also to provide 
alternative explanations against which to judge my hypotheses and conclusions. 
Moreover, ideas about approaches to studying this topic, gleaned from examining 
secondary sources, have assisted in shaping the direction of research. Finally, good 
secondary sources are themselves often based on data from multiple primary sources 
that could be difficult to obtain, such as personally conducted interviews with key 
decision-makers. This, combined with the unique nature of this project, ensures that 
secondary sources are often the only readily available sources for a significant amount 
of primary information concerning the connections between NBC weapons 
development and governmental policy decisions. 
 
Interviews 
 Case studies typically combine data collection methods such as archives, 
interviews, questionnaires, and observations.43 Yin believes that interviews are one of 
the most important sources of case study information.44 The interview process has 
proven to be a eminently valuable tool of data collection for both case studies. 
Interviews are defined here as: 
A specialized pattern of verbal interaction – initiated for a specific 
purpose and focused on some specific content area, with consequent 
elimination of extraneous material. Moreover, the interview is a pattern 
of interaction in which the role relationship of interviewer and 
respondent is highly specialized, its specific characteristics depending 
somewhat on the purpose and character of the interview.45 
 
I interviewed over thirty academics, policy analysts, scientists, government officials and 
persons of note46 each providing me with a great deal of insight and analysis on either 
Iraq or the United Kingdom’s NBC weapons programmes. 
A comprehensive list of potential interview participants was compiled in the 
months leading up to the start of the fieldwork process. This list was comprised of 
approximately 80 individuals located at over 30 different institutions and organizations 
                                                
43 Eisenhardt, “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” 534. 
44 Yin, Case Study Research, 82. 
45 Robert L. Kahn and Charles F. Cannell, The Dynamics of Interviewing: Theory, Technique, and Cases 
(New York: Wiley, 1957), 16. 
46 A person of note is someone who falls outside of the four aforementioned professional areas, but has a 
significant amount of insight and knowledge on the relevant topic(s). One such person was Lorna Arnold 
of Botley, Oxford. Mrs. Arnold was involved in the British nuclear weapons programme as one of two 
official historians – the other being the late Margaret Gowing. 
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in Europe, North American and Australia. Creating a comprehensive list or guide can be 
an important tool as it makes the researcher aware that quite often, valuable respondents 
become identified only during the course of study, whereas some respondents initially 
selected might be of little value.47 Individuals were both added and removed from the 
list as the interview process evolved, leaving a focused and concise list of potential 
interview participants.48 
The interview format was semi-structured, with candidates being selected based 
primarily on their expertise in the related field. Since I am dealing with different 
weapons technologies and different case study states, it has been of great benefit to have 
potential interviewees chosen in this way as opposed to a more stringent pre-selection 
process as this has allowed candidates identified in the course of formal interviewing to 
be incorporated into the process as well.49 Because of the diversity in expertise of 
interview candidates and the nature of this research project, a non-standardized 
approach was taken, thereby allowing greater freedom in the interview question/answer 
process. The main benefit of this type of interviewing process is that: 
The interview content can be varied from one respondent to another on 
the basis of his conceptual grasp of the overall subject matter of the 
study, each respondent giving the information and the idea that he is best 
suited to provide. Since, in these circumstances, use of a predetermined, 
comprehensive set of questions can be only a hindrance, the non-
standardized interview does not employ a schedule.50 
 
The preferred method of data collection during the interview process has been to 
digitally record the interviews. I believe that it is the most accurate method of data 
collection and it is far less likely that information will be taken out of context or 
misinterpreted due to poor note-taking. Yin believes that recording interviews provides 
a more accurate rendition of any interview than any other method.51 In conducting 
previous research for my Master of Strategic Studies dissertation, titled, Terrorism and 
Mass-Casualty Weapons: The Choice of a New Generation? I interviewed a number of 
policy analysts, scientists, government officials and military personnel in both Europe 
and North America. It was my experience that the majority of interviewees were 
comfortable with having their interview digitally recorded. In fact, voice recorders are 
                                                
47 Stephen A. Richardson, Barbara Snell Dohrenwend and David Klein, Interviewing: Its Forms and 
Functions (New York: Basic, 1965), 65. 
48 For the complete list of Interview Participants see Appendix 3. 
49 Ibid., 54. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Yin, Case Study Research, 85. 
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widely used in journalism and in other forms of research that it can be quite uncommon 
to have the request to record refused.52 This has proven to be the case once again, with 
the lone exception of an individual employed by a national government, legally bound 
to not be audio recorded. However, it was anticipated that some candidates would not be 
comfortable with the recording process and therefore an attempt to take comprehensive 
handwritten notes was made during the interview as per their request. 
In regard to the issue of confidentiality, all candidates had the option presented 
to them to remain completely anonymous. A standardized release form was provided, 
which informed them of their rights as well as the guarantee of anonymity.53 While the 
release forms were appreciated they were deemed superfluous by all of the participants, 
with a single individual wishing not to be quoted directly. 
Interviews typically lasted between 45 and 120 minutes. The majority of 
interviews were conducted in person with three needing to be done via the telephone as 
the distances involved were outside the logistical scope of the project. Initial response to 
interview requests varied between Europe and North America and between 
organizational areas. Some of the individuals contacted were either unavailable, unsure 
as to how they could contribute so respectfully declined or were simply unreachable. 
Since a large number of individuals were identified, it was unavoidable that there would 
be scheduling conflicts and refusals to participate. Having said that, there were a 
significant number of high-priority or elite interviews54 that were identified as being of 
high-value to the project and all of these individuals were interviewed successfully.  
 
Elite Interviews 
 An elite interview is any interviewee who in terms of the current purposes of the 
interviewer is given special, non-standardized treatment.55 Lewis Dexter defines non-
standardized treatment as: 
Stressing the interviewee’s definition of the situation; Encouraging the 
interviewee to structure the account of the situation and; Letting the 
interviewee introduce to a considerable extent – and extent which will of 
course vary from project to project and interviewer to interviewer – his 
                                                
52 Jack D. Douglas, Creative Interviewing (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985), 83. 
53 See Appendix 4 for a reproduction of the interview release form. 
54 The number of elite interviews was twelve. 
55 Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
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notions of what he regards as relevant, instead of relying upon the 
investigator’s notions of relevance.56  
Some of the individuals interviewed have a long and extensive history in dealing with 
aspects of one of the two case studies. These individuals were singled out as high-
priority targets and every effort was made to ensure their participation in the interview 
process.  
 According to Tansey, “One of the strongest advantages of elite interviews is that 
they enable researchers to interview first-hand participants of the processes under 
investigation, allowing for researchers to obtain accounts from direct witnesses to the 
events in question.”57 He also states: 
The usage that is arguably most relevant to process tracing entails the 
conduct of elite interviews in order to establish the decisions and actions 
that lay behind an event or series of events. Through direct and focused 
questioning, researchers can reconstruct political episodes on the basis of 
the testimony of respondents, stitching together various accounts to form 
a broader picture of a complex phenomenon, and gather detailed 
information about the process in question. Elite interviews can shed light 
on the hidden elements of political action that are not clear from analysis 
of political outcomes, or of other primary sources. By interviewing key 
participants in the political process, analysts can gain data about the 
political debates and deliberations that preceded decision-making and 
action taking, and supplement official accounts with first-hand 
testimony.58 
This is especially relevant for the study of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes of the 
1980s and 90s.  
Fortunately I was able to meet with a number of scientists and government 
officials who had been actively involved in UN activities in Iraq after the 1990 invasion 
of Kuwait and the 1991 Gulf War. These individuals witnessed first-hand the 
concealment and covering-up of the proscribed weapons programmes and were 
involved in the attempts to counter the deception campaign. Since the UK case study is 
firmly rooted in the immediate post Second World War period, there are few people left 
who would have been involved in the programmes in any capacity in, with the 
exception of Gradon Carter of Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) 
Porton Down, Ron Manley formerly of Chemical Defence Establishment (CDE)59 
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57 Tansey, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing,” 767. 
58 Ibid., 766-767. 
59 It should be noted that Dr. Manley joined CDE in 1960, after the offensive programme had been 
abandoned. Interview with Ron Manley, 29 August 2009. 
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Nancekuke and Lorna Arnold. These individuals provided me with a first-hand account 
that would have been difficult to acquire otherwise.  
Other advantages of elite interviews relate to the particular weaknesses of 
archival documents, as interviews can compensate for both the shortfall and limitations 
of documentary evidence. The data from elite interviews are rarely considered in 
isolation, and the goal of collecting such data is often to confirm information that has 
already been collected from other sources. Tansey argues that, “interviewing, and 
especially elite interviewing, is highly relevant for process-tracing approaches to case 
study research as process tracing frequently involves the analysis of political 
developments at the highest level of government, and elite actors will thus often be 
critical sources of information about the political processes of interest.”60 
 
Fieldwork 
The course of action decided upon in regard to fieldwork, was to focus on one 
case study at a time – to gather all the data necessary for the analysis then move on to 
the next case. Fieldwork for the Iraq study took place at the end of March 2008, lasting 
15 days. During this trip I met with a number of individuals familiar with Iraq’s 
proscribed weapons programmes. Many of these individuals were key players in the 
United Nations’ effort to verify disarmament and to monitor Iraqi compliance. Along 
with an exhaustive study of the Iraq Survey Group report on Iraq’s proscribed weapons 
programmes as well as the UNMOVIC Compendium – two key documents necessary 
for any analysis of Iraq’s NBC weapons programmes – the interviews provided valuable 
insight into the decision-making process in the former regime. What has emerged from 
the work has been an insightful look into the decision-making processes of a complex 
and ultra-violent authoritarian regime.  
The fieldwork for the British case study occurred entirely within the United 
Kingdom. A number of short trips were made to various archives, universities, 
government ministries and research establishments throughout the late summer and 
autumn of 2008. One month was spent researching at TNA. As TNA is located a 
moderate distance away, travel to and from Kew was never an issue, which made the 
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data collection process run smoothly. A number of interviews were conducted in 
addition to the primary documentary evidence gathered. These interviews helped fill in 
some of the gaps in knowledge that existed and also provided context to the primary 
data.  
I had anticipated having some difficulty in establishing contact with some of the 
more senior people who dealt with Iraq via the United Nations or IAEA in Vienna. 
Fortunately, this proved to not be the case. I have interviewed a number of high-level 
diplomats, scientists, analysts and government officials, all intimately familiar with  
Iraq. The response was positive. This was also the case for the British study, as it was 
more of a challenge to establish contact with individuals familiar with the British 
nuclear weapons programme as opposed to the CBW programmes. The Mountbatten 
Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton proved to be an 
invaluable resource in helping identify contacts in the nuclear field.  
 
Summary 
 Methodology is an important aspect of any doctoral research project and 
choosing one that is appropriate is critical to the overall success of the research project. 
Evidence has been provided for the justification of employing a case study methodology 
as well as using Iraq and the United Kingdom as the two historical cases. The argument 
for using polar type case studies is that they provide the strongest and most relevant data 
possible. Being unable to generalize from one case to another is a common criticism of 
case study research. Yin believes that the solution to this is, “instead of trying to 
generalize findings to other cases, the researcher should be aiming to generalize their 
findings to theory, similar to how a scientist would generalize from experimental 
findings to theory.”61 This is an important point, as the intention is to use the two cases 
to try and determine how and why states make decisions to develop NBC weapons. 
Synthesizing the lessons learned from the UK and Iraq case studies will help to form a 
framework for understanding connections between NW and CBW. Since my research 
has often gleaned useful and relevant data that lies beyond the boundaries of the chosen 
case studies, this will also be elaborated upon in the concluding chapter on 
interconnections.  
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A final note about methodology – while it provides a good base for “conducting 
operations,” a suitable theoretical approach must be in place to help drive the research 
forward. Without theory as a guide, research questions can end up being too broadly 
based and ill defined, with the potential to create an unfocused end product. The 
methods eventually chosen for this research project proved satisfactory. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
It will be a cardinal principle of policy to be prepared to use immediately weapons of 
mass destruction. The knowledge of this preparedness is the best deterrent to war in 
peace-time.1 
- UK Chiefs of Staff, 23 April 1947 
 
During the first half of the twentieth century the British Empire spread across 
roughly one-quarter of the earth’s surface and encompassed over 400 million people, 
with interests on every continent. It was accepted that some of its colonial territories 
would be resistant to British Imperial rule and would desire more autonomy and greater 
independence from London. In October 1899, hostilities erupted between the British 
and the two-predominately Afrikaans republics of Orange Free State and the South 
African Republic (Transvaal) and lasted for three years.2 While the Second South 
African War was far from the most influential event of the twentieth century, it 
highlighted the existence of a significant strategic and tactical learning curve that 
influenced how future military conflicts would be conducted. 
 A few months prior to the outbreak of hostilities in South Africa, the meetings 
for the First Peace Conference of The Hague took place from 18 May to 29 July. This 
conference was convened on the initiative of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia for the purpose 
of, “seeking the most effective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real 
and lasting peace, and, above all, of limiting the progressive development of existing 
armaments."3 In total twenty-six states were represented, including the USA, UK, 
Russia, Germany, Japan and France. The subsequent convention, which entered into 
force on 4 September 1900, consisted of four main sections along with three 
declarations. Of special note was Declaration II, titled, “On the Use of Projectiles the 
Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases,” which read: 
The undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of the Powers represented at the 
International Peace Conference at The Hague, duly authorized to that 
                                                
1 Defence Research Policy Committee, Final Version of a Paper on Future of Defence Research Policy, 
30 July 1947. TNA DEFE 10/19. 
2 The war officially ended on 31 May 1902 with the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging. See Thomas 
Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Abacus, 1991). 
3 “International Humanitarian Law – Treaties & Documents – Final Act Of the International Peace 
Conference, The Hague, 29 July 1899.” (Russian note of 30 December 1898/11 January 1899). 
International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed 30 October 2009, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/145?OpenDocument. 
  
50 
effect by their Governments, inspired by the sentiments which found 
expression in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 29 November (11 
December) 1868, Declare as follows: The Contracting Powers agree to 
abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the 
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The present Declaration is 
only binding on the Contracting Powers in the case of a war between two 
or more of them. It shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a 
war between the Contracting Powers, one of the belligerents shall be 
joined by a non-Contracting Power. The present Declaration shall be 
ratified as soon as possible. The ratifications shall be deposited at The 
Hague. A 'procès-verbal' shall be drawn up on the receipt of each 
ratification, a copy of which, duly certified, shall be sent through the 
diplomatic channel to all the Contracting Powers. The non-Signatory 
Powers can adhere to the present Declaration. For this purpose they must 
make their adhesion known to the Contracting Powers by means of a 
written notification addressed to the Netherlands Government, and by it 
communicated to all the other Contracting Powers. In the event of one of 
the High Contracting Parties denouncing the present Declaration, such 
denunciation shall not take effect until a year after the notification made 
in writing to the Government of the Netherlands, and forthwith 
communicated by it to all the other Contracting Powers. This 
denunciation shall only affect the notifying Power. In faith of which the 
Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Declaration, and affixed their 
seals thereto. Done at The Hague, 29 July 1899, in a single copy, which 
shall be kept in the archives of the Netherlands Government, and copies 
of which, duly certified, shall be sent by the diplomatic channel to the 
Contracting Powers.4 
 
The Russian proposal stemmed from their realization that “in order to sufficiently rearm 
their military to the level of their adversaries would effectively bankrupt the treasury as 
opposed to the pure humanitarian construct of multilateral disarmament.”5 According to 
Catherine Jefferson, “While the conference achieved nothing in terms of disarmament in 
the literal sense, delegates did endeavour to revise the customary laws of war (re-
visiting the draft code prepared at the Brussels Convention of 1874) and to consider the 
question of unnecessary suffering with respect of newly invented weapons.”6 The First 
Hague Conference attempted to establish a norm against causing unnecessary suffering 
in war. Fifteen years later, large-scale chemical warfare would be unleashed on 
battlefields across Europe.  
                                                
4 “International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents - Declaration (IV, 2) concerning 
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Twelve years after the end of the conflict in South Africa, the United Kingdom 
would find itself embroiled in a terribly destructive war alongside its dominions, 
colonies, France, Russia, Serbia, Belgium, Italy, Romania and from 1917 the United 
States; against the Central Powers of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
Empires along with newly-independent7 Bulgaria. From August 1914 millions of men 
fought and died in the fields of Europe, Asia Minor and the Middle East. By November 
1918, roughly ten million soldiers had died and over twice as many had received 
varying levels of injury from a multitude of both old and new weaponry. Aircraft, 
armoured tanks, submachine guns, flamethrowers and chemical weapons all saw their 
introduction into the arsenals of the combatants during this period.8  
Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, according to Stephen Van Evera, 
“Militaries glorified the offensive and adopted offensive military doctrines, while 
civilian elites and publics assumed that the offense had the advantage in warfare, and 
that offensive solutions to security problems were the most effective.”9 All major 
European armies prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 subscribed to this “cult of the 
offensive.”10 By 1917, both sides were quick to try new ideas in hopes of breaking the 
stalemate that developed. Gone was the belief in offensive infantry attacks and the 
efficacy of a cavalry charge. This replaced with a combined arms approach to offensive 
tactics as well as the appalling concept of attritional warfare.11 
The lessons of this war were such that it impressed upon the military and 
political leadership of the United Kingdom the need for rapid technological change. 
New strategies and tactics were formed with the advent of these new weapons 
technologies. Defence would play a bigger role than it ever had previously. Above all, 
people started to realize that in order to be ultimately successful in battle, you needed to 
                                                
7 Bulgaria proclaimed itself a fully independent state on 5 October 1908. This is perhaps a bit confusing 
as the 5 October declaration was according to the Gregorian calendar, even though Bulgaria did not 
formally adopt the Gregorian calendar until 1915.The date under the Julian calendar was 22 September. 
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& Sword Military Classics, 2005), 35-36. 
9 Steven Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International 
Security, Volume 9, Number 1 (Summer 1984): 58. 
10 Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern 
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11 See Gordon Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War (London: Cassell, 
2008) and Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power: The British Army – Weapons and 
Theories of War, 1904-1945 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2004). 
  
52 
provide your troops with every available means to assist them in achieving their overall 
objectives. Unfortunately this meant that interest in non-conventional weapons would in 
due course become paramount to Britain’s understandings of offence, defence and the 
concept of deterrence. 
  
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME 
British opinions on chemical warfare were influenced by events occurring 
during the First World War. This conflict saw the first large-scale uses of toxic 
chemicals as weapons, which began in early 1915. On 10 March, approximately 6000 
chlorine gas cylinders were put in position in front of the trenches of Germany’s XV 
Corps.12 Five weeks later, after countless delays due to specific meteorological 
concerns, at 17:00 hours on 22 April, elements of Pioneer Regiments 35 and 36 of XV 
Corps tasked with the job of releasing the deadly gas did so to great effect. As the 
green-yellow cloud of chlorine drifted towards the Allied lines, many believed that it 
was merely a new type of gunpowder that the Germans were experimenting with.13 This 
was not the case. The hardest hit were the 45th Algerian (Colonial) and 87th French 
Territorial Divisions, which was to the left of the Canadian 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the 
1st Canadian Division. Amidst the confusion, casualties and retreating soldiers, the 
Germans managed to force a mile-long gap in the front lines.14 This posed immediate 
problems for the 50 000 British and Canadian troops of the British Second Army that 
were situated directly to the right of the gap. If the line could not be reformed and held 
the Germans would have had an open road to Calais, as nothing lay between them and 
Calais but the Canadians. Fortunately elements of the 1st Canadian Division – namely 7, 
10, 14 and 16 Battalions were called up to stem the German advance and hold the line 
vacated by the rapidly retreating French.  
In total, 168 tons of chlorine gas from 5730 canisters was released on 22 April.15 
Allied losses were substantial. The Canadians suffered 637 gas-related casualties while 
the French put their losses at about 600. Unfortunately for the men at the front, there 
would be no respite from the horrors of gas attacks. At 04:00 hours on 24 April another 
                                                
12 Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 19. 
13 Ibid. 
14 J. E. Edmonds and G. C. Wynne, Official History of the Great War, Military Operations: France and 
Belgium, 1915, Volume 1 (London: Macmillan, 1927), 180. 
15 Augustin M. Prentiss, Chemicals in War: A Treatise on Chemical Warfare (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1937), 663.  
  
53 
gas attack was launched after a whirlwind German bombardment of the Allied front 
lines. This time 8 and 15 Canadian Battalions bore the brunt of the chlorine attack. 
Fighting over the next few days was fierce and when the beleaguered 1st Division was 
finally relieved it had lost over half of its fighting strength with 6036 casualties, though 
not all from the effects of CW.16 
 While the bulk of the British 2nd Army was spared the horror of gas warfare, the 
lessons of Gravenstafel Ridge and St. Julien were not lost on their commanders. On 3 
May, Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener authorized the preparation of measures 
to retaliate against the German use of poison gas.17 That July saw the formation of 
Special Companies Nos. 186 and 187 of the British Special Brigade, under Major 
Charles H. Foulkes of the Royal Engineers, totalling 670 men.18 A month later, Special 
Companies Nos. 188 and 189 were formed. The Special Companies were comprised of 
volunteer chemists and chemistry students and they were responsible for preparing the 
British chemical retaliation against German troops. Organization of the companies 
continued throughout the summer. On 4 September, eighteen Sections (No. 186) of men 
were assigned to the First Army, I Corps, and another sixteen Sections (No. 187) went 
to IV Corps, totalling thirty-four Sections.19 The Special Companies were eventually 
reorganized in 1916 into the Special Brigade, which consisted of four full-sized 
battalions (1, 2, 3, 4 Battalions) of four companies, each with twenty four sections, plus 
5 Mortar Battalion, which had four companies and sixteen sections.20 
On 24 September 1915, the British launched their first chemical weapons attack of 
the war. Approximately 5500 canisters containing 150 tons of chlorine were used 
against German troops during the Battle of Loos.21 There were a number of logistical 
and communications problems that prevented the attack from being a successful one. In 
fact, British gas casualties were high – 2639 and the Special Companies had lost 14% of 
their total strength, including twenty-two dead.22 
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According to L. F. Haber, “The British initiative came from the Admiralty where 
Churchill’s imagination was fired by hydrogen cyanide.”23 This interest would lead to 
the creation of what was referred to as Jellite. This consisted of an aqueous hydrogen 
cyanide solution thickened with chloroform and cellulose acetate dope.24 On 13 
September, the first batch of Jellite was produced and ten days later, 120 jars, each 
weighing fifteen kilograms was sent to Boulogne, France.25 This was never used and 
was ultimately returned to the production facility at Stratford. Throughout 1916 and into 
1917, both Britain and France employed another hydrogen cyanide solution in artillery 
shells. Called Vincennite after the French factory at Vincennes, this compound proved 
to be largely ineffective as an artillery shell, especially in light of the efficacy of 
phosgene as a chemical weapon.26 By the end of 1916, approximately 160 000 British 
artillery shells were filled with the solution though the shells were never fired.27 The 
French however, used Vincennite for the first time at the opening of the Battle of the 
Somme on 1 July 1916.28  
Phosgene, like chlorine, is a non-persistent lung irritant or choking agent that killed 
by destroying lung tissue in an affected person. First used by the Germans against the 
British at Nieltje in Flanders, phosgene was the deadliest of all gases used during the 
First World War as it accounted for roughly 80% of all gas-related fatalities.29  
The German first-use of mustard on 12 July 1917 near Ypres was of particular 
significance, as, according to Augustin Prentiss, it “marked the beginning of a new 
phase of gas warfare.”30 Mustard is a persistent blister agent or vesicant. It was the pre-
eminent chemical weapon used during the First World War, as it was responsible for 
causing the highest number of gas-related casualties though a relatively small 
percentage of men contaminated with mustard died.31 As Prentiss explains: 
With its far-reaching diffusion over the battlefields, its insidious action, 
and its manifold physiological effects, it is no wonder that mustard gas 
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became the “king of battle gases” and, pound for pound, produced nearly 
eight times the number of casualties produced by all the other battle 
gases combined.32 
Exposure to mustard gas would typically result in blisters, blindness and respiratory 
damage and in cases of substantial exposure, central nervous excitations, convulsions 
and death.33 However, it was not until August 1918 when the UK was finally able to 
manufacture, weaponize and deploy a made-in-Britain mustard, three months before the 
November Armistice ending the war. 
 
The Interwar Years 
The interwar period saw a number of changes in British CW policy. In early 1919, 
the British government had decided on major cutbacks in the production of chemical 
weapons.34 During this time, destruction and decontamination of British and French-
based CW dumps continued, ending in 1921. The first major British use of chemical 
weapons post-First World War occurred between 27 August and 4 September 1919.35 
British forces had conducted eight separate attacks using the “M” device during the 
Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War.36 This device generated toxic smoke by 
heating an arsenic derivative, Adamsite. In total, 361 bombs were dropped during the 
conflict.37 Later that year, on 16 October, in a reversal of policy, the British War 
Cabinet decided to retain its wartime gas organization stating that, “no other military 
Power had taken the initiative in chemical disarmament.”38 One year later, the League 
of Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on Military and Naval Technical 
Questions decided that, “it would be useless to seek to restrict the use of gases in War 
time by prohibiting or limiting their manufacture in peace time.”39 This declaration 
prompted the British government to increase funding for chemical warfare from £52 
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000 in 1920-21 and £135 130 in 1921-22.40 Hereafter the British chemical warfare effort 
would focus on the retention of its wartime organizational structure as well as its R&D 
efforts.  
The year 1925 would see the international agreement on the Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Signed on 17 June 1925 in Geneva, the Protocol 
reads: 
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of 
all analogous liquids materials or devices, has been justly condemned by 
the general opinion of the civilized world; and 
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to 
which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and 
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of 
International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of 
nations; 
Declare: 
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties 
to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend 
this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and 
agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this 
declaration. 
The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other 
States to accede to the present Protocol. Such accession will be notified 
to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all 
Signatory and Acceding Powers, and will take effect on the date of the 
notification by the Government of the French Republic. 
The present Protocol of which the French and English texts are both 
authentic, shall be ratified as soon as possible. It shall bear today's date.  
The ratifications of the present Protocol shall be addressed to the 
Government of the French Republic, which will at once notify the 
deposit of such ratification to each of the Signatory and Acceding 
Powers. The instruments of ratification and accession to the present 
Protocol will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the 
French Republic. The present Protocol will come into force for each 
Signatory Power as from the date of deposit of its ratification, and, from 
that moment, each Power will be bound as regards other Powers which 
have already deposited their ratifications.41 
 
The 1925 conference in Geneva was originally intended to restrict or prohibit the 
international arms trade. This however morphed into an effort to attempt to codify the 
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condemnation of chemical warfare and, to lay down definite rules as to its application.42 
The resulting document outlawed the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, 
however the final Protocol did not contain any provisions for enforcing the norm against 
CBW.43 On 9 April 1930, the UK ratified the Protocol, following a handful of other 
states including Germany and France.44  
British policy towards chemical warfare at this time was primarily defensive in 
nature in terms of both research and training.45 This was slowly changing and as D. J. C. 
Wiseman stated: 
Service schools and commands should study the offensive employment 
of gas, not only because the study of offensive gas was necessary for the 
study of protection against it, but also in order that we might be in a 
position to retaliate immediately, should this course be forced upon us by 
our opposition.46  
As Paul Harris explains, “For various reasons, notably lack of money, few serious 
preparations for chemical warfare were made until the beginning of the rearmament 
programme in 1936.”47 That November, the Committee of Imperial Defence approved 
requests of the Chiefs of Staff for the manufacture and storage of mustard gas.48 Cabinet 
approval was eventually received two years later. In November 1938, Cabinet 
authorized the completion of a mustard gas production facility at Randle on Merseyside, 
with a projected scale of 300 tons of mustard per week and a reserve of 2000 tons.49 By 
September 1939, British stockpiles of gas were limited, consisting of 500 tons of 
mustard with a manufacturing capacity of 90 tons per week and 5 tons of bromobenzyl 
cyanide (BBC) with a manufacturing capacity of 5 tons per week.50 According to Carter 
and Pearson, “By October 1939 the War Cabinet approved service proposals to increase 
chemical warfare agent and weapons production” with the construction of new factories 
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“to meet the targets.”51 While stockpiles of CW gradually increased, by September 
1940, production capacity had not yet reached the level authorized by the War Cabinet 
the previous year.52 
 
The Second World War and Postwar Period 
When war came to Europe in 1939 a new and deadly type of chemical weapon 
was emerging. In late 1936, Dr. Gerhard Schrader of IG Farbenindustrie had 
synthesized a new organic compound by incorporating cyanide with a phosphorus 
compound. This new organophosphate proved to be highly toxic to warm-blooded 
animals leading IG Farben to inform the German government of its properties.53 
Originally called Preparation 9/91 and renamed Le-100, this compound would become 
known as tabun (GA). Sarin (GB) was created in 1938, followed by soman (GD) in 
1944. Along with cyclosarin (GF), these G-agents were designed primarily to act via 
inhalation, but also through the skin. Nerve agents affect the transmission of nerve 
impulses in the nervous system through the, “inhibition of tissue cholinesterases at 
synaptic sites, and to an accumulation of excessive amounts of acetylcholine at nicotinic 
and muscarinic receptors in effector organs.”54  
 British chemical weapons at this time consisted primarily of First World War 
mustard and phosgene. Chemical weapons did not play a big part in the British 
government’s overall strategic decision-making, although there were plans in place that 
called for the saturation of south coast beaches in the event of a German amphibious 
landing.55 Production and stockpiling continued throughout the war and by 6 June 1944, 
at the commencement of Operation Overlord, the chemical weapons stockpile consisted 
of 7700 tons of mustard, 111 tons of BBC and a production capacity of 900 tons/month 
for mustard, 400 tons/month of phosgene and 110 tons/month of BBC.56 Between 1929 
and 1945 a total of 40 719 tons of mustard had been produced, with most of it being 
weaponized, as well as 14 042 tons of phosgene and tear gas.57  
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During the Second World War the use of chemical weapons was given serious 
thought.58 In a secret memorandum from the Air Ministry dated 22 June 1940: 
In the event of invasion we should use any means at our disposal to repel 
the enemy, including gas, if this weapon should prove valuable for the 
purpose. The employment of gas in such circumstances might require the 
sanction of the War Cabinet in view of our International undertaking not 
to use gas unless it is first used against us.59 
The plan was to saturate possible coastal landing points with mustard with the belief 
that, “it will compel the enemy to wear gas masks and anti-gas clothing and this will 
have a serious hampering and exhausting effect on his troops at a time when speed and 
energy will be vital.”60 While the use of mustard was not going to prevent an 
amphibious landing, it was however, thought that by slowing down the disembarking 
troops, it would give the coastal defence units more time to organize and mount an 
effective defense of the region. There were two scenarios where the employment of gas 
was considered – in an attempt to invade Britain and against the civil population, 
without invasion.61 In a memo to General Ismay, Churchill supported the possibility of 
using chemical weapons against Germany. He says, “I quite agree that it may be several 
weeks or even months before I shall ask you to drench Germany with poison gas, and if 
we do it, let us do it one hundred per cent.”62 Churchill felt strongly about Britain 
needing to possess weapons capable of deterring or responding to a potential German 
CBW attack or amphibious landing on British soil.63 
After the war the threat shifted eastward toward the Soviet Union where it was 
suspected that the Soviets were involved in R&D of biological and chemical warfare 
agents. A Joint Intelligence Committee Report from 1947 states: 
Although we have no evidence on which to base a reliable estimate of 
when the Soviet Union may be ready to use biological weapons on a big 
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scale, it seems probable that her production can be equal to, or greater 
than, that of any other Power by 1951. Furthermore, the slower her own 
estimated rate of production of atomic bombs, the more likely is she to 
seek to hasten her preparedness for using biological weapons.64 
 
In terms of chemical warfare the Report states that: 
The Russians are likely to be as well prepared to wage chemical warfare, 
both in offence and in defence as any other Power, after 1948. Until then, 
the Western Allies will hold the advantage of possessing considerable 
stocks of the German nerve gas, Tabun, but will not yet have begun 
production of this or of the more toxic nerve gases. By contrast the 
Soviet Government could, if this were their policy, produce and build up 
stocks of Tabun after 1948, or of the other two more toxic types, Soman 
and Sarin, after 1951.65 
In fact, the Soviets had acquired some German CW technology in the closing stages of 
the war. On 5 February 1945, three days prior to the launch of the Silesian Offensives, 
elements of the Red Army’s 1st Ukrainian Front66 captured the Silesian town of 
Dyhernfurth67 and with it the full-scale tabun plant as well as the pilot sarin plant.68 
While no actual chemical agents were acquired – the liquid stockpiles having been 
pumped into the Oder River – research into the agents would continue in the Soviet-
occupied zone in Germany and later on in the USSR when the plant had been rebuilt in 
its entirety.69  
 The chemical weapons programme in the years immediately following the end 
of the Second World War was strongly influenced by the belief that the UK needed to 
possess a retaliation-in-kind capability. With the advent of the German G-agents, many 
of the old first-generation chemical weapons seemed to be of little use. Carter and 
Pearson write that, “In comparison, it was difficult to see a future military role for the 
old lachrymators and sternutators; phosgene was dismissed and even mustard gas now 
seemed of minor utility.”70 In 1945, approximately 71 00071 German aircraft tabun 
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bombs were shipped to the UK as a contingency plan for use against Japan.72 These 
bombs were the best available weapons the British had access to and doubled as a 
supply for research work into nerve agents.  
In the postwar period, Chemical Defence Research Establishment (CDRE) 
Sutton Oak became the UK’s centre for development of production methods for 
chemical warfare agents.73 After the discovery of German research into nerve agents, an 
R&D programme aimed at nerve agent production had commenced at Porton Down. 
Due principally to Sutton Oak being an old and ill-equipped facility and the toxicity of 
the nerve agents, it was decided in 1947 that a new location for pilot plant studies be 
chosen.74 The Royal Air Force (RAF) airfield at Portreath was acquired by the Ministry 
of Supply (MoS) to be developed as a new Chemical Defence Establishment. Renamed 
Nancekuke, it was deemed to be more suitable for work on chemical production 
processes. CDE Nancekuke began operating as a small-scale chemical agent production 
and research facility in 1951 as an outstation of Porton Down.75 Eventually, a pilot 
production facility was built to support R&D into sarin. Production at this plant 
commenced in 1954 and continued for two years. The planned expansion of the pilot 
plant to a full-scale production plant was cancelled in 1956 when the decision was taken 
to discontinue offensive research into chemical warfare. From this point work at 
Nancekuke concentrated on the small to pilot-scale development of chemicals and 
agents to support the UK’s defensive research programme, which was being directed 
from Porton Down in Wiltshire. The sarin pilot plant at Nancekuke was shut down after 
two years and the manufacture of twenty metric tons of agent.76 
 When the Cabinet Defence Committee met on 10 July 1956, there was a 
proposal put forth by the Minister of Defence, Sir Walter Monckton, to eliminate all 
offensive developments from the chemical weapons programme. What Monckton 
suggested was to: 
1. Agree that we should abandon the means of large scale production of 
nerve gas and the development of nerve gas weapons; 
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2. Agree that we should dispose of reserve capacity for the manufacture 
of mustard gas and of our stocks of gas and of filled shells and 
bombs; 
3. Note that we will thereby preclude retaliation in kind from our own 
resources if we are attacked by such weapons; 
4. Note that it is not our intention to abandon research work in the 
chemical warfare field or development work for defence against 
chemical warfare.77 
His reasoning for making this recommendation was British possession of nuclear 
(fission) weapons, the massive US nuclear arsenal, the US chemical warfare potential 
and the current economic situation in the UK.78 The key thing with this proposal was 
that while offensive developments would be discontinued, R&D was not going to be 
affected.79 This decision was taken in secrecy, as there was some concern as to what the 
Americans would think. The fear was that the US would be reluctant to continue to 
share information as had happened a number of times previously in the nuclear area.80 
That October, the Defence Research Policy Committee interpreted the Cabinet decision 
on CW as applying to BW and requested that Cabinet alter the requirement for a 
retaliatory capability. According to a Defence Research Policy Staff note from 24 
October: 
The arguments which led to the cancellation of weapons for the offensive 
use of chemical warfare agents largely apply to BW weapons. The 
Ministry of Supply paper to be tabled at the next DRPC meeting stresses 
the covert use of BW agents but the Staff may feel that the time lag 
between dispersal and effect rules them out in any war concept which 
involves atomic weapons. However, until the directive mentioned in 
para.1 above is altered, it will not be possible for the Service 
Departments – in particular the War Office and the Air Ministry – to 
delete BW offensive weapon requirements and targets from their lists.81 
 
The following March the Minister of Defence gave approval for the disposal of 
remaining mustard stocks and munitions.82 The 71 000 German tabun bombs were 
disposed of in the north Atlantic in 1955-56 during Operation Sandcastle.83 This 
signalled that the UK was effectively out of offensive CW production. What is less 
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obvious is when the decision to get out of offensive BW production was taken. The 
original 10 July document makes no mention of BW. It only refers to CW. Though there 
is little evidence to show how and when the BW decision was taken, it is accepted that 
the chemical declaration would cover biological weapons as well. This will be 
examined further in the upcoming section. 
 
THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME 
Early twentieth century British thinking about biological weapons can be traced 
back to the First World War with German attempts to infect allied livestock and feed 
with Bacillus anthracis, Pseudomonas mallei, and a wheat fungus, Puccinia graminis.84 
However, according to Gradon Carter, “it seems unlikely that any nation gave nay 
serious thought to biological warfare until the 1920s.”85 Concerted British interest in 
BW began during the interwar period. In 1934 Henry Wickham Steed, former editor of 
The Times, claimed that Germany had carried out clandestine tests with biological agent 
simulants on the London Underground and Paris Metro.86  Before making his report 
public, Steed consulted with Sir Maurice Hankey (later Lord Hankey), secretary of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, who took the matter to the Medical Research Council 
(MRC). Three eminent bacteriologists at MRC studied the feasibility of biological 
warfare and produced a memorandum for the Committee of Imperial Defence.87 The 
memorandum was very cautious about Steed’s report and generally dismissed the threat 
of biological warfare but did draw attention to the problems of public health during 
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wartime, suggesting that compromised public health conditions could make the 
population more vulnerable to disease.88 
In November 1936 the Bacteriological Warfare Subcommittee was set up with 
Lord Hankey in the chair.89 On 17 March the following year, the Bacteriological 
Warfare Subcommittee produced its first report dealing with foot-and-mouth disease.90 
A second report followed in April 1938 that reiterated the latest intelligence and 
summarized the activities initiated within the armed services and other areas.91  
 
BW and the Second World War 
When Britain declared war on Germany the possibility of a deliberate BW attack 
became an increasing concern. On 27 November 1939 the War Cabinet decided that the 
former Committee of Imperial Defence, Bacteriological Warfare Subcommittee should 
be reconvened as the Biological Warfare Committee under Lord Hankey.92 During the 
first meeting of the Biological Warfare Committee, offensive BW research was 
discussed in reference to a memorandum prepared by eminent Canadian scientist, Sir 
Frederick Banting, which warned of the biological weapons threat facing Britain and 
France. Banting was convinced that Germany had been conducting research into BW 
prior to the outbreak of the war. He claimed that: 
While Germany knows that we are prepared for bombing and even gas 
attack, and would be able to retaliate, she probably knows that we are 
unprepared for bacterial warfare, even as we know that she has for years 
carried out experiments, and now knows, in all likelihood, the 
possibilities, limitations and conditions necessary for the successful use 
of bacteria in warfare.93 
While the Bacteriological Warfare Committee dismissed Banting’s warnings as 
alarmist, the possibility of a biological attack, including “bacteriological sabotage” was 
starting to gain traction.94 Following the debate on Banting’s memo in early 1940, 
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Hankey argued that further research was needed and suggested that offensive 
possibilities of BW should also be explored more extensively in order to improve 
defensive capabilities. That autumn, the “Biology Department, Porton” at Chemical 
Defence Experimental Station Porton was established under Paul Fildes.95 
The capitulation of France in June 1940 prompted a shift in policy from “offence for 
defence to offence for retaliation” and with the new research establishment in place, 
efforts were soon underway to create a biological weapon.96 In December 1941, Hankey 
proposed the development of ‘cattle cakes’ – linseed cakes contaminated with anthrax 
spores – as a potential weapon against livestock in order to disrupt German food 
production.97  In January 1942 the Cabinet Defence Committee affirmed its policy to 
undertake research in order to be able to retaliate with biological weapons without 
undue delay and approved Hankey’s plans to produce anthrax cattle cakes for retaliatory 
purposes.98 Also in January, scientists from the US, UK and Canada met in Ottawa to 
discuss biological warfare collaboration between the three countries. 99 Taking part in 
the discussions from the UK were Paul Fildes and Professor Dudley Maurice Newitt, 
who represented the interests of Special Operations Executive. It should be noted that 
while they were permitted to discuss biological warfare issues, it was to be done with 
the pronouncement that British research was “defensive and protective.”100 This was an 
interesting time in the relationship of the three wartime allies. There was significant 
collaboration between them in the areas of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
research. As we will see, this would not always be the case. 
The months of July, August and September saw a number of BW tests on Gruinard 
Island. Gruinard Island is a small island off the northwest coast of Scotland, roughly 
halfway between the towns of Gairloch and Ullapool. It was here that multiple tests of 
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the new anthrax bomb were field tested during Operation Vegetarian. The anthrax bomb 
was a modified high-explosive chemical bomb, filled with a liquid suspension of 
anthrax spores. The bombs were exploded at rest as well as dropped from aircraft.101 
One of the tests included an aerial drop of a twenty-five-pound anthrax bomb.102 In 
October there were further trials with aircraft at Penclawdd, Wales. This occurred due in 
part to the previous aircraft bomb tests at Gruinard proving to be somewhat of a failure. 
By April the following year, approximately seven cattle, two horses, three cats and 
between thirty and fifty sheep had died on the shores of Wester Ross. Fildes reported to 
the Chair of the BW Committee that: 
There can be little doubt that the outbreak of anthrax that has taken place 
was due to a carcase being washed up from the island. I approved of the 
method of disposal, but unfortunately the demolition charge was too 
great and one or perhaps two sheep were blown into the sea and could 
not be recovered. This was an unfortunate mischance which will not 
occur again.103  
More tests would take place at Gruinard between July and September 1943. Plans to 
develop a retaliatory biological capability were in the pipeline. The planned “N bomb” 
was to be a 500 lb. cluster bomb, containing just over 100 smaller 4 lb. anthrax sub 
munitions.104 This cluster bomb was the precursor to Project Red Admiral, which is 
discussed in an upcoming section. As well as developing the anthrax cluster bomb plans 
to develop anthrax cattle cakes were moving forward. Operation Vegetarian, soon to be 
renamed Operation Aladdin, saw the preparation of 5 000 000 anthrax cakes to be used 
against what Gradon Carter describes as “Germany’s already weak agricultural sector” 
and to more importantly, “underline the principle of retaliation-in-kind.”105  
In early 1944, a committee was set up under the Chiefs of Staff in order to 
control biological warfare research and development. The Inter-Services Subcommittee 
on Biological Warfare (ISSBW) was made up of representatives of the Ministry of 
Supply as well as the four branches of the British Forces. The ISSBW was responsible 
for: 
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Advising on the formulation of the general policy for biological warfare 
research in the light of service needs, operational factors, etc. 
Responsibility for the administration of the research work and for 
obtaining the necessary financial credits, etc. is vested in the Ministry of 
Supply, and the Director-General of Scientific Research (MoD) has been 
charged with the responsibility within the Ministry for the new 
Microbiological Research Department at Porton, which is under the 
direction of Dr DW Henderson as Chief Superintendent.106 
The ISSBW in effect replaced the Bacteriological Warfare Committee, which, 
according to Fildes, had been sidelined by Lord Hankey due to the committee’s contrary 
advice regarding biological warfare issues. Brian Balmer states that, “This opposition of 
the BW Committee could be construed as a product of their opinions on the complexity 
of establishing epidemic disease.”107 It was hoped that the new committee would be 
involved in helping shape the future of postwar biological warfare planning in the UK. 
On 11 July 1946, the Biological Research Advisory Board (BRAB) was set up, in 
order to obtain independent scientific advice on problems arising during the course of 
biological warfare research.108 According to the terms of reference, BRAB was, “to 
consider and advise on biological problems with special reference to micro-biological 
research carried out in the Ministry of Supply and extra-murally.”109 The Advisory 
Council on Scientific Research and Technical Development was the body to which 
BRAB reported. Lord Hankey was installed as BRAB Chairman, with Professor E. C. 
Dodds, Sir Howard Florey, Lord Stamp and Sir Paul Fildes110 all consenting to serve as 
members of the Board as well as representatives of the MoS.111 
The Board also included three scientists that were also appointed to ISSBW, thereby 
providing some sort of consistency throughout this process. Research into biological 
warfare received equal priority to that of the nuclear programme.112 Though the 
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understanding of using biology for military purposes was in its infancy during the 
postwar period, interest continued to grow, eventually culminating with Project Red 
Admiral. 
 
Project Red Admiral and BW Testing 
 In November 1946, in a Top Secret document composed by the Air Staff, 
several key points in regard to requirements for a biological bomb were outlined. The 
interest in an air-deliverable biological weapon was due much in part to British opinions 
on strategic defence in the postwar period. According to Brian Balmer: 
The rapid expansion of the British biological warfare research 
programme was in part, a response to the perceived threat of a similar 
attack against the nation coupled with the broader position of the Chiefs 
of Staff on their preparedness to use weapons of mass destruction. 
Growth was also driven by a more proximate Air Staff requirement, 
dating from immediately after the Second World War, for an anti-
personnel biological bomb to be in operation by 1955.113 
Air Staff Requirement (ASR) OR/1006 was the document that embodied the Air Staff’s 
initial thoughts on a British anti-personnel biological bomb. Balmer states that it was 
planned to be “comparable in strategic effect with the atomic bomb.”114 Seven 
requirements were laid out in OR/1006 that were to be met: 
1. The Air Staff require the development on high priority of an anti-
personnel bomb containing a biological agent. 
2. The bomb is intended for strategic use against industrial targets and 
should contain the most effective biological agent for the incapacitation 
of workers. 
3. The bomb should be designed to achieve the most economical 
distribution of the biological material on the assumption that the aircraft 
will be able to make only a single run over the target. 
4. The bomb should be capable of being aimed from heights of up to 50 000 
feet and at speeds of up to 500 knots. The contents should not be 
adversely affected by atmospheric conditions at these altitudes nor by 
temperature or humidity conditions in any part of the world. 
5. If possible the outer container of the bomb should permit its stowage in 
the space required by one of the series of ballistically stable bombs now 
under design. The bomb should not need special precautions in handling 
and loading. 
6. In selecting the biological technique, the necessity should be borne in 
mind of later occupying the contaminated area with our own forces. 
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7. The bomb should be available for carriage in the B3/45 and the long-
range and medium bombers now being schemed. To this end, 
development should be completed in 5 years’ time.115 
The following October a new ASR was distributed that cancelled OR/1006 as well as 
OR/1002, which was a request for the production of a strategic gas bomb.116 The new 
ASR provisioned that the Air Staff required a toxic weapon for use against personnel in 
enemy industrial areas with the objects of: 
a. Reducing the enemy’s means of making war by causing 
widespread incapacitation of the workers. 
b. Reducing the enemy’s will to make war by producing the 
maximum adverse effect on morale.117 
Whether the Chief of the Air Staff actually believed that this was possible is not clear. 
But what is clear is the Air Staff had ambitious plans and were intent on having a 
biological bomb operational by 1955. 
Between 1948 and 1953 a series of biological tests were carried out in the 
Caribbean and in the Hebrides. In August 1948 Operation Harness began, which was 
the release of biological agents at Parham Sound, off the coast of Antigua.118 More tests 
occurred between June and September 1952 with Operation Cauldron. This was the 
testing of Brucella suis and Pasturella pestis on monkeys in the Hebrides.119 Operation 
Hesperus began in 1953 and involved the testing of B. suis and Francisella 
tularensis.120 The following February to May was Operation Ozone. This was the testing 
of B. suis, F. tularensis and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE) on animals in 
the Bahamas.121 Operation Negation followed, which saw field trials of B. suis, F. 
tularensis and Vaccinia virus off the coast of the Bahamas.122  
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Prior to the end of the sea trials, policy concerning BW had begun to shift. With 
a new government in power, a Conservative one, the Chiefs of Staff undertook an 
extensive review of British strategic policy. At the twenty-seventh meeting of BRAB, 
on 6 December 1952, Dr. Owen Wansbrough-Jones attempted to clarify the Chiefs of 
Staff policy towards BW. Wansbrough-Jones stated that the Chiefs of Staff could give 
broad direction and had agreed on a policy that, “research and trials to determine the 
true risk of BW should be continued, the best defensive measures should be established, 
and that we should concentrate mainly on the study of long-range offensive 
possibilities.”123 The phrase “long-range” is an interesting choice of words. Carter, 
Pearson and Balmer believe that long-range is taken to mean long-term.124 Interest in 
offensive biological warfare capabilities had started to decrease and according to Carter 
and Balmer, research into biological warfare had begun to shift to the defensive in 
1953.125 Economic concerns, the war in Korea, changes in strategic doctrine and the 
success of Operation Hurricane in October 1952 all contributed to the diminished role 
of BW. 
Air Staff Target (AST) OR/1065 from July 1954 effectively cancelled the anti-
personnel biological bomb project. The memo read: 
To implement the national policy of retaliation in the event of biological 
warfare being initiated by an enemy, the Air Staff will ultimately require 
toxic biological weapons. In 1947 an Air Staff Requirement No. 
OR/1065 was issued for such a weapon which it was hoped would be 
available to the Service by 1955. It is now apparent that because of the 
magnitude of the problem a great deal of research still remains to be 
done in both the agent and weapon fields before a satisfactory weapon 
can be recommended to the Service. Moreover it appears that the storage, 
transportation, testing and preparation for use of the weapon and its agent 
will present new problems to the Service and may necessitate the 
provision of special skills and equipment. The Air Staff considers that 
until problems associated with the toxic biological weapons are better 
appreciated it would be unwise to state definite requirements for 
weapons and other equipment. This AST is therefore issued to replace 
ASR No. OR/1065 which is hereby cancelled.126 
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What is interesting is that while this AST replaced ASR OR/1065, it did explicitly state 
that the Air Staff would “ultimately require toxic biological weapons” but that was not 
going to be any time soon. 
With the biological bomb project on the shelf and research being primarily 
defensive in nature, fewer resources were being allocated to the BW programme. In 
September 1954 the ISSBW was dissolved.127 The official reason given was that the 
committee had lost its effectiveness and had essentially become a rubber-stamping 
operation. Balmer suggests that, “At a symbolic level, removal of the committee can be 
construed as an indicator of the waning regard for biological weapons in the minds of 
defence policy-makers.”128 Following the success of the Hurricane test and the 
resources being pumped into the thermonuclear programme, it is of little wonder that 
the biological weapons programme withered in size, scope and importance. The postwar 
British economy was in such poor shape that there were not the resources to spread 
around to all of these different programmes. While there was a point in 1946-47 where 
biological warfare issues did receive priority on par with nuclear issues, that period was 
relatively short lived, though it was at this time the decision to begin construction of a 
new “purpose-built facility” at Porton, which was a significant commitment of 
resources, was taken.129  
When the Cabinet Defence Committee met on 10 July 1956, the decision was 
taken to discontinue offensive production of chemical weapons. Six days previously, a 
memorandum on chemical warfare policy by Minister of Defence, Sir Walter 
Monckton, was circulated that outlined his ministry’s current CW policy.130 
Interestingly there is no reference to biological weapons anywhere in either Monckton’s 
memo, or in the official records of the Cabinet Defence Committee meetings. That 
autumn, a note from the Defence Research Policy Staff interpreted the Cabinet Defence 
Committee decision to mean, “The arguments which led to the cancellation of weapons 
for the offensive use of chemical warfare agents largely apply to BW weapons.”131 The 
reasons Monckton listed for cancelling the offensive chemical programme are all valid 
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when looking at the biological programme. Economic considerations, the possession of 
British, as well as American nuclear weapons, and the existence of the US BW 
programme, which had recently come to reflect a new, more offensive policy, could 
have influenced the decision, or in this case the non-decision to cancel the offensive 
BW programme.132 It is also possible that since the British biological weapons 
programme was not as comprehensive as the chemical or nuclear programmes, a 
separate and distinct policy decision on the fate of BW may not have been necessary. 
 While the government had decided to get out of the production and stockpiling 
of CW, these weapons were going to continue to play a part in British strategic 
planning.133 The weapons were not going to be British chemical weapons, but 
American. The Chiefs of Staff saw no real need for the UK to continue its offensive 
programmes since it was unlikely that the US were going to get out of CBW any time 
soon. This was reflected in a memo from July 1958 that stated: 
We agree with existing policies that the United Kingdom needs no 
offensive or retaliatory capability in either BW or CW, provided that 
capability is retained by the West as a whole. There seems little doubt 
that in the near future the United States will continue to have such an 
offensive capability.134  
By getting out of offensive production and in terms of a strategic deterrent, Britain was 
going to rely on its stockpile of nuclear fission weapons as well as the soon-to-be tested 
thermonuclear device. 
 
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME 
The genesis of the British nuclear weapons programme can be traced back to the 
early days of the Second World War. In February 1940 émigré physicists Otto Frisch 
and Rudolf Peierls, working at Birmingham University, completed their memorandum 
entitled, ‘On the Construction of a “Super-bomb”; based on a Nuclear Chain Reaction in 
Uranium’ in which they postulated that five kilograms of Uranium 235 was all that was 
necessary for an atomic explosion.135 The memorandum stated, “The energy liberated 
by a 5kg bomb would be equivalent to that of several thousand tons of dynamite, while 
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that of a 1kg bomb, though about 500 times less, would still be formidable.”136 Frisch 
and Peierls memorandum was given to Professor Mark Oliphant, also of Birmingham 
University, who passed it on to Sir Henry Tizard, the Chairman of the Committee on the 
Scientific Survey of Air Defence. This memo would eventually result in the formation 
of a committee of government officials, scientists and university academics, in April. 
The committee would become known as the Maud Committee. 
 
Maud Committee and Wartime Collaboration 
The Maud Committee was originally comprised of Committee Chair Sir George 
Paget Thomson, Marcus Oliphant, P. B. Moon, Patrick Blackett, James Chadwick and 
John Cockcroft.137 The precise origin of the committee’s name is somewhat unclear. 
Initially it was thought to be a coded message from Danish physicist Neils Bohr who 
was residing in Denmark when it was invaded and occupied by German forces. Bohr 
had sent a message to Otto Frisch instructing him to pass his words on to "Cockcroft 
and Maud Ray Kent." It was initially thought that Maud Ray Kent was an anagram – 
somewhat misspelled – for radium taken, meaning that the Germans had come into the 
possession of some valuable Scandinavian radium. The name had stuck and it was not 
until after the war that Maud Ray Kent was identified as the former governess of Bohr's 
children who moved to the English county of Kent. 
 They came together to attempt to develop a research programme on isotope 
separation and fast fission.138 The first Maud Committee report was completed in March 
1941 and it described the importance of fast fission for bomb design. A copy of the 
report was sent to the Secretary of the US Uranium Committee, Lyman Briggs.139 The 
final two reports of the Maud Committee were completed on 15 July the same year. The 
first report, entitled, 'Use of Uranium for a Bomb' concluded that an atomic bomb was 
feasible. The report described design possibilities in technical detail as well as providing 
specific proposals for bomb development and initial cost estimates.140 The second report 
was titled, 'Use of Uranium as a Source of Power'. This report concluded that the 
controlled fission of uranium could be used to provide energy in the form of heat for use 
in machines as well as providing large quantities of radioisotopes, which could be used 
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as a substitute for radium.141 The Maud Committee was a significant early development 
in the timeline of the British nuclear weapons programme. According to Margaret 
Gowing: 
The Maud Reports were a fitting climax to the work of the Committee. 
Indeed in its fifteen months’ existence it had proved itself one of the 
most effective scientific committees that had ever existed. Under its 
aegis much brilliant and original scientific work had been done and this 
had been welded together into a remarkably coherent and complete 
whole. Theoreticians and experimentalists, physicists and chemists, 
many of them endowed with real mechanical flair, had worked together 
with an efficiency that seems in retrospect quite extraordinary.142 
 
The primary focus of the Maud Committee revolved around answering two 
related questions. First, whether or not the creation of a uranium bomb was at all 
scientifically possible. Some advances in physics had recently been made to make 
people believe that it was at least theoretically possible to create an atomic explosion, 
thousands of times greater than what was possible with conventional explosives. 
Second, it dealt with whether the British and their allies could make an atomic device 
before the Germans. To the British it was an intolerable, though very real thought, that 
the Germans could conceivably have a bomb before they would. There were some signs 
that the Germans were working on a uranium bomb from April 1940 right through to 
1941.143 It was also important that the UK and its allies harness the power of the atom 
before Hitler’s scientists were able to. This was a hugely motivating factor for the 
British. According to Gowing, “All except the convinced pacifists were deeply 
committed to the war and to the defeat of Nazi Germany: the refugees from Europe who 
played such an important part in the development of the bomb were the most deeply 
committed of all.”144 Plans to develop an atomic bomb were officially endorsed by 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 3 September 1941.  
Churchill was personally interested in the concept of harnessing the power of the 
atom. He thought that if something were to come out of the theoretical research that was 
being done at laboratories and universities in the UK, it could be potentially decisive in 
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the war against Germany. Many individuals working on the bomb project shared this 
feeling. As Margaret Gowing explains: 
The use of the bomb was to arouse passionate feelings among 
scientists…. at this stage their task seemed clear and it still seems clear in 
retrospect: even those scientists who worked on the wartime bombs and 
who were to regret most bitterly their release on Japan, would have 
regarded the victory of Germany in the Second World War as a far 
greater evil.145  
  
Throughout the remainder of 1941 there was a concerted effort within the British 
government to push forth with its atomic aspirations. That autumn the Directorate of 
Tube Alloys was formed within the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. 
This is what the British atomic weapons research project was to be called. According to 
Gowing, “The name Tube Alloys was to prove an excellent cover name: this 
meaningless and unintelligible expression had a ‘specious air of probability about it’ 
and might be taken by the uninitiated to have a connection with aeroplane radiators or 
tanks.”146 The formation of Tube Alloys would bring together again many of the 
scientists that had worked on the Maud Committee reports, thereby establishing 
continuity in relation to the subject matter. 
 Meanwhile in the US the situation on the atomic front was continuing to 
develop. After receiving both Maud Committee reports in July, Lyman Briggs had 
locked the reports away in his safe, without giving them much of a read. In August, 
Professor Marcus Oliphant, Maud Committee member and Birmingham University 
physicist, went to the US to discuss the findings of the Maud Reports and to gauge US 
reaction. Oliphant soon realized that Briggs had not read the documents and encouraged 
him to circulate the reports amongst his colleagues. On 9 October, Vannevar Bush, 
director of the newly created Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), 
convinced US President Franklin Roosevelt of the need for an accelerated nuclear 
programme.147 Throughout 1940-41 the study of nuclear fission was the primary focus 
of the American efforts. On 6 December, one day before the Japanese attack at Pearl 
Harbor was the first meeting of the US Top Policy Group, which was created to inform 
Roosevelt of bomb development, and allow Bush and his colleagues to guide the 
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project.148 This all changed the following day. When the smoke had finally cleared in 
Hawaii and the US government realized that they had been dragged into war with 
Imperial Japan, priorities shifted. On 18 December US interest in atomic energy issues 
switched from studying nuclear fission to investigating the feasibility of developing 
atomic weapons.149 War had come to the US and it was at this point that they became as 
serious as the British about developing an atomic weapon. 
 On 22 December Churchill arrived in Chesapeake Bay, Virginia aboard the 
HMS Duke of York. He came to the US in order to meet Roosevelt regarding the 
conduct of the war in the aftermath of the attack at Pearl Harbor. One the table was a 
commitment of continued diplomatic and military cooperation between the two 
countries.150 Churchill knew that the key to allied victory in Europe lay in the economic 
and military might of the US. In these talks, codenamed Arcadia, Churchill and 
Roosevelt met daily between 22 December and 14 January to discuss all aspects of the 
war effort from North Africa to Southeast Asia to atomic energy. These early meetings 
between the two charismatic leaders were crucial to the ongoing war effort and to the 
eventual development of atomic weapons. 
The amount of resources as well as the sheer scale of the atomic programme 
meant that it would be difficult for Britain to allocate sufficient money, manpower and 
materiel to the atomic programme while conducting an air campaign in Europe along 
with operations in the Pacific. This led Sir John Anderson, the minister responsible for 
the Tube Alloys project, to advise Churchill that the scale and cost of the atomic bomb 
project required the UK to base its efforts in the US.151 The rest of 1942 would see the 
ever-increasing involvement of the US in the fledgling British atomic programme. That 
August, a new organization was created under the auspices of the Army Corps of 
Engineers, with the intentionally misleading name of "Manhattan Engineer District.”152 
On 17 September, Colonel Leslie Richard Groves was notified that he was to take 
immediate control of Manhattan Project.153 The formal order that outlined Groves’ 
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responsibilities stated that “he was to be tasked with taking complete charge of the 
entire DSM154 project as well as drawing up the plans for the organization, construction, 
operation… and security of the project, and after approval, take the necessary steps to 
put it into effect.”155 Robert Norris states that: 
Total program authority was vested in Groves. He had the complete 
support of the president and the other high officials of the 
administration… The objective was clear, unmistakable, finite, and well 
defined. Compartmentalization, in addition to maintaining security, kept 
people focused on their assignment to achieve it.156 
Many of the individuals working on the Manhattan Project were foreign nationals from 
Europe, Britain and Canada. Lots of individuals came together in order to facilitate the 
development of an atomic weapon to be used with the hope of ending the war. This was 
what Groves was single-mindedly focused on the entire time he was in charge of the 
bomb project. 
The early years of the Manhattan Project saw a heightened level of cooperation 
between the US and UK. On 19 August 1943, during the Quadrant meetings, the 
Quebec Agreement was signed by Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
which outlined the terms of nuclear non-proliferation between the United Kingdom and 
the United States. As John Simpson explains, “The Quebec Agreement bound the two 
states never to use atomic weapons against each other, only to use them against another 
country with the other’s consent, and never to transfer atomic information obtained as a 
consequence of the agreement to third parties without the other’s acquiescence.”157 That 
December a team of nineteen British-based scientists, including Otto Frisch, Rudolf 
Peierls and Francis Simon of Oxford University, arrived in the US to begin work at Los 
Alamos.158 British scientist William Penney arrived In June 1944 to begin work at the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory. Penney spent one year working on the implosion 
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process component of the atomic chain reaction, which sent powerful shock waves 
inwards on to a radioactive core.159 This was important as Penney ended up the key 
figure in the development of the British independent atomic weapons programme. 
Like the Quadrant and Arcadia meetings between Churchill and Roosevelt earlier in 
the war, the Second Quebec Conference, codenamed Octagon, produced an equally 
important document regarding postwar US-UK collaboration. Signed on 19 September 
1944, The Hyde Park Agreement laid out, in principle, between the US and UK, an 
agreement that “promised that full collaboration between the two countries in 
developing Tube Alloys for military and commercial purposes should be continued after 
the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement.”160 Churchill and 
Roosevelt both agreed that the bomb project should be kept in the utmost secrecy and 
that full collaboration between the two nations in the military and commercial 
development of the atom should continue after the war. Any suggestion that the world 
be informed about the bomb as a prelude to an international agreement regarding its 
control and use, the agreement noted, was “not accepted.” Both sides were firmly 
committed to the defeat of Germany and victory in the Pacific. Churchill saw the atomic 
bomb as a war-winning weapon and was prepared to do whatever it would take to 
ensure victory.  
Churchill’s focus on the European theatre was obstinate. Throughout his meetings 
with President Roosevelt, Churchill was adamant that something needed to be done to 
help ease the pressure on the Soviet Union and create a second front on the continent.161 
Roosevelt was less confident that this was the proper course of action. The US 
Commander-in-Chief was fixated on the Pacific theatre and the threat that Imperial 
Japan posed to US interests.162 Churchill was reluctant to accept second-tier status for 
the war effort in Europe and was pressing the Americans hard to commit to decisive 
action on the continent. The Prime Minister was of the belief that the Nazi threat should 
be dealt with first and foremost.  
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Throughout 1944 and 1945, allied forces pushed deeper into occupied France and 
the Low Countries. With the successes of the US 7th and British 8th Armies in the Italian 
theatre, the Allies had firmly established military operations in two separate European 
combat theatres. Coupled with the Red Army’s powerful push westward, it was only a 
matter of time until the war in Europe ended. This meant that no atomic weapon would 
be used in the European theatre as Alfred Jodl, Chief of Staff of OKW163 signed the 
instrument of unconditional surrender at approximately 02:30 on 7 May, with the 
cessation of operations to occur on 8 May at 23:01 CET.164  
Though the opportunity to test the atomic bomb in Europe did not materialize, the 
war in the Pacific was still raging. The Battle of Okinawa was fought over an eighty-
two day period and was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific Theatre during the 
war. This costly battle claimed the lives of 10 000 American troops, 110 000 Japanese 
Imperial forces and culminated in the mass suicide of over 100 000 civilians at the 
behest of the Japanese Imperial Army, rather than be taken “prisoner” by the invading 
forces.165 Allied losses in the weeks leading up to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki were significant. With the bloody Battle of Okinawa complete, casualties 
were averaging around 7000 per week.166 This was due primarily to the kamikaze tactics 
of the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force and the attack wings of the Imperial Japanese 
Navy.167 Facing an enemy, desperate to avoid the humiliation of unconditional 
surrender, the decision was taken by newly sworn-in President Harry Truman. 
On 4 July 1945, Churchill gave British approval for the atomic bombs to be 
dropped on Japan.168 The final test was still a few weeks away, but since the US was 
still encountering fierce resistance in the Pacific, it was accepted that the bombs would 
be dropped on the Japanese Home Islands. At precisely 05:29:45 local time on 16 July 
1945, the atomic device codenamed Gadget, was detonated in the Jornada del Muerta, 
located within the Alamogordo Bombing Range in central New Mexico, forty-eight 
kilometres southeast of the town of Socorro.169 The resultant explosive yield of Gadget 
was between 20 and 22 kilotons (kt), with initial estimates placing the yield at 18.6 
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kt.170 Three weeks later, two separate atomic weapons designs were deployed, on 6 
August over Hiroshima and on 9 August over Nagasaki. These two incidents would be 
the first and last times that nuclear weapons of any type would be used in active combat. 
Truman’s decision was not taken lightly or rashly. It was made pragmatically and in the 
interest of ending the war in the Pacific and limiting the numbers of American 
casualties. Subsequently the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan has come 
under intense scrutiny from all sides in the debate.171 Truman remained steadfast in his 
belief that he did what was necessary to facilitate the end of the bloodiest and most 
destructive war in human history.  
 
British Defence Economics and Postwar Progress 
 The euphoria of the end of the war in Europe brought about political change in 
the UK. Gone was Churchill’s Wartime Coalition Government, replaced by the Labour 
Party led by Clement Attlee, with a majority of 146 seats in the House of Commons.172 
Churchill was lauded as the man to lead Britain to victory during the war, but was not 
seen to be the man to lead it through postwar reconstruction. The electorate believed 
that Attlee’s Labour Party would provide Britain with the appropriate roadmap toward 
social and economic recovery. The postwar years would prove to be difficult as food 
and goods continued to be rationed and Britain’s shattered infrastructure was rebuilt. It 
was within this social and political environment that the decision to go for an 
independent nuclear weapons programme was made. 
After the end of the Second World War the United Kingdom was faced with 
considerable difficulty. Having fought a global war for over six years took its toll on 
HM Treasury. Needing a sizeable investment of capital to undertake a large-scale 
reconstruction of parts of Britain, Attlee’s government looked towards the US for 
support. At the beginning of the war Britain was able to pay the US (and Canada) 
directly, for war materiel under the cash and carry scheme.173 But, as T. O. Lloyd 
explains, “Once the United States had committed itself to providing unlimited credit for 
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the purchase of raw materials and food, the limits on resources were relaxed.”174 What 
transpired as a result was on 11 March 1941, US Public Law 77-11, better know as the 
Lend-Lease Act, was enacted. Under the agreement of Lend-Lease the UK received 
large quantities of equipment and supplies from the US totalling approximately $30 
billion. In return the US received leases on military installations in Newfoundland and 
the British West Indies. On 2 September 1945, Lend-Lease was cancelled leaving the 
British government drastically short of the finances needed for postwar reconstruction. 
As a result, the UK took a loan for $586 million (about £145 million at 1945 exchange 
rates), and a further $3750 million line of credit (about £930 million at 1945 exchange 
rates).175 The loan was to be paid off in fifty annual repayments starting in 1950, 
although there were six years when payment was deferred in the 1970s due to economic 
crises and pressure on the official reserves.176   
 Some food items and household materials were still being rationed into the 
1950s. Petrol rationing ended on 26 July 1950, sweets in February 1953 and sugar in 
September 1953. The end of all food rationing occurred on 4 July 1954, with meat and 
bacon being the last food items to be rationed. According to Hancock and Gowing, 
“From the invasion of Normandy onwards, a steady stream of papers came before the 
War Cabinet making it clear, in forceful terms, that the state of British external finances 
would be by far the gravest economic problem facing the country, once peace came into 
sight.”177  
The British economy was shifting from a wartime economy focused primarily 
on the production of war materials to providing assistance for the greater society. As 
mentioned previously, this was the era of the development of the British welfare state, 
the origins of which came to prominence in the pages of the 1942 Beveridge Report. 
This report discussed three guiding principles intended to create a national social 
security system that revolved around family allowances, the creation of a National 
Health Service and full employment.178 These ideas culminated in the establishment of 
the 1946 National Insurance Act, the National Health Service Act 1946, and the 1948 
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National Assistance Act, all coming into effect on 7 June 1948.179 It was with the 1945 
election of the Labour Party that the establishment of the welfare state in the UK began 
in earnest. As Sidney Pollard explains, “By 1950 the immediate after effects of the war 
had been overcome, both in the UK and abroad, and the world could settle down to the 
peaceful creation of wealth which most of its citizens expected after the holocaust.”180 
The amount of money going into the nuclear programme was a very real concern 
for both the Attlee and second Churchill governments. How could Britain afford its own 
independent nuclear deterrent? In November 1951, newly reelected Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill believed that it was still possible to reestablish wartime collaboration 
with the US on atomic matters. Initially Churchill was not completely sold on the 
necessity of Britain possessing its own independent nuclear weapons programme. 
Writing to Lord Cherwell: 
I have never wished, since our decision during the war that England 
should start the manufacture of atomic bombs. Research, however, must 
be energetically pursued. We should have the art rather than the article. 
A large sum of money will have to be provided for this. There is, 
however, no point in our going into bulk production even if we were able 
to. When we go to Washington in January we can, I have no doubt, 
arrange to be allocated a reasonable share of what they have made so 
largely on our initiative and substantial scientific contribution.181 
Churchill’s concerns were pragmatic.182 They were also driven by economic 
considerations. Research and development into nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons is typically a very costly enterprise from a number of perspectives. Creating a 
resource-intensive nuclear programme is not easy during times of relative austerity. The 
amount of capital that went into the British atomic weapons programme between the 
years of 1946 and 1952 totalled £104 million.183 
Britain in the postwar period was in a slightly better state than the continent but 
from 1940 onwards the UK survived on US credit.184 Britain needed to take away 
resources from conventional forces and demilitarize the economy in order to establish 
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some civilian infrastructure.185 It was clear that Britain could not afford to maintain the 
sort of conventional forces that they had during the First and Second World Wars.186 As 
G. C. Peden explains, “Given that British defence expenditure was pressing against the 
limits of what was economically possible, reliance upon a nuclear deterrent might seem 
to be a logical way of achieving security at an affordable cost.”187 It might be difficult to 
see how developing a nuclear weapons programme from the ground up, was cost 
effective, but it did provide Britain with a strong independent and strategic deterrent that 
helped to offset the proposed personnel cuts to the services. The Defence Committee 
had come to an agreement whereby the total strength of the armed forces should be 
reduced from 1 227 000 in September 1947 to 713 000 by the end of March 1949.188 
Further reductions were planned during the final days of the Eden government, where 
the overall size of the armed forces would be reduced to 450 000.189 
November 1945 saw the creation of the Washington Declaration, which was an 
agreement in principle between the USA, UK and Canada to share atomic research and 
technology. This agreement was primarily limited to the atomic energy question though 
Article (a) states “there should be an extending between all nations the exchange of 
basic scientific information for peaceful ends” and Article (c) states that “there should 
be the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major 
weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”190 Buoyed by this recent agreement of 
cooperation, Prime Minister Atlee called for the construction of two reactors to be built 
in Britain.191 This decision was made in the view that Anglo-American cooperation in 
nuclear science was to continue. This was not the case as 1946 would be a difficult year 
for British nuclear aspirations.192 
On the other side of the Atlantic the situation was changing. On 16 April, the US 
                                                
185 A long term defence planning memorandum from October 1955, shows the MoS attempting to save 
£30 million annually in cuts to defence spending. The fear at the time was that the proposed cuts would 
not only jeopardize its military future but also its commercial future. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint 
Planning Staff, Long Term Defence Programme – Aim, JP (55) Note 19 (Final), 4 October 1955. TNA 
DEFE 7/964. 
186 Interview with Kristan Stoddart, 6 August 2008. 
187 G. C. Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy from Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 260. 
188 Cabinet Defence Committee Meeting minutes, 29 September 1947. TNA CAB 131/5. 
189 Cabinet Policy Review, Long Term Defence Programme, Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 
14 December 1956. TNA CAB 134/1315. 
190 The original text of the agreement can be found as Appendix 4 in Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold, 
Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952. Volume I, Policy Making 
(London: Macmillan, 1974), 82-84. 
191 Cabinet, Atomic Energy, GEN 75 8th Meeting, 18 December 1945. TNA CAB 130/2. 
192 See Gowing and Arnold, Independence and Deterrence, Volume I, 131-146. 
  
84 
Combined Policy Committee met to discuss atomic issues. Led by President Truman, 
the US offer of atomic collaboration laid out in the Washington Declaration was 
rescinded.193 That July, Senator Brien McMahon (D-Conn.) tabled a bill that proposed 
to create a control board of Cabinet officers and other federal officials.194 This led to a 
succession of other bills and amendments that sought to limit the sharing of atomic 
information with other states. Congress passed the McMahon Act on 2 July.195 Signed 
into law by the President on 1 August, the newly created Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
made it illegal for the newly created Atomic Energy Commission to engage in any 
information exchanges with any state, including the UK.196 At a news conference in 
Tiptonville, Tennessee on 8 October 1945, when asked if the US should be sharing 
atomic information with its wartime allies, President Truman was quoted as saying, “If 
they catch up with us on that, they will have to do it on their own hook, just as we 
did.”197  
During this period the US, UK and Canada were continuing their wartime 
collaborations in chemical and biological warfare R&D. As Brian Balmer explains, “the 
tripartite division of labour established during the Second World War had held, with the 
UK concentrating on fundamental research while bomb trials continued in both the US 
and Canada.”198 Gowing states, “in chemical and biological warfare the programmes of 
the two countries remained so closely in step as to be virtually integrated.”199 According 
to Carter and Pearson, “While the UK’s liaison with the United States and Canada on 
chemical warfare and defence was of earlier origin and channeled through more formal 
links, that on biological depended considerably on personal contact and notably through 
the efforts of Lord Trevor Stamp, one of Fildes’ staff who remained in the USA and 
Canada from 1943 to 1945.”200 The First Tripartite Meeting on collaborative research 
and development of chemical and biological agents and weapons occurred on 18 March 
1947, with twenty-one senior individuals from the US, UK and Canada, meeting at the 
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Army Chemical Center, Edgewood, Maryland for “an informal discussion on a US-UK-
Canadian research programme on toxicological warfare.”201 These meetings brought 
together scientific personnel from the US, UK and Canada, who were working on 
chemical and biological warfare issues. Carter and Pearson state: 
The perceived value of collaborative efforts between America, Britain 
and Canada remained as an important facet in the BW programme of 
each nation. The CW communities, which were then preoccupied with 
evaluating the military significance of the German nerve agents, also 
recognized the benefits of collaboration. However, it was now evident 
that the informal and ad hoc apparatus for wartime collaboration needed 
some formalization and structure. Thus, the formalized tripartite co-
ordination of research in BW and CW began in 1947.202 
Collaboration however did not spill over into atomic energy, as John Baylis explains: 
Apart from atomic energy, in other respects the defence relationship 
mirrored the general pattern with the informal defence links of 1946/7 
providing a portent of the closer partnership to follow and the attempts to 
maximize the mutual defence effort in 1948/9 providing one of the most 
important and distinctive manifestations of the gradual renewal of a more 
‘special relationship’ between the two countries.203 
Other events dealt a blow to Britain’s atomic aspirations. The US Atomic Energy Act 
moved to severely limit atomic collaboration and information exchange between the US 
and its wartime allies, effectively ending any hope of nuclear collaboration with the US.  
In September 1947, US Secretary of State George C. Marshall decided to reopen 
dialogue with the UK and Canada regarding nuclear weapons development. British 
official nuclear historian Margaret Gowing believed that this was due primarily to the 
US need for Canadian and Congolese uranium ore.204 However, this led to a thawing in 
relations between the US and UK, which in turn led to high-level meetings between 
American, British and Canadian representatives on atomic cooperation. The outcome of 
these meetings led to the creation of a tripartite agreement on atomic energy in 
January.205 This agreement or modus vivendi was initially created as an outline of ways 
in which the three states could collaborate on nuclear weapons designs and 
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production.206 While this was not the complete restoration of US-UK collaboration on 
nuclear research, it was a compromise that in the short term would provide the UK with 
the belief that the two wartime allies would eventually reestablish the special 
relationship. 
Research and development into a fission bomb continued throughout 1948 and 
1949. By August 1949, scientific staff at High Explosive Research (HER) numbered 
over 300, which was a ten-fold increase over its initial membership.207 The Labour 
government was strongly committed to building its nuclear capabilities in the early 
postwar period. Knowing that the transfer of information between the UK and US had 
been curtailed due to the Atomic Energy Act, it was going to require a substantial effort 
on the part of the government, military and scientific community to develop a 
deliverable, kiloton nuclear weapon. Not only was it important for national prestige 
concerns and the reestablishment of the special relationship with the US, it was 
important from the perspective of British security. Attlee had explained the rationale 
behind the decision to go for nuclear weapons years later in terms of the fear of US 
isolationist policy and British defence and security: 
We had to hold up our position vis-à-vis the Americans. We couldn’t 
allow ourselves to be wholly in their hands, and their position wasn’t 
awfully clear always. At that time we had to bear in mind that there was 
always the possibility of their withdrawing and becoming isolationist 
once again. The manufacture of a British bomb was therefore at this 
stage essential to our defence. You must remember that this was all prior 
to NATO. NATO has altered things. But at the time although we were 
doing out best to make the Americans understand the realities of the 
European situation – the world situation – we couldn’t be sure we’d 
succeed. In the end we did. But we couldn’t take risks with British 
security in the meantime. We had worked from the start for international 
control of the bomb. We wanted it completely under the United Nations. 
That was the best way. But it was obviously going to take a long time. 
Meanwhile we had to face the world as it was. We had to look to our 
defence – and to our industrial future. We could not agree that only 
America should have atomic energy.208 
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However, something was about to happen that would send shock waves through the 
intelligence world and the repercussions would be felt in London and Washington for 
some time. 
On 29 August, at approximately 07:00 local time, the USSR detonated its first 
atomic bomb at Semipalatinsk Test Site in the northeastern part of Kazakh SSR. Called 
First Lightning and codenamed Joe-1, by the British and Americans, this shot had an 
explosive yield of 22 kt.209 A few days after the detonation, on 1 September, a B-29 
operated by the US Air Force’s Weather Service departed Misawa Air Force Base on 
the Japanese island of Honsh! bound for Eilson Air Force Base in Alaska. The B-29 
was equipped with special filters, which were designed to detect atmospheric 
radiological debris. Upon examining the aircraft’s filters trace amounts of radioactivity 
were found.210 In order to determine whether or not a nuclear detonation had occurred, 
more flights were made in order to collect more meteorological data. After discussions 
with numerous scientists, government officials and representatives from the UK, it was 
determined that the Soviet Union had indeed detonated a nuclear device in late 
August.211 
The British Atomic Energy Authorities were informed of American suspicions on 
10 September at 11:30 prior to a “mass of air containing radioactivity” that was due to 
pass north of Scotland. Two converted Handley Page Halifax bombers were dispatched 
from RAF bases in Gibraltar and Aldergrove, Northern Ireland, equipped with filters 
similar in design to British Army standard issue gas masks.212 The flight departing from 
RAF Aldergrove returned with traces of radioactive debris, while the other did not. 
What was most surprising about this test from the British and American point of 
view was not that the Soviets were able to develop and detonate a nuclear device but the 
timing in which this occurred. In a 23 September statement Truman publicly announced 
evidence of the first Soviet atomic explosion. He stated: 
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Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual 
development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This 
probability has always been taken into account by us.213 
He also claimed that: 
Nearly 4 years ago I pointed out that "scientific opinion appears to be 
practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon 
which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also 
substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our 
present theoretical knowledge in time." And, in the Three-Nation 
Declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers 
of the United Kingdom and of Canada, dated November 15, 1945, it was 
emphasized that no single nation could in fact have a monopoly of 
atomic weapons.214 
 
In a CIA memo dating from July 1948, from Director Roscoe Hillenkotter to 
President Truman, it was believed that the Soviets were still a few years away from 
possessing a nuclear device. The report states: 
On the basis of the evidence now in our possession, it is estimated that 
the earliest date by which it is remotely possible that the USSR may have 
completed its first atomic bomb is mid-1950, but the most probable date 
is believed to be mid-1953.215 
It was thought that the Soviet Union’s reserves of raw materials were more of a 
“potential rather than actual strength.” Compared with the US and UK one can see that 
in 1946 the Soviet Union was well behind the US in terms of resource reserves. The 
total reserves of uranium available to the Soviet programme were believed to be low as 
well, which would have proven to be a significant obstacle for its enrichment 
programme. Barely four years had elapsed since the first US test in the New Mexico 
desert. The American nuclear monopoly was no more. How did this happen? How were 
the Soviets able to detonate a nuclear device so quickly? All this occurred, as we have 
seen, years before the US and UK thought possible. President Truman, in the wake of 
the Joe-1 shot, announced a crash programme to develop a fusion or hydrogen bomb on 
31 January 1950.216 
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TABLE 2. PRODUCTION IN BASIC ITEMS 
 USSR USA UK 
Steel (millions of tons) 14 61.6 12.7 
Coal (millions of tons) 168 524.8 189 
Oil (millions of tons) 21.7 248 n/a 
Motor Vehicles 132 000 3 096 000 365 000 
Source: Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, Soviet Interests, Intentions and 
Capabilities – General: Report by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee. JIC (47) 7/2. TNA CAB 158/1. 
 
Many questions concerning how the Soviets were as quick to develop a nuclear 
device were answered over the course of February and March. On 3 February 1950, 
German-born physicist Klaus Fuchs was charged with passing nuclear secrets to the 
Soviet Union.217 The previous autumn, the FBI had intercepted Soviet cable traffic 
indicating that there was a spy operating out of the Manhattan Project.218 Fuchs first 
began working on the Tube Alloys project in 1941 after an approach from Rudolf 
Peierls. In 1943, Fuchs was sent to Columbia University in New York then on to Los 
Alamos where he was employed in the theoretical physics division under Hans Bethe.219 
Fuchs’ primary area of research dealt with the issues surrounding the implosion of the 
fissionable core of the plutonium design. He returned to Britain after the war and 
became deputy scientific director of the British Atomic Energy Research Institute at 
Harwell, outside Oxford until his arrest in 1950.220 Fuchs was released from prison nine 
years into his fourteen-year sentence, eventually emigrating to East Germany.221 
 
Operation Hurricane 
On 25 October 1951, Sir Winston Churchill and the Conservative Party won the 
British General Election with a majority of twenty-six.222 This was significant as 
Churchill placed a strong emphasis in the idea of developing a substantial nuclear 
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weapons programme in the UK and was a key supporter of Tube Alloys before it was 
subsumed into the Manhattan Project. That November, Churchill was briefed on the 
previous government’s work on the nuclear bomb project. Churchill was surprised as to 
how the Attlee government was able to conceal the size, scope and cost of the project 
from Parliament.223 Churchill initially felt that it might be better for Britain to possess 
“the art rather than the article” meaning research into developing a nuclear device 
should continue, though stopping short of the genuine article.224 Churchill’s Paymaster 
General, Lord Cherwell, was one his most influential advisors in nuclear issues and was 
a great supporter of an independent British nuclear programme. His influence with 
Churchill was such that it was never really a question of whether or not Britain would 
possess a deliverable thermonuclear device. The Attlee government during the previous 
five years had already taken many of the important nuclear decisions. Over £100 million 
had already been allocated to the nuclear programme by the time Churchill returned to 
10 Downing Street.225 Nevertheless, the new government made plans that would ensure 
the test of an independent British nuclear weapon by the end of 1952. 
 With the British nuclear programme moving forward at a steady pace, decisions 
needed to be made regarding the testing of the fission device. In February 1951 the 
British Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the first atomic bomb trial would be a ship-borne 
test, tentatively scheduled for late 1952.226 The other big question was where would the 
test occur? A few years earlier the search for a suitable location had begun with sites in 
Australia, Canada, South Africa and the US short-listed.227 On 27 December 1951, the 
head of High Explosive Research, Dr. William Penney, informed Australian Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies that the preferred site for the British nuclear test would be the 
Monte Bello Islands.228 It was initially hoped that test sites in the US would be available 
to the British for Hurricane. Unfortunately the Americans were not prepared to offer 
their test sites to the British until they were ready to, “put forward further proposals for 
tripartite cooperation.”229 The nuclear relationship between the US and UK had become 
strained in light of the Fuchs affair and while it was hoped that a British nuclear test in 
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the US could be seen as a purely military exercise and not as a scientific endeavour, this 
was not the case. The Monte Bello test site off the northwest coast of Australia would 
be the location for Britain’s first nuclear detonation or ‘shot’. 
 On 8 June 1952 a River class frigate, the HMS Plym, embarked for Australia 
with the nuclear test device safely on board. This device was very similar in structure 
and composition to the first US atomic device detonated at Alamogordo in 1945.230 The 
plutonium implosion device was successfully detonated at 09:15 on 3 October in a bay 
off Trimouille Island off the west coast of Australia.231 The estimated yield was 25 kt. 
With this test, Britain had become the third nuclear weapons state behind the US and 
USSR. While the test was ultimately successful it was overshadowed a few weeks later. 
On 31 October the US tested the first fusion device as part of Operation Ivy, on 
Enewetak, an atoll in the Marshall Islands. Based on the Teller-Ulam design Ivy Mike 
was the first full test of a ‘staged’ fusion bomb. Ivy Mike’s yield was a staggering 10.4 
megatons (Mt).232 According to Peter Hennessy, this device produced a yield that was 
twice the power of all of the explosives used during the Second World War.233 Sixteen 
days later the US detonated Ivy King at Enewetak. This explosion was the largest pure 
fission nuclear bomb ever tested by the United States, with a yield of 500 kt.234 The 
Teller-Ulam staged fusion bomb design set a new standard for sheer destructive power. 
If the UK was going to reestablish its strategic partnership with the US, then possessing 
thermonuclear weapons was necessary. 
 
The Hunt for Fusion 
 While the Hurricane test was universally acknowledged as successful, its 
significance relating to US-UK atomic cooperation was less so. It was hoped that 
Hurricane would suitably impress the Americans and that it would lead to renewed 
cooperation between the two former Allies on atomic issues. With the megaton blast of 
Ivy Mike atomic cooperation seemed much less likely. In fact Congressman William 
Harrison (R-Wyoming) was noted in a poll conducted by the Washington Star that 
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atomic cooperation with Britain would be “trading a horse for a rabbit.”235 Britain could 
not afford to rest on the results of Hurricane. If atomic cooperation and the renewal of 
the special relationship was the goal, Britain needed to prove its worth and get that seat 
at the table. On 7 January President Truman, in his Annual Message to the Congress on 
the State of the Union, announced the development of the hydrogen bomb.236  
With Truman’s statement, it soon became more of a question of “when” as 
opposed to “if” in whether the UK would try and develop nuclear fusion weapons.237 
This was further reinforced on 12 August –when the USSR detonated what it claimed 
was its first thermonuclear device. In reality Joe-4 was a hybrid device that included a 
thermonuclear component. The yield of Joe-4 was estimated around 400 kt.238 In 
November the RAF received delivery of the first air-deliverable nuclear weapon. The 
Mark I bomb, Blue Danube, was the first air-deliverable nuclear weapon to be wholly 
developed in the UK. It measured five feet wide by twenty feet long and its design yield 
was variable between five and twenty kilotons.239 Blue Danube was to be delivered by 
the new Vickers Valiant strategic bomber. 
The year 1954 would prove to be an important one for the British thermonuclear 
programme. On 13 April, Prime Minister Churchill informed his ministers at the GEN 
464 Cabinet Subcommittee meeting240 that he would like the full Cabinet to authorize 
the manufacture of a hydrogen bomb.241 One year prior to the GEN 464 meeting, Lord 
Cherwell informed the Cabinet that he thought it necessary to create a body similar to 
the United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), funded by the Treasury and 
responsible to MoD, to oversee the thermonuclear programme.242 In early 1953 a 
committee under former Chancellor and Home Secretary Lord Waverley was set up to 
make recommendations as how best to transfer the nuclear programme to a public 
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enterprise.243 The Chiefs of Staff meanwhile submitted their general strategic 
assessment to the Defence Policy Committee (DPC) on 1 June.244 Eight days later 
another memorandum from the Chiefs of Staff laid out recommendations regarding H-
bomb research and production.245 Suggestions laid out in the Waverley Report and the 
subsequent Atomic Energy Authority Act of 1954 would lead to the creation of the 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) on 19 July.246  
Throughout the process, Cabinet was not always in agreement. Lorna Arnold 
argues that there were five major questions discussed by the Cabinet: costs, the moral 
issue, the need for influence and standing in world affairs, concern that other European 
nations, particularly Germany, might also want to produce thermonuclear weapons and 
the need to justify production of thermonuclear weapons to public opinion.247 Churchill 
mistakenly thought that on 7 July he had the Cabinet’s support to go ahead with the 
thermonuclear programme. He did not as Cabinet had decided to defer its decision. 
Finally, on 27 July, upon the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence 
Policy Committee, Cabinet agreed to move forward with the development of a 
thermonuclear weapons programme. 
 With the decision now taken it remained to be seen exactly which route towards 
developing a thermonuclear weapon Britain would take. A Chiefs of Staff report from 
November 1954 identified two types of thermonuclear devices, Type A: 
could be based on the present Mark I bomb but would be more efficient 
with a redesigned implosion system. Such a weapon would weigh about 
12,000 lbs., have a diameter of 60 inches and would yield between 1 and 
1.5 MT; its fissile material would cost about four times as much as that 
in a mixed 20 KT Mark I bomb. The chief advantages of this type are 
relative simplicity and comparatively small demands for special 
material.248 
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Type B: 
Could be based on Red Beard which is a physically small atomic 
detonator. While exact estimates cannot yet be given, this type would 
give an H-bomb smaller in diameter, lighter in weight and of a higher 
yield than that of Type A for the same expenditure of fissile material and 
money.249 
It was believed the Type A device would be more achievable in foreseeable future, 
whereas Type B was still more or less in the theoretical stages. Because Type A was 
seen as more similar to the plutonium implosion device used previously, it was thought 
that Britain’s best chance in achieving thermonuclear weapons lay with this particular 
method. However if the secrets of the H-bomb could be unlocked, it was this technology 
that would prove to be the most desirable for British nuclear deterrence. The report also 
made three key recommendations regarding R&D priorities for the Atomic Weapons 
Research Establishment (AWRE). They were: 
1. Development of the Type B H-bomb, including development of a 
Red Beard type of ‘detonator’, with a yield of about 5 MT, with a 
view to trial of the warhead in late 1958 and production of 10 bombs 
a year from 1959. 
2. Development of Red Beard as a warhead for an aircraft bomb (‘in-
flight insertion and extraction’ not to be included in the initial 
production) and for ground-to-ground guided weapons. 
3. Further development of the Mark I warhead to raise the power by 
mixing and boosting to the greatest extent possible consistent with 
the use of the minimum amount of fissile material necessary to 
ensure detonation, but without involving any further considerable 
development.250 
The idea was to get an air-deliverable megaton bomb into service as quickly as possible. 
And the shortest route to it was going to be through a boosted fission device. Type B 
design’s main problem dealt with the production of lithium-6, which was technically 
difficult to produce and that it was needed in large quantities for large yield radiation 
implosion weapons.251 According to Lorna Arnold, “No one in the UK had ever 
produced lithium metal in anything more than fractions of a gram, much less separated 
the isotopes (lithium-6 and lithium-7) in quantity, or made lithium compounds and used 
them to fabricate components.”252 John Simpson states that: 
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The first half of 1955 thus produced a series of decisions on the military 
exploitations of nuclear energy which led to a transformation of the 
nature of the project as it had evolved over the previous ten years, and 
injected a pervading sense of urgency into it. It no longer had a single, 
finite and limited aim but was concerned now both to develop new types 
of weapons and achieve a substantial stockpile of operational ones.253 
Eventually it was decided that a Type B hydrogen bomb would be possible and that was 
where the bulk of AWRE’s efforts should lie.254 
 The culmination of the efforts into developing a thermonuclear weapon was to 
occur in May 1957 with the Grapple tests. Envisaging the Pacific tests scheduled for 
spring 1957 was an interesting situation. From a logistical perspective, the Pacific trials 
would require a significant effort as Grapple would be the single biggest combined 
operation since the Second World War, including a large civilian component as well as 
the three branches of the Armed Forces.255 In total, 3515 individuals were involved in 
the Grapple trials.256 As a result, plans for the trials were going ahead, whereas it was 
not clear which types of devices would be tested. When the trials were conceived in late 
1955, there were four weapon designs that were initially favoured. They were: 
1. Green Bamboo, a single spherical device with a thermonuclear 
component. 
2. A version of G2, the second round to be fired in June 1956 in the 
Mosaic trial at Monte Bello (the Mosaic G2, was intended to have 
a lead tamper, but a uranium tamper was planned for the Grapple 
version). 
3. Orange Herald, a megaton boosted fission round. 
4. Green Granite, a cylindrical bomb, a hydrogen bomb employing 
a radiation implosion technique – a design discussed at 
Aldermaston at least as far back as January 1955. 
Three of the four original designs were actually boosted or Type A weapons. Only 
Green Granite was a Type B device. The final list of devices to be tested in the Grapple 
trials underwent a few permutations, as there were specific issues that affected the 
ability of one or more of the devices to be adequately tested.257 In the end the three 
devices that were tested were: 
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1. Short Granite, a two-stage thermonuclear modified, ‘close 
proximity’ version of Green Granite. 
2. Orange Herald. 
3. Purple Granite was essentially the same as Short Granite but 
with extra uranium-235 and an outer layer of aluminum.258 
First off on 15 May was Short Granite. This was intended to be Britain’s first 
detonation of a thermonuclear weapon. Unfortunately, Short Granite did not achieve the 
desired results and its initial estimated yield of 300 kt fell far short of the anticipated 1 
Mt blast. Sixteen days later, Orange Herald was detonated with the estimated yield a 
much larger 720 kt, though it must be said that this design was a pure fission weapon as 
it was uncertain whether there had been any boosting effect at all or if the yield came 
from the fission of uranium-235.259 On 19 June, Purple Granite was detonated and 
while operationally it was a success, the estimated yield was around 150 kt, roughly half 
of what Short Granite produced.260 Overall, the Grapple trials were valuable but 
somewhat disappointing as none of the devices were able to achieve what was hoped.  
 Following closely behind the Grapple shots came the Antler series, followed by 
another series of Grapple tests in late 1957. There were three separate bomb designs 
that were potential test devices for Grapple X. It was eventually decided that Round A 
would be the first shot in the Grapple X series. On 8 November 1957, the Round A 
warhead, installed in a Blue Danube casing, was dropped from a Valiant bomber shortly 
after 08:46 local time and detonated at approximately 8000 feet above the surface of the 
ocean261 The estimated yield of Grapple X was 1.8 Mt, a figure that far exceeded the 
anticipated yield of 1 Mt.  
The Grapple X shot was significant for two reasons; first it showed that Britain 
possessed the scientific expertise to develop a thermonuclear device capable of a blast 
in the megaton range. Second, it also showed that Britain was technologically able to 
develop an air-deliverable thermonuclear weapon. Grapple X was delivered by an RAF 
Valiant strategic bomber the primary component of Britain’s strategic nuclear 
deterrent.262 Britain had entered into the realm of thermonuclear weapons five years 
after their initial atomic detonation in 1952. Further tests occurred in April 1958 – 
Grapple Y – and the final British-only thermonuclear test Grapple Z occurred in 
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September 1958, with shots on the 2nd and 11th of the month. From this point forward, 
there would be no more British-only nuclear tests.263 As John Walker explains,  
Grapples X and Y put the UK well down the road to meeting its nuclear 
defence requirements. There were further developments and 
improvements that still needed to be made in UK design capabilities, 
irrespective of the promise of US information, which finally became a 
reality in the late summer and early autumn of 1958.264 
 
The final few Grapple tests helped convince the Eisenhower administration that 
Britain did indeed deserve their seat at the head table and were worthy of renewed 
scientific and military cooperation. On 30 June 1958, US Congress approved changes to 
the Atomic Energy Act, which permitted technical cooperation between the US and UK. 
This culminated in the 4 August 1958 Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of 
Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes. After twelve years of frustration, the 
special relationship had been reestablished. In the words of Edward Teller, “it was plain 
that the laws of physics operated on both sides of the Atlantic.”265 
 
TABLE 3. TIME BETWEEN FIRST ATOMIC AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS 
USA Trinity to Bravo 103 months 
USSR Joe 1 to Joe 19 75 months 
UK Hurricane to Grapple X 61 months 
Source: Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 223. 
 
TABLE 4. TIME FROM INITIAL DECISION TO FIRST THERMONUCLEAR TEST 
USA Presidential directive to Bravo 49 months 
UK Cabinet decision to Grapple X 39 months 
Source: Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 223. 
 
CABINETS AND COMMITTEES 
The UK case study is a straightforward example of how different governments 
make nuclear, biological and chemical weapons decisions. With a parliamentary system 
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that dates back well over four centuries, major policy decisions are taken in a very 
specific, formalized manner. Much has been written on how the British government, 
specifically the Cabinet, functions.266 Cabinet and other committees are important 
components of the policy process. Committees are the lifeblood of government. Many 
important policy issues are referred to specific committees, either appointed by the 
Prime Minister or by the Cabinet. These committees are sometimes broken down into 
smaller subcommittees, which can exist for brief periods, usually to debate a specific 
policy issue. The Committee of Imperial Defence, Subcommittee on Bacteriological 
Warfare is an example. This subcommittee was, as Brian Balmer explains, “the key 
interface between biowarfare scientists and policy-makers.”267 Since the understanding 
of the potential to use biological agents as weapons of war was in its infancy in the 
1930s, these committees were invaluable in presenting policy-makers with up to date 
information on R&D efforts. The following section will provide a look at how the 
decision to develop an independent nuclear weapons programme was made. The focus 
on nuclear weapons is due to time constraints and general availability of primary 
sources.268 
 
British Bureaucratic Politics 
When the Labour Party won the 1945 British General Election, the atomic 
bombings of Japan were a few months away. British involvement in the creation of the 
first atomic weapon was extensive and vital to the ultimate success of the project. Many 
key Manhattan Project scientists were British-based and had begun work on atomic 
issues at the outbreak of the Second World War. Unfortunately from a British 
perspective, the goodwill shared between the wartime allies was relatively short lived. 
The 1946 Atomic Energy Act signalled the end of nuclear cooperation and presented the 
Attlee government with a considerable decision; should Britain develop its own 
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independent nuclear weapons programme? To debate this singular issue, Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee created a small committee of ministers, named GEN 75. As Margaret 
Gowing explains, “Committees of ministers who gather together for certain ad hoc 
purposes are given GEN numbers; although they have a formal secretariat and formal 
circulation of papers, their existence and functions are not included in committee books 
and organization charts.”269  
Committees are a standard component of the Whitehall parliamentary system. 
Issues that are deemed too sensitive or secretive for general debate are frequently 
referred to committees. GEN 75 was an ad hoc ministerial committee where a small 
group of ministers met to discuss atomic energy and the development of a British 
atomic weapon. This is in slight contrast to official committees where informed civil 
servants take part in the debate of the issue(s) in question. In August 1946 the Atomic 
Energy Official Committee was set up to “consider questions in the field of atomic 
energy which call for discussion between departments.”270 The Committee consisted of 
the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat, the Foreign Office, the Treasury, 
the Dominion Office and the Ministry of Supply.271  
The atomic bomb question was initially debated by a small number of 
individuals within GEN 75.272 Since the decision to develop an independent nuclear 
weapons programme was of vital importance, it was in the government’s best interest to 
keep the circle small. Attlee was reluctant, much in the same way Churchill was, to 
bring the full Cabinet into atomic discussions. Gowing states that, “During the six years 
of Mr. Attlee’s Government atomic energy or bombs appeared less than ten times on the 
agenda of Cabinet meetings” and “half these appearances – five – were in the first six 
months of the period.”273 Attlee, as well as some of his closest colleagues, were of the 
opinion that the British public “know as little as possible lest an enemy learn even 
more.”274 On 28 August a memorandum from the Prime Minister outlined the necessity 
of developing major policy regarding the atomic bomb.275 As Peter Hennessey explains:  
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Attlee and his inner group of atomic-primed ministers pursued a twin-
track approach. Hopes still existed for an international agreement 
through the proposed United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. But at 
the same time, GEN 75 began work of creating a UK capacity to make a 
bomb by authorizing funds for the construction of a plutonium pile in 
Cumberland as a matter of the highest urgency and importance.276 
 
Bureaucratic pulling and hauling was evident during the discussions leading up 
to the decision to develop an independent nuclear weapons programme. During the 
fifteenth meeting of GEN 75 on 25 October 1946, President of the Board of Trade, Sir 
Stafford Cripps and Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton had voiced the greatest 
opposition against the creation of an independent British nuclear weapons programme. 
There was a proposal tabled to pursue a preliminary design for the construction of a 
gaseous diffusion plant for the production of Uranium 235.277 The Minister of Supply, 
John Wilmot, estimated the cost to be between £30-40 million, spread over a period of 
four to five years.278 Both Cripps and Dalton expressed their concerns over the 
perceived high cost of the proposal. The minutes of the meeting recorded their doubts: 
In discussion it was argued that we must consider seriously whether we 
could afford to divert from civilian consumption and the restoration of 
our balance of payments, the economic resources required for a project 
on this scale. Unless present trends were reversed we might find 
ourselves faced with an extremely serious economic and financial 
situation in two to three years time.279 
Cripps and Dalton presented a convincing argument based on what they thought was 
sound economic pragmatism. The tone of the meeting changed once Foreign Secretary 
and influential trade unionist Ernest Bevin entered into the debate. Bevin was a man of 
enormous personality and personal conviction. The official meeting minutes recorded 
his thoughts on the matter as: 
On the other hand it was argued that we could not afford to be left behind 
in a field which was of such revolutionary importance from an industrial, 
no less than from a military point of view. Our prestige in the world, as 
well as our chances of securing American co-operation would both suffer 
if we did not exploit to the full a discovery in which we had played a 
leading part at the outset. The development of a new source of industrial 
power might strengthen our industrial position very considerably in the 
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future, particularly at a time when it was becoming more and more 
difficult to find labour for coal mining.280 
 
According to Sir Michael Perrin, who was present at the meeting as a 
representative of the Ministry of Supply, the tenor of Bevin’s thoughts and opinions 
were much more compelling. As Perrin recalls, Bevan stated: 
No, Prime Minister, that won’t do at all. We’ve got to have this. I don’t 
mind for myself, but I don’t want any other Foreign Secretary of this 
country to be talked at, or to, by the Secretary of State in the United 
States as I just have in my discussions with Mr. Byrnes. We’ve got to 
have this thing over here whatever it costs. We’ve got to have the bloody 
Union Jack on top of it.281 
Bevin was ultimately successful in turning the discussion toward pursuing an 
independent nuclear programme. After this meeting, Lord Portal the Controller of 
Production of Atomic Energy, wrote a memo to Prime Minister Attlee, dated 31 
December. In Portal’s brief, he lays out three possible courses of action282 that the 
government could take: 
1. Not to develop the atomic weapon at all. 
2. To develop the weapon by means of the ordinary agencies in the 
Ministry of Supply and the Service Departments. 
3. To develop the weapon under special arrangements conducive to 
the utmost secrecy. 
Attlee decided that the appropriate course of action regarding this brief would be to take 
it to committee. Since he was cautious of involving Dalton and Cripps, two of the GEN 
75 dissenters, Attlee created a new committee, which met only once, on 8 January 1947. 
This British Cabinet Committee on Atomic Energy, recorded as GEN 163, included 
representatives from the Ministries of Supply, Defence, Dominion Affairs and Foreign 
Affairs. This meeting laid out the path to developing Britain’s own nuclear weapons 
programme, under the guidance of William Penney.283 May would see a plan to build 
two air-cooled reactors approved by the government. A month later Penney would be 
put in charge of the BHER programme. Under Penney, BHER was tasked with 
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developing Britain’s atomic weapons programme, which was located at Woolwich 
Arsenal.284 
 Lord Portal and Foreign Secretary Bevin were strong supporters of Britain 
having an independent nuclear weapons programme. During the first (and only) meeting 
of GEN 163, Bevin was recorded as saying that: 
We (Britain) should press on with the study of all aspects of atomic 
energy. We could not afford to acquiesce in an American monopoly of 
this new development. Other countries also might well develop atomic 
weapons. Unless therefore an effective international system could be 
developed under which the production and use of the weapon would be 
prohibited, we must develop it ourselves.285 
The omission of Dalton and Cripps, two of the Cabinet’s most senior economic 
politicians, from GEN 163 was significant, and as Peter Hennessy argues, “can only be 
explained by Attlee’s determination that the decision should go through on the nod.”286 
For a few individuals, like Bevin, prestige was an important factor. Britain had been 
involved in the comprehensive defeats of the Axis Powers in the Second World War and 
was keen to retain its status as a leading global player. Bevin’s comments reflected this 
and it had resonated throughout the committee.  
 The decision to develop an independent nuclear weapons programme is a good 
example of bureaucratic politics at work. On the table was a significant policy decision 
that required debate at the highest levels of government. A small, ad hoc committee was 
created for this singular purpose.287 Though the key players in the committee 
discussions were largely Labour Party politicians, there were competing interests 
between a few individuals. As highlighted, Hugh Dalton and Sir Stafford Cripps were 
two of the government’s most senior economic politicians. They had very real concerns 
regarding the cost-benefit and viability of an independent nuclear programme, so close 
to the end of the Second World War, which had left Britain with a large debt and 
considerable payments to its wartime Allies. Bevin saw things differently. Outside of 
the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary had more contact with US officials than any 
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other Cabinet member. The creation of the US Atomic Energy Act was a particularly 
sensitive issue for the British as many had felt betrayed by American refusals to share 
atomic secrets. Though both sides had the same political affiliations, they definitely saw 
this issue from different places. According to Morton Halperin, “participants usually do 
not see issues as arbitrary, and they tend to find strong grounds to favor one 
position.”288  
Each individual in the decision to go nuclear had his own personal reasons, for 
or against. Graham Allison states that, “Individuals share power and they differ about 
what must be done. Differences matter.”289 In this case the ministries that Dalton, 
Cripps and Bevin represented were all different and as Allison explains, “because their 
preferences and beliefs are related to the different organizations they represent, their 
analyses yield conflicting recommendations.”290 Since Attlee was for the nuclear 
weapons programme, it made sense that he would decide not to include Dalton and 
Cripps in the reconvened GEN 163 committee for fear of having the process start over 
from the beginning.  
The decision to develop an independent nuclear weapons programme, when 
viewed through the bureaucratic politics lens, provides a characteristic example of the 
“pulling and hauling” that is endemic to politics.291 The bureaucratic politics model is 
only one of a number of means in approaching British decisions on nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons. When used in a non-crisis situation and in examining a specific 
policy issue, in this case whether or not to develop an independent nuclear weapons 
programme, bureaucratic politics can provide an extra level of analysis that other 
decision-making models cannot. As we have seen, these types of decisions are not made 
because of one individual’s personal bias. Within the Cabinet, decisions on NBC 
weapons were referred to small standing or ad hoc committees for discussion and 
debate. While the Prime Minister is ultimately responsible for taking the decision, but 
that is not before multiple levels of discussion and analysis by political figures, 
scientists and military personnel. Bureaucratic politics has ultimately proven to be a 
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useful tool in looking at the British government’s decisions to develop nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This case study was intended to provide an in-depth look at the British 
government’s decisions to develop NBC weapons, in order to understand the 
connections between nuclear weapons on the one hand and chemical and biological 
weapons on the other. The Second World War was a significant factor in Britain’s 
decisions to develop a non-conventional weapons capability. During the Second World 
War some influential members of the government saw the development of an atomic 
weapon as a necessary component of their war effort against the Axis powers. At this 
time British thinking was influenced by the belief that Germany might be conducting 
research into the possibility of using nuclear fission to create atomic bombs. Since the 
United States was not actively involved in combat operations at this point, the Roosevelt 
administration did not view nuclear technology the same way the British did. American 
interests eventually shifted to investigating the feasibility of developing atomic weapons 
on 18 December 1941, nine days after the Japanese attack that crippled the US Pacific 
Fleet at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii. This sentiment was not as widely accepted in the United 
States as it was in the UK, as nuclear weapons were thrust into the forefront of weapons 
technology beginning in 1945. Believing that the Soviet Union was close to developing 
a thermonuclear device, Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, had pressed President Harry Truman into committing to the mass-
production of H-bombs, thereby making it the United States’ primary weapon. The 
atomic bomb came to occupy a central role in US military strategy, while the 
deployment of B-29’s to Britain signified an American nuclear commitment to the 
defence of Western Europe.  
This desire to impress the US was significant within both the Churchill and 
Attlee governments.292 There was a strong belief within Attlee’s Cabinet that they 
needed to have a nuclear capability to earn American respect and cooperation in 
political and military affairs.293 The US had a nuclear monopoly until 1949 when the 
Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon. As John Simpson explains, “What 
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complicates this from 1948 onwards is that at heart the British did not actually want to 
make nuclear weapons but what they ideally wanted was to get back to the relationship 
they had with the USA during the war and to therefore have access to US weapons but 
not necessarily to make them themselves.”294 While the declared motive was security 
and the defence of Britain, reestablishing the relationship with the US was a key factor 
in the British decision to go for nuclear weapons.295 The desire to impress the US was 
very strong and that an independent nuclear weapons programme was necessary in order 
to earn American respect and cooperation in military and political matters.296 British 
reasoning was much more complex than the declared purpose of national security and 
defence of the realm. 
 Chemical weapons had been used extensively in the First World War. All sides 
knew the military utility of the early types of chemical agents. Advances in chemistry 
had created a new and highly potent family of nerve agents in the late 1930s and early 
1940s, known as the G-agents. The V-agents were a new type of CW that was 
discovered in the 1950s, and their creation necessitated a rethink of the role that 
chemical weapons would play in British strategic planning. In the postwar period, the 
concept of retaliation-in-kind became part of the accepted language for addressing 
adversity.297 The Soviet Union had supplanted Nazi Germany as the West’s pre-eminent 
enemy and the assumption was that the Soviets were conducting research into different 
types of non-conventional weapons.298 It remained in Britain’s best interest to do the 
same, lest they be left without the ability to retaliate. 
Very little was known about how best to use biological agents as weapons, 
during the early years of British interest in BW. Again, during the Second World War, 
there were concerns that Germany was actively pursuing research into biological 
warfare agents. At the time Britain had tested anthrax biological bombs on Gruinard 
Island as well as having developed anthrax cattle cakes. Effort was put into developing 
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a biological weapon “comparable in strategic effect with the atomic bomb, and 
defensive measures against them.”299 After the Hurricane test in 1952, interest in 
offensive BW had begun to drift, as Brian Balmer explains, “in an ambiguous and 
ambivalent manner… in the direction of defensive in preference to offensive 
priorities.”300 This eventually culminated in the Eden government’s cancellation of the 
offensive chemical and biological weapons programmes in July 1956. 
As demonstrated in this case study, having a non-conventional weapons 
capability – especially nuclear weapons – for the purpose of use in war is not always a 
state’s ultimate goal. These weapons are intrinsically connected to each other on 
multiple levels, such as financial constraints, resource allocation/competition and 
thoughts on national defence and regional security.  
Bureaucratic politics provides a useful theoretical perspective when looking at 
how a state like the UK decides to embark upon developing NBC weapons programmes. 
The example of the GEN 75 committee debates highlights the manner in which these 
decisions are taken. In this particular case, the decision to develop an independent 
nuclear weapons programme was deliberate and pragmatic. A particular issue needed to 
be discussed at the highest levels of government and a decision to develop or not 
develop a nuclear weapons programme had to be taken. Individual personalities were 
influential in determining the final decision. Not that there were competing interests in 
that different proposal for weapons development were put forth, merely competing 
interests between government ministries. In the end it came down to the belief that it 
was in Britain’s best interest to try and reestablish the special relationship with the 
United States – a relationship that had suffered somewhat since the end of the Second 
World War. As C. J. Bartlett explains, “Thus at the end of the war, both in the United 
States and in Britain, there was a definite loosening of the relationship. It was 
understandable that the government of each should have tried to reappraise its policies 
and priorities, and been anxious to explore its range of options.”301 The relationship was 
eventually reestablished and Britain had successfully demonstrated its scientific and 
technical abilities in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons R&D to be of the highest 
calibre.  
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CHAPTER 4 
IRAQ 
We shall use the weapons that will be equatable  
to weapons used against us by our enemies.1 
- Saddam Hussein, 28 January 1991 
 
The area that comprises modern day Iraq (Mesopotamia) has been commonly 
referred to as the cradle of civilization. In approximately the seventh millennium BCE, 
the practice of intensive year round agriculture began. This created a continual supply of 
food and eliminated the need for people to migrate to other food sources, which helped 
to create some of the earliest known permanent settlements.2 The Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers provided a rich, fertile soil and a supply of fresh water for the irrigation of 
agricultural crops. Eventually many civilizations would flourish including Sumer, 
Akkad, Assyria and Babylonia. There were many notable accomplishments during this 
time including the creation of irrigation agriculture, development of roads, the invention 
of the wheel and many achievements in astronomy, mathematics, medicine, architecture 
and philosophy.3 This would continue on throughout the centuries, from the Bronze Age 
through the Islamic conquest in the seventh century, to the establishment of the British 
Mandate of Mesopotamia in 1920, which led to the eventual creation of an independent 
Iraq in 1932.4  
The following decades saw a number of coups d'état occur inside Iraq. The first 
occurred on 14 July 1958 and was led by Army Colonel ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif and 
Brigadier General ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim.5 This violent and bloody affair effectively 
ended the rule of the Hashemite Monarchy and instilled Qasim as Prime Minister. The 
next coup d'état occurred on 8 February 1963 when forces loyal to the newly 
established Ba’th Party seized a number of military installations in and around Baghdad, 
resulting in the deaths of up to 5000 people.6 This event culminated in the capture and 
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execution on 9 February of General Qasim and his colleagues and the establishment of 
‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif as president with Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr as vice-president.7 
November of that same year saw the Ba’th Party torn apart by a bitter ideological 
struggle between rival internal factions. On one side a leftist, militant group headed by 
Ba’th Party Secretary-General Ali Salih al-Sa’di and on the other a right-wing group led 
by Commander of the Air Force General Hardan al-Tikriti.8 On 11 November the leftist 
group was expelled from the party and al-Sa’di and four of his closest associates were 
arrested. The following day the members of the right-wing faction were removed from 
the party by the National Command. This allowed President Arif to turn against the very 
people who promoted him to Ba’th Party leadership and prevent the remaining Ba’th 
Party leaders from achieving positions of power.  
After the problems of November 1963, the Ba’th Party was thrown into disarray. 
Emerging from this as the dominant force was a group of men loyal to Ahmad Hassan 
al-Bakr. In 1964 al-Bakr was elected to the newly formed National Council of the 
Revolutionary Command (NCRC) and a year later Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid al-
Tikriti’s selection was confirmed as well.9 According to Charles Tripp, the NCRC was 
comprised of twelve Ba’thist and four Arab nationalist members. This group exercised 
supreme power, and had some of its members part of the, “formal apparatus of 
government.”10 This regime was to be relatively short lived. 
On 17 July 1968, units loyal to the Ba’th Party seized Broadcasting House, the 
Ministry of Defence as well as Republican Guard headquarters.11 As buildings in 
Baghdad fell to Ba’th forces on 30 July, President Arif was flown out of the country to 
Morocco. He was ‘appointed’ ambassador, but this was merely window dressing, as it 
was widely believed that he would mount a counter-coup against the al-Bakr bloc. This 
event ended his tenure as Iraq’s President and saw the reestablishment of Ba’thist rule, 
with Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr as president and Saddam Hussein as his second-in-
command.12 On 16 July the following year, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr announced his 
resignation as President of Iraq.13 Hours later General Saddam Hussein was sworn in as 
his replacement, completing his relatively rapid rise to the apex of power. For years 
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Hussein was seen as one of al-Bakr’s most trusted lieutenants and his thirst for power 
was known throughout Iraq. Charles Tripp in The History of Iraq states that his power 
grab was “symbolically charged and that the speed of the operation showed that Saddam 
Hussein would take no chances in allowing opposition to his personal rule to 
crystallize.”14 He would continue to operate in much the same capacity up to the 2003 
Invasion of Iraq and his subsequent capture by the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 4th 
Infantry Division, United States Army on 13 December 2003.15  
Politicians, senior technocrats and scientists, military personnel, government 
officials and even family members were not immune to Saddam’s ruthless form of 
autocracy.16 No one was considered untouchable. Nothing was sacrosanct. If it were 
thought that you had done something that was perceived to not be in the best interest of 
the regime, you would be dealt with in a swift and often brutal manner. This frequently 
meant jail time, and for many a fate much worse. Saddam nurtured his aura of fear and 
reward and he understood people at their basest levels.17 Former nuclear weapons 
scientist Mahdi Obeidi said that Saddam’s “culture of intimidation was almost 
mystical.”18 People understood that they could be either horribly punished for 
something or handsomely rewarded with houses, Mercedes-Benz cars or cash.  
Iraqi interest in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons predates Saddam 
Hussein’s 1979 ascent to power. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, 
successive Iraqi governments had shown interest in NBC technology. Iraq’s nuclear 
programme dates back to 1956 with the creation of the Iraqi Atomic Energy 
Commission (IAEC). The IAEC fell under the auspices of the newly created Atoms for 
Peace Program, which sought the peaceful development of nuclear energy.19 The IAEC 
was established with US help and encouragement in order to foster and conduct 
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research, development and training in nuclear science and technology.20 The early 
1960s saw a number of Iraqi military officers sent abroad for training in nuclear, 
biological and chemical defence, which culminated in the formation of the Iraqi 
Chemical Corps in 1964.21 The events of the following decade and the perceived dual 
threats of Israel and Iran would see Iraq pour massive amounts of money and resources 
into their NBC weapons programmes. It is through this lens that I examine Saddam 
Hussein, Iraq, the decisions to pursue nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the 
connections between the programmes. 
 
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME 
Iraq’s interest in nuclear energy was formalized with the creation of the IAEC in 
1956. This does not mean that Iraq’s goal at the time was the creation of a full-scale 
nuclear weapons programme. Certain things need to be established well before any 
substantial weapons development can take place. The establishment of the IAEC was 
the first in a long line of decisions that were crucial to Iraq developing a nuclear 
weapons programme. Three years later, 375 Iraqi university students were sent to the 
Soviet Union to study nuclear technology.22  
During the rule of the Hashemite monarchy, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa’id had 
cultivated close ties with western powers, believing that they were the key players in 
guaranteeing the existence of the monarchy.23 This all changed after the coup with Abd 
al-Karim Qasim as Prime Minister. Friendly relations with the Soviet Union were 
established and Iraq’s relationships with the US and UK suffered as a result. While a 
staunch anti-Communist, Qasim nevertheless saw the USSR as a chief source of 
diplomatic, economic and military support.24 This is further evidenced by the sale of a 
2-megawatt thermal (MWth) research reactor, IRT-5000 supplied by the Soviets in 
1962. The Tuwaitha site, located about thirty kilometres south of Baghdad, became the 
Nuclear Research Center after it was chosen as the location of the Soviet-supplied 
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reactor and its associated facilities.25 According to Khidhir Hamza, when the Kennedy 
administration learned that the USSR was supplying a research reactor to Iraq, they 
offered to supply an American one, which was refused due to a strong pro-communist 
faction within the government.26  
The IRT-5000 reactor went critical in 1967 and began operating at full power the 
following year.27 According to the IAEA, the reactor was used primarily for, 
“radioisotope production and as a neutron source for experimental research in the field 
of nuclear and solid state physics and activation analysis.”28 This was a significant date 
in the chronology of events of the nuclear programme as it marks the beginning of 
dedicated nuclear research in Iraq.29 Another important event took place on 1 July 1968 
with Iraq signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.30 On 29 October 1969 Iraq 
ratified its signature of the NPT, thereby pledging to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes and to not develop nuclear weapons.31 Though safeguards had been in place 
since 1961 it was not until 1972 and the adoption of IAEA INFCIRC/153 that the 
provision for safeguards inspections would come into force.32 This was significant as it 
meant that IAEA safeguards inspectors were permitted to inspect a signatory states’ 
nuclear facilities every six months. Once Iraq had joined the NPT it would be subject to 
the same intrusive inspection mechanisms that all states parties were subjected to, other 
than the five recognized nuclear weapon states. In theory it meant that attempts at 
nuclear subterfuge would be more difficult. However, this proved not to be the case, as 
Iraq would ignore its treaty obligations and begin the process of developing a nuclear 
weapon. 
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Expansion 
The decade of the 1970s would see the greatest expansion of the nuclear 
programme. Early in 1970, the Tuwaitha facility underwent a substantial expansion that 
saw it grow to include a number of buildings, including an isotope production 
laboratory, power substation, workshop, physics and chemistry laboratories, and 
expanded office space for the Nuclear Research Center. The number of personnel also 
expanded from a few dozen to a few hundred.33 According to Khidhir Hamza, “in 1971 
orders were given by Saddam Hussein to begin the process of creating a nuclear 
weapon.”34 This was eventually developed into a comprehensive plan for developing 
nuclear weapons in the form of a 40-page report, co-authored by Hamza and others. The 
plan called for acquiring a medium-sized research reactor from the French, to be 
concealed under the guise of a civilian nuclear programme. The plan also called for a 
clandestine reprocessing unit, which is necessary to separate the plutonium. The report 
was reviewed by a group affiliated with the Revolutionary Council and was ultimately 
approved by Saddam himself.35 
The locus of Hamza's plan was the acquisition of a foreign reactor for producing 
plutonium. His goal was to acquire a complete, safeguarded fuel cycle able to produce 
separated plutonium and duplicate the facilities clandestinely in order to produce non-
safeguarded plutonium, which could be diverted towards a nuclear bomb.36 On 29 
February 1972, in accordance with Article III of the NPT, Iraq agreed to accept IAEA 
safeguards. The agreement was designed to monitor and prevent Iraqi fissionable 
material from being diverted towards a nuclear weapons programme.37 The following 
year French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and Saddam Hussein reached an agreement 
in which France provided Iraq with a nuclear reactor in exchange for petroleum 
concessions, imports of French automobiles, and options on future military aircraft 
purchases.38 Saddam would eventually gain control of Iraq’s nuclear programme when 
in late 1973 oversight of the IAEC was transferred to the Revolutionary Council.39 This 
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was a key moment in the development of Iraq’s nuclear programme. Though he 
understood very little of the science behind the nuclear process, he was nevertheless an 
ardent supporter of the programme. He would make sure that the programme was well-
funded and provided massive incentives and disincentives for all those involved. People 
knew that refusal to cooperate in the clandestine weapons programme would be viewed 
negatively by the regime. Saddam took it as a personal affront of his authority if 
someone refused to assist in developing the programme. This created a level of tension 
that would persist until the end of Operation Desert Storm. 
When the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in 1958, political and economic 
cooperation with the West began to suffer – the notable exception being France – and 
the USSR became one of Iraq’s principal financiers. In June 1974, a delegation from the 
IAEC, including Khidhir Hamza, Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far, and Hussein al-Shahristani, 
travelled to Paris to negotiate the purchase of a nuclear reactor based on the French-
designed Osiris reactor.40 After considerable negotiations, the total cost for the entire 
reactor package came to approximately $300 million.41 Interestingly, this was nearly 
double the initial estimate originally given by the French. The following year, on 10 
September, Saddam Hussein travelled to Paris to meet with French Prime Minister 
Jacques Chirac where he intended to negotiate the export of the two Tammuz research 
reactors.42 Hussein would leverage the deal with sales of discounted Iraqi oil to the 
French. Iraq eventually purchased a 40 MWth nuclear materials testing reactor (MTR) 
from France. This reactor would be known as Tammuz-1 or Osirak.43 The collaboration 
with France was an important period for Iraq’s nuclear programme. The French had 
little problem receiving Iraqi oil in return for nuclear materials. It seemed that Iraq had 
found a partner willing to assist them in their quest to develop a civil nuclear energy 
programme and ultimately, a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. 
 
Enrichment Programmes 
On 7 June 1981, fourteen Israeli jets destroyed Tammuz-1 in Operation Babylon. 
The smaller Tammuz-2 (Isis) reactor, the 600-kilowatt thermal (kWth) critical assembly 
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unit, and associated reprocessing laboratories escaped damage.44 The destruction of 
Osirak was important as it compelled Iraq to investigate the highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) route and not the plutonium route. This meant the creation of a clandestine 
programme dedicated to the enrichment of uranium.45 Later that autumn, Iraqi physicist 
Dr. Humam ‘Abd Al-Khaliq ‘Abd Al-Ghafur suggested enriching uranium using gas 
centrifuge technology.46 Along with Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) 
technology, gas centrifuges would become the regime’s favoured method of uranium 
enrichment.  
According to the ISG Report, Iraq had purchased large quantities of uranium, in 
various forms, including yellowcake and uranium dioxide (UO2), between 1979 and 
1982.47 Portugal and Niger were Iraq’s two biggest suppliers of yellowcake, the others 
being Italy and Brazil. Portugal supplied 286.446 tons over a two-year period and Niger 
sent 199.9 tons between February and March 1981.48 Other imports consisted of 
thousands of kilograms of natural, low-enriched and depleted uranium as UO2 powder 
from both Italy and Brazil.49 The production facilities designated for uranium 
enrichment included Tuwaitha, Al Jazira, Tarmiya, Ash Sharqat, Rashdiya and Al 
Athir.50 
The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War was a watershed event for the Iraqi regime. During 
this time Iraqi scientists were studying a number of different uranium enrichment 
techniques.51 April 1987 saw the IAEC create a mechanism that would assign 
responsibility for different enrichment research methods to special groups. Group One 
was responsible for gaseous diffusion research, Group Two for EMIS research and 
support activities were designated Group Three.52 Many different types of uranium 
enrichment were considered including, laser isotope separation (LIS), chemical 
enrichment and gas centrifuge technology.53 In August 1987, Group One left the 
Tuwaitha complex with the intention of being an independent unit to be known as the 
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Engineering Design Directorate (EDD), located in the Al Rashdiya area of Baghdad.54 
This programme would fall outside the control of the IAEC and directly under Saddam 
Hussein’s son-in-law and head of the Military Industrial Commission (MIC), Hussein 
Kamel. Kamel had a certain amount of autonomy with this project that he viewed as his 
own and because of his position within the MIC; it was funded very well and staffed 
with a number of well-respected scientists and technicians. The head of the programme 
was US-educated physicist Mahdi Obeidi.55 The programme eventually evolved from 
one that dealt with gaseous diffusion to a gas centrifuge programme. Though the 
centrifuges were a modern approach to enriching uranium, they were more difficult to 
manufacture and the programme had not advanced to the same degree as the EMIS 
programme. 
 Iraq’s preferred method of uranium enrichment pre-1991 was EMIS 
technology.56 According to the ISG Report, EMIS was chosen because of the 
availability of this technology in open literature57 and the overall technical competency 
of the Iraqi scientific community.58 Another factor was that Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far who had 
previous training/experience in EMIS technology headed this programme. As was 
commonplace in Iraq, it became an issue of who could promote their own agenda the 
best. EMIS technology utilized a machine called a calutron, which is a type of mass 
spectrometer. According to Frank Barnaby: 
In a calutron, atoms of uranium are ionized – that is, one or more 
electrons in the atom are removed – and injected into a magnetic field. 
The particles bend as they travel in the magnetic field with the lighter 
particles, the uranium-235 particles, bending more than the heavier 
uranium-238 particles.59 
EMIS technology had other appreciable benefits as well. One important factor was that 
no one in the West was thinking about calutrons.60 This was decades old technology – 
first used by the USA during the Manhattan Project – and was not on anyone’s radar 
screen as gas centrifuges had become the standard method for uranium enrichment. For 
Iraq it was an interim measure, post hoc. It was important for the Iraqis to get the NW 
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programme up and running quickly and to do this they needed to use calutrons. Another 
factor was confidentiality. Ja’far’s group working with EMIS had, as their number one 
priority, a need to maintain confidentiality and secrecy. No one outside of Iraq had any 
idea about the existence of the EMIS R&D efforts.61 
 The gas centrifuge programme never achieved the same levels of success that 
the EMIS programme had. This particular technology, though commonplace now, is 
technologically very difficult to perfect. Mahdi Obeidi, head of the centrifuge project 
states that the manufacturing of the centrifuge’s component parts “requires elaborate 
calculations of geometry, advanced metallurgy, and knowledge of stress and tolerances 
beyond the capabilities of most nations.”62 Obeidi’s team eventually produced a 
prototype sub-critical centrifuge, which it considered to be appropriate for large-scale 
exploitation.63  The 1997 IAEA Report on Iraq’s NW programme states that, “this 
achievement – greatly accelerated by foreign assistance – is considered to be consistent 
with the time-scale and resources invested. It is widely believed that without the 
interruption of the Gulf War, Iraq would have been in a position to build and commence 
to operate gas centrifuge pilot cascades of up to one hundred machines around the end 
of 1991.”64 Because the centrifuge programme wanted to move very fast, lots of 
footprints were left, so much so that by 1990 there were open source articles in the 
literature and the intelligence community was aware that Iraq was interested in 
centrifuge technology.65 They had speed of development as their top priority and not 
confidentiality. 
 As previously mentioned, several different methods of uranium enrichment were 
investigated, there was research into uranium enrichment through solvent extraction and 
ion exchange processes during 1988.66 There was also effort put in to developing a laser 
isotope separation (LIS) programme. Beginning in 1981, Iraq had committed substantial 
resources into exploring the possibility of LIS.67 This project was under the supervision 
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of former Vice President of the IAEC, Dr. Humam Al-Ghafur.68 While they investigated 
atomic vapour laser separation and molecular laser isotope separation, the programme 
was ultimately unsuccessful in their attempts to enrich uranium and was subsequently 
shut down in 1988.69 Iraq also claimed to have begun exploratory work on gaseous 
diffusion technology that had commenced in 1982.70 The intention was to develop a 
capability to either directly produce highly enriched uranium or to produce low enriched 
uranium for use as feed material for the EMIS process.71 As stated earlier, the team 
assigned to this project was moved into the gas centrifuge area as priority was to be 
given to developing an indigenous centrifuge programme.  
 
Persian Gulf War and Aftermath 
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Saddam Hussein believed that Kuwait 
had stolen $2.5 billion worth of oil from the Rumalia oil field that spanned the borders 
of the two neighbours.72 He wanted reparations. Four days later, United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661 was passed which imposed sanctions against 
Iraq and occupied Kuwait.73 Later that month on 25 August, UNSCR 665 was passed, 
authorizing maritime forces in the Persian Gulf to enforce sanctions.74 On 29 November 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 678 which authorized the use of “all necessary 
means” to liberate Kuwait. The deadline for Iraq withdrawing from Kuwait was set at 
15 January 1991.75  
Meanwhile the Iraqi clandestine nuclear programme continued to develop. 
Personnel, sophisticated equipment, and testing systems pertaining to Iraq's weapons 
efforts were transferred from Al Tuwaitha and other sites to Al Atheer, which remained 
undiscovered for months after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.76 
On 3 April 1991 the Security Council adopted Resolution 687. This resolution 
created the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was to oversee, in 
                                                
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 1997 IAEA Report, 36-37. 
71 Ibid. 
72 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 339. 
73 “United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) – Adopted by the Security Council at its 
2933rd meeting on 6 August 1990, Security Council Resolutions Concerning Iraq.” US Department of 
State, accessed 12 April 2009, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Bomb: Blueprints and Artifacts," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists (January/February 1992): 31. 
  
118 
conjunction with the IAEA, the destruction of Iraq’s WMD programmes as well as their 
long-range ballistic missiles.77 Eight days later the Security Council acknowledged 
Iraq’s acceptance of Resolution 687, thereby bringing a formal ceasefire into effect.78 
This would mean that Iraq was to be subjected to an intrusive inspection regime and 
would find it difficult to deceive and mislead the international community. On 18 April, 
the initial disclosure of part of Iraq’s weapons declaration that was required under 
Resolution 687 was submitted. Iraq denied having undeclared nuclear-weapons-usable 
material.79 Nine days later, after considerable pressure from the IAEA, Iraq submitted a 
second declaration and admitted for the first time to having some nuclear material and 
facilities in addition to those previously known to the Agency.80 The IAEA conducted 
its first on-site inspection (IAEA 1) under UNSCR 687, from 15-21 May. The team 
inspected the main Iraqi nuclear research facility at Al Tuwaitha and one additional site 
in the Baghdad area, which had been designated by UNSCOM. The principal purpose of 
this inspection was to verify the quantities and conditions of nuclear materials existing 
at the Al Tuwaitha site as declared by Iraq in its letter of 27 April.81 According to the 
ISG Report: 
As part of the denial and deception effort at the end of May 1991, 
(Hussein) Kamel issued orders to collect all documents and equipment 
indicating NPT violations. Equipment and documentation were moved to 
a variety of locations to hide program elements from the IAEA. Iraqi 
researchers were instructed by their managers to dispose of their 
laboratories, some of which were then set up in universities and 
institutes. In addition, Kamel ordered that at least one set of all nuclear-
related documents and some equipment be retained by a senior 
scientist.82 
 
On 7 May 1991 the head of the Ministry of Industry and Military 
Industrialization (MIMI), Hussein Kamel, opened the Al Atheer centre, which was 
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intended to be the major nuclear weapons research and design facility as well as 
functioning as a materials production centre.83 In August, Project 601 was established at 
Al Tuwaitha for the purpose of extracting highly enriched uranium from both the 
French and Russian research reactors.84 This would have seen the Iraqis contravene 
IAEA safeguards by diverting the HEU from Tuwaitha to be used as the core of a 
nuclear device. This plan, referred to as the crash programme, was one of the most 
substantial pieces of information that UN inspectors received in the years following the 
end of the Persian Gulf War. The plant, to be used for the recovery of HEU, was built 
and fully commissioned and the IAEA was successful in accounting for the complete 
inventory of the HEU reactor fuel, throughout May and June 1991.85 This suggests that 
the campaign for actual extraction of HEU from the reactor fuel had not been initiated 
and had the crash programme been carried through it could have reduced the time for 
Iraq to fabricate its first nuclear device by as much as two years.86   
In July, the third IAEA nuclear inspection (IAEA 3) found large stockpiles of 
natural uranium and fifteen kilograms of HEU.87 Shortly thereafter, Iraq confirmed the 
existence of a clandestine programme with the express purpose to manufacture several 
kilograms of UO2, irradiate it in the IRT-5000 reactor, and reprocess the irradiated fuel 
in order to chemically separate gram amounts of plutonium.88 This would precipitate 
UNSCR 707, which demanded Iraq cease all nuclear activities of any kind and provide 
full, final and complete disclosure of its past weapons programmes and that it allow 
UNSCOM and IAEA inspection teams complete access to all UNSCOM designated 
sites.89 By now the Iraqi deception campaign was in full-flight. Inspection teams, tasked 
with uncovering the clandestine nuclear weapons programme were finding it difficult to 
see the whole picture.  
 This came to a head when on 24 September, the IAEA 6 inspection team led by 
David Kay was detained at gunpoint in the parking lot of the Nuclear Design Centre for 
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four days after discovering documentation relating to Iraq's nuclear weaponization 
programme.90 The inspection proceeded without incident until approximately 11:00 
Arabia Standard Time, when Iraqi authorities prevented the team, over strong protest of 
the chief inspector, from copying documents that the team was reviewing. Iraqi security 
surrounded the premises and the inspection was terminated. The team left the building 
with the copies they had been able to make, and entered the awaiting vehicles. The 
inspection team was then informed by Iraqi authorities that they would be detained until 
they were personally searched and all photographs, films, videotapes and any copies of 
Iraqi documents were surrendered.91 This directly contravened UNSCR 707 Article 3(b) 
which stated that Iraq:  
Allow the Special Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and their inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted 
access to any and all areas, facilities equipment, records and means of 
transportation which they wish to inspect.92 
On 4 October, Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA reported that IAEA 6 had 
obtained conclusive documentary evidence that Iraq had a programme for developing 
nuclear weapons.93 This was determined from the information gleaned from some of the 
classified papers they had obtained. The key finding revealed a clandestine nuclear 
weapons programme supported by a wide-ranging international procurement effort.94 
Prior to this series of events, much was speculated and little was known. This in essence 
provided the IAEA with the ‘smoking gun’ they needed to prove Iraq’s previous 
ambitions and its current non-compliance.95 On 14 October 1991 the IAEC formally 
disclosed that the Al Tuwaitha facility was set up to conduct research on the 
weaponization of nuclear technology.96 
 After the tumultuous events of 1991, the period of 1992 to 1994 was relatively 
quiet in comparison. Inspections continued and new evidence kept on cropping up but 
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IAEA inspection teams were getting a much clearer picture of the clandestine nuclear 
programme. According to the ISG Report, starting in 1992, Hussein Kamel dispersed 
some of the more valuable PC-397 and Engineering Design Center (EDC)98 personnel 
amongst various military R&D and production facilities.99 It was believed to be 
important for the future of the nuclear programme that they preserve “the progress and 
talent” that had been developed prior to 1991.100 The retention of knowledge and the 
scientists who possessed that knowledge was of utmost importance and would provide 
the focus for the regime’s rationale in the upcoming years. However, ISG reports that 
the efforts were ultimately unsuccessful and the intellectual capital that had been built 
up subsequently decayed in the succeeding years.101 
On 7 August 1995, Hussein Kamel, fled to Jordan. He assisted western 
intelligence sources in uncovering more then was previously known about Iraq's 
proscribed weapons programmes.102 On 20 August regime officials revealed 
information about previously unknown aspects of the nuclear programme, among other 
things, during high-level technical talks with UN officials.103 The official line was that 
Kamel had acted independently to develop a nuclear weapons programme without the 
consent of the Iraqi government. The regime’s attempt at proof was to make UNSCOM 
aware of a large cache of highly classified documents that appeared rather suddenly at 
Haidar House farm, which was owned by members of Kamel’s family. Iraq's failure to 
declare its crash programme and to give the IAEA all nuclear-related documents and 
materials constitute violations of Iraq's obligations under pertinent UN Security Council 
resolutions. The ISG Report states that: 
The release of the long-concealed WMD documentation planted at 
Husayn Kamil’s farm in August 1995, and Iraq’s declarations in 
February 1996 revealing new aspects of the WMD programs were major 
turning points in the Regime’s denial and deception efforts following 
Desert Storm. Iraq considered the declaration to be a measure of 
goodwill and cooperation with the UN; however, the release of these 
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documents validated UNSCOM concerns about ongoing concealment 
and created additional questions from the international community.104 
Both UNSCOM and IAEA teams conducted their inspections in a much more 
comprehensive and aggressive manner with the adoption of UNSCR 707. Iraq’s 
credibility had quickly eroded and further declarations were met with suspicion. This 
ended up backfiring on the regime as they were keen to have some relief from UN-
imposed sanctions, but what they ended up with was a much more aggressive and 
rigorous inspection campaign, which in turn led to a short-term political crisis between 
the UN and Iraq.  
 
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME 
 Iraq signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare on 
17 June 1925. The protocol, which entered into force on 8 February 1928, was ratified 
by Iraq on 8 September 1931.105 The Iraqi chemical weapons programme has its origins 
decades later, in the early 1960s. A select group of military officers were sent abroad for 
training in non-conventional weapons defence issues. Some of these individuals would 
soon after form the nucleus of the newly created Iraqi Chemical Corps (ICC).106 
Established in 1964, the ICC’s was tasked with, teaching, including the “properties of 
chemical and biological warfare agents, their medical effects, and identification and 
detection methods. Usage of individual and collective protective and decontamination 
equipment, and appropriate prophylactic measures were also covered.”107 The United 
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission Report states that:  
With minor adjustments, Iraq’s Chemical Corps adopted foreign field 
manuals on NBC defence and acquired relevant equipment and materials, 
from abroad including individual protective equipment, portable field 
laboratories and decontamination stations. The Chemical Corps further 
                                                
104 ISG Report, I, Regime Strategic Intent, 49. 
105 Iraq entered the following reservation, "On condition that the Iraq government shall be bound by the 
provisions of the Protocol only towards those States which have both signed and ratified it or have 
acceded thereto, and that it shall not be bound by the Protocol towards any State at enmity with Iraq 
whose armed forces, or the forces of whose allies, do not respect the provisions of the Protocol." “SIPRI: 
High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Protocol.” Stockholm International Pearce Research Institute, 
accessed 22 April 2009, http://www.sipri.org/contents/cbwarfare/cbw_research_doc/cbw_historical/cbw-
hist-geneva-parties.html#I. 
106 ISG Report, III, Chemical Programme, 5. 
107 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Compendium of 
Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes in the Chemical, Biological and Missile areas, June 2007, 
Chapter 3, 49. Will be referred to as UNMOVIC Compendium.  
  
123 
introduced NBC training procedures for all other units within Iraq’s 
Armed Forces. Such military training involved the use of CW agent 
simulants in field exercises.108 
By the end of the decade, the ICC had obtained some general knowledge in the fields of 
chemical defence. This knowledge would provide a solid foundation in moving towards 
an offensive CW capability.109 
In 1971 a group of ICC officers sought authorization to synthesize small 
quantities of CW agents, mustard, tabun, and CS gas (orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile), 
for “familiarization and the experience.”110 The Iraqi General Staff ultimately approved 
the request and the construction of the Al Rashad facility was commissioned.111 Three 
years later the programme was retooled and the Al Hasan Ibn al-Haytham Institute was 
created under the auspices of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research.112 The Institute took its name from a famous Iraqi mathematician, born in 
Basra (965-1040 CE) named Abu Ali al-Hasan ibn al-Haytham and would be the 
predecessor of Iraq’s proscribed offensive CBW programmes of the 1980s113  
The Al Hasan Institute was organized into three separate centres as well as an 
administrative headquarters. The UNMOVIC Compendium states that, “The Institute’s 
First Centre was responsible for CW-related activities. In 1974, it took over the site at 
Al Rashad village, which was previously operated by the Chemical Corps.”114According 
to the ISG Report, the Al Hasan Institute was tasked with the research and synthesis and 
production of mustard, tabun, CS and some organophosphate pesticides, with the end 
result being large-scale production.115 Progress was achieved in the laboratory 
production of mustard, tabun, and, to some degree, sarin.116 The Al Hasan project met 
the same fate as Al Rashad. A presidential decree dissolved the project as it was found 
to have made “insufficient progress” towards the production of chemical weapons.117 
Some work in CW ultimately continued in 1978 when the former head of the Chemical 
Corps, Bizar al-Attar submitted a five-year plan that included the production of 
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chemical weapons.118 The ISG reports that, “By the end of 1979, a reorganized 
Chemical Corps started using the expanded Al Rashad site to produce CW agents, 
ostensibly for the testing of CW defensive gear and detection equipment.”119 
The Iraq CW programme did not fully find its feet until the end of the decade. 
Prior to then it was more a case of small-scale experimentation and becoming familiar 
with select agents. By 1979, Iraq had obtained the ability to commence large-scale CW 
development. The scientists and technicians that would form the nucleus of the 
chemical programme had acquired valuable experience and knowledge in, laboratory 
synthesis of CW agents, scaling-up production, building CW research capabilities, 
training personnel, forming a procurement network, founding several production plants 
and obtaining a number of key pieces of pilot and industrial size equipment.120 The 
efforts of the 1970s eventually culminated in the formation of Iraq’s large-scale military 
chemical weapons programme. The CW programme would become a focal point of the 
ensuing 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. 
 
The Iran-Iraq War 
 The beginning of the new decade saw an escalation of tensions in the Persian 
Gulf. This was precipitated by the expulsion of Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini from the Iraqi Shia holy city of Najaf in October 1978.121 Khomeini left Iraq 
for Iran and was instrumental in engineering the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi and establishing a new government in February 1979. The Islamic Revolution 
eventually resulted in a Shia controlled, fundamentalist Iran, which had significant 
implications for Iraq's national security environment as Shi’ite demonstrations spilled 
over the border into southern Iraq.122 Further to this, on 17 September President Saddam 
Hussein symbolically tore up the 1975 Algiers Agreement in an act of defiance. This 
agreement was meant to end the long-standing dispute over control of the Shatt al-Arab 
waterways that had existed for centuries.123 The situation continued to deteriorate and 
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then on 22 September Iraqi units crossed the border into Iran eventually capturing and 
occupying Iranian territory.  
 On 16 November 1980, Teheran Radio claimed that Iraq had used chemical 
bombs in the fighting around the southern Iranian town of Susangerd.124 The Iranian 
allegations were not specific regarding the agents used, only saying that the weapons 
used “spread germs and caused blisters.”125 This would appear to be the first allegation 
of Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran. However, this incident was not included 
in Iran’s letter of 21 April 1988 that was addressed to the Secretary General.126 The first 
officially recorded complaint regarding Iraq’s use of chemical weapons occurred on 13 
January 1981. According to Iranian allegations, Iraq had used chemical weapons against 
Iranian troops at Halaleh and Neykhzar, causing ten casualties.127 No reference was 
made as to what chemical agent was used. Four more alleged Iraqi attacks using 
chemical weapons were made by Iran in 1981. Of these four, only the alleged incident 
on 21 March at Howeyzeh would result in casualties.128 The failure of Iraqi forces to 
achieve victory in the early days of the war helped provide the impetus for the creation 
of its large-scale, strategic chemical warfare programme called Research Centre 922 or 
Project 922.129 This project was launched on 8 June 1981 and was to develop mustard, 
tabun, sarin, VX and white phosphorus.130 
The Iraqi CW campaign continued. According to Iranian allegations there were 
six CW attacks against Iran, totalling twenty-nine casualties.131 In July 1982 Iran 
launched Operation Ramadan. This was an Iranian offensive intended to break the Iraqi 
lines and capture Iraqi territory near Basra. What is important about this operation was 
that Iran had utilized "human-wave" attacks conducted primarily by Pasdaran and Basij 
volunteer forces.132 These largely untrained and ill-equipped troops were used to clear 
minefields and prepare the area for the arrival of Iranian armour. The Iranians sustained 
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an immense number of casualties, but they enabled Iran to recover some territory before 
the Iraqis could repel the bulk of the invading forces. That October, the Iraqi Permanent 
Representative to the UN denied that Iraq had ever used chemical weapons against 
Iran.133  
The year 1983 was an important one as it marked the first formal allegations, to 
the UN, that Iraq was using chemical weapons against Iranian targets. According to 
Iranian sources, there were thirty-three attacks with chemical weapons against Iranian 
targets, the majority of which were described as either mustard gas or blister gas.134 This 
would be consistent with Iraqi production capabilities at the time. After Project 922 
came online, both the Al Rashad and Al Muthanna sites had produced roughly 150 tons 
of mustard during the course of 1983, along with 85 tons produced the previous year.135 
Also in 1983, Iran launched three major, though largely unsuccessful, human wave 
offensives. These attacks were characterized with enormous losses of troops and 
minimal gains in terms of territory.136 What was emerging was a heightened Iranian 
commitment to wage a war of attrition against Iraq. The Iranian military was not as well 
equipped as its Iraqi counterpart, but where it was lacking in material it more than made 
up for in the number of troops it could deploy at any given time. These tactics would 
eventually force the Iraqi regime to reevaluate how it was conducting the war up to that 
point. 
Beginning in 1984, there was a shift in Baghdad’s overall strategic goals. Instead 
of attempting to capture targets and territory within Iran, Baghdad was more concerned 
with preventing Iranian incursions and loss of territory within its own borders. Iraq’s 
use of chemical weapons became more pronounced as well between 1984-86. Iraq had 
become the first nation to use a nerve agent in combat when it employed tabun-filled 
munitions against Iranian troops.137 The reliance on chemical weapons signalled the 
intent to defend Iraqi territory at all costs. Some intelligence reports at the time made 
mention of the serious deficiencies in Iraq’s defensive posture. For example: 
CW, ineptly employed, has not proved to be a panacea to make up for 
other weaknesses. Non-chemical tactical weaknesses such as failure to 
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maximize advantages and ineffective employment of tactical airpower 
carry over into the employment of CW. CW employment shortcomings 
have included use of inadequate concentrations in relation to required 
area coverage, enemy troops numbers, weather and terrain, ineffective 
delivery, and failure to integrate CW properly with the scheme of 
manoeuvre.138 
 
Iraq’s use of CW would become more of an issue for the international 
community during this time. UN Security Council Resolution 582 would take a 
different approach to the situation in the Gulf. Unlike previous Security Council 
Resolutions, 582 addressed the issue of Iraqi CW use against Iranian targets.139 This 
read: 
Profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists 
that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces 
against Iranian forces, most recently in the course of the present Iranian 
offensive into Iraqi territory, the members of the Council strongly 
condemn this continued use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use in war of chemical 
weapons.140 
Not that this would change anything, but it showed that the international community, 
while still somewhat indifferent to the situation in the Persian Gulf, was slowly 
becoming more aware of Iranian CW allegations. 
 The period from 1984 to 1986 was marked by Iraq’s gradual escalation of CW 
attacks, whereas the period of 1987 to 1988 was highlighted by an intensified approach 
to CW attacks.141 Not only were the Iraqis using chemicals in defensive or counter-
offensive operations, they were also employing them in order to try and recover lost 
territory. Another tactic was to saturate an area with large amounts of chemical agent 
and then send in offensive troops to take the area. Depending on the type of chemical 
weapon used, Iraqi forces would wait between thirty and sixty minutes before moving in 
on an area that had been saturated. While their troops were better equipped than the 
Iranians, they were still suffering a high number of CW-related casualties, though not 
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nearly as high as the Iranian troops they were targeting.142 In April 1988, Iran had 
published an account detailing the number of Iraqi CW attacks during the period of 
January 1981 to March 1988. According to a UN Conference on Disarmament 
document, 242 attacks were carried out affecting 44 000 individuals.143 
 During the phase of the war commonly referred to as “the war of the cities,” Iraq 
had begun to target Iranian civilian populations with chemical weapons.144 The first 
known incident of Iraqi targeting of Iranian civilians occurred on 28 June 1987 in the 
Kurdish town of Sardasht, near the northwest border with Iraq.145 On 16 March 1988 the 
northern Kurdish city of Halabja was the scene of an Iraqi chemical weapons attack that 
resulted in thousands of casualties. Iranian forces had overrun Halabja in the days 
leading up to the 16 March attack. The Iraqi counterattack began mid-morning with 
conventional airstrikes and artillery shelling from the town of Sayed Sadeq to the 
north.146 This was followed by wave after wave of low-flying Iraqi Air Force jets. 
According to eyewitness accounts, the first wave of air strikes appeared to have 
included the use of napalm or phosphorus – something flammable. Later that afternoon, 
at approximately 15:00 local time, residents noticed an acrid smell permeating the air. 
One resident noted that it smelled "very bad, like snake poison."147 The exact number of 
casualties resulting from the attack on Halabja is unknown.148 However, it has been 
widely speculated that casualties may have been in excess of 5000.149 The attack on 
Halabja was one incident among many in what was known as the Al Anfal Campaign. 
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 The mastermind of the Anfal Campaign, was Ali-Hasan al-Majid, first cousin to 
President Saddam Hussein. In a speech made to Ba’th Party members in 1987, al-Majid 
laid out his thoughts on dealing with the Kurdish situation in northern Iraq. He said: 
This is my intention, and I want you to take serious note of it. As soon as 
we complete the deportations, we will start attacking them everywhere 
according to a systematic military plan. Even their strongholds. In our 
attacks we will take back one third or one half of what is under their 
control. If we can try to take two-thirds, then we will surround them in a 
small pocket and attack them with chemical weapons. I will not attack 
them with chemicals just one day, but I will continue to attack them with 
chemicals for fifteen days. Then I will announce that anyone who wishes 
to surrender with his gun will be allowed to do so. I will publish one 
million copies of this leaflet and distribute it in the North, in Kurdish, 
Sorani, Badinani and Arabic. I will not say it is from the Iraqi 
government. I will not let the government get involved. I will say it is 
from here [the Northern Bureau]. Anyone willing to come back is 
welcome, and those who do not return will be attacked again with new, 
destructive chemicals. I will not mention the name of the chemical 
because that is classified information. But I will say with new destructive 
weapons that will destroy you. So I will threaten them and motivate them 
to surrender. Then you will see that all the vehicles of God Himself will 
not be enough to carry them all. I think and expect that they will be 
defeated. I swear that I am sure we will defeat them.150 
The Anfal Campaign lasted from approximately 23 February to 6 September. Like the 
Halabja massacre, the precise number of casualties is not known. Estimates put the 
number between 50 000 and 100 000.151 In response to the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan’s (PUK) claims that Anfal took the lives of 182 000 Kurds, al-Majid 
apparently exclaimed that it could not have been more that 100 000.152 Regardless of the 
final number, the Anfal Campaign showed that Iraq was prepared to defend its interests 
no matter what the cost. 
Hostilities between Iran and Iraq ended on 20 August 1988, one full month after 
the formal adoption of UNSCR 598. The casualty figures resulting from the eight-year 
war are uncertain, though estimates suggest more than one and a half million war and 
war-related casualties. Iran acknowledged that nearly 300 000 people died in the war 
and estimates of the Iraqi dead range from 160 000 to 240 000 maimed. Anthony 
Cordesman and Abraham Wagner calculate that there were between 1 050 000 and 1 
                                                
150 “Genocide in Iraq,” Appendix A: The Ali Hassan Al-Majid Tapes.  
151 See Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair, 132-135. 
152 “Genocide in Iraq,” Appendix A: The Ali Hassan Al-Majid Tapes. 
  
130 
930 000 Iranian casualties and 555 000 to 1 040 000 Iraqi casualties153 They also 
estimate that the total cost of the war for each side in monetary terms was $69 billion 
for Iran and $159 billion for Iraq.  
 
Desert Storm and UNSCOM 
After the end of the Iran-Iraq War there was no immediate demand for chemical 
weapons, yet developmental efforts in improving production methods, binary chemical 
weapons, new delivery methods and precursor production, continued throughout 1989 
and 1990.154 The newly renamed Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) had become the 
locus for Iraq’s large-scale chemical programme. According to the ISG Report, the 
Research and Development Directorate at MSE was experimenting with multiple 
chemical agents.155 This Directorate also had individual departments dedicated to the 
development of mustard agents, nerve agents and others.156 The experiences of the war 
with Iran had shown Baghdad that there was an intrinsic value in possessing chemical 
weapons. R&D into other types of chemical munitions was also being looked at, some 
of which would prove to be a major point of interest for western governments and 
enemies of Iraq. 
 On 1 April 1990, Saddam Hussein in a speech broadcast on Baghdad Radio 
made a startling declaration, one that caught many in western intelligence agencies off 
guard. Hussein claimed that: 
We do not need an atomic bomb. We have the binary chemical. Let them 
take note of this. We have the binary chemical. According to our 
information only the United States and the Soviet Union have it. They 
still have not reached an agreement with respect to its disarmament. It 
exists in Iraq. So that the Iraqis may know, it existed during the last 
period of the war – I believe during the last year of the war. It was there. 
In spite of this, we did not use it against the Iranians. We did not use it 
against the Iranians. We said that the weapons we had were more than 
enough, and hoped that God would enable us to liberate our land without 
it. Why, then, do we need the atomic bomb?157 
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What exactly did Saddam mean when he said binary chemical? Avigdor Haselkorn 
states that, “Saddam’s concept of a binary chemical weapon covered a number of 
approaches that the Iraqis had adopted to increase the effectiveness of their CW.”158 
Iraqi binary weapons were along the lines of putting two toxic chemicals together in one 
compartment immediately prior to use as, opposed to the idea of having two inert 
chemicals in separate compartments in the munition and enabling them to mix shortly 
before impact. This mix-before-flight binary system ended up being used to fill 1000 
binary bombs as well as 50 al-Hussein warheads by August 1990.159 This speech not 
only caught western intelligence off guard, and according to the ISG Report, his own 
chemical weapons scientists as well.160  
 Throughout 1990 Saddam was defiant. His threats grew in scope and in 
frequency. On 12 April he reiterated his threats to drench Israel with chemical weapons 
if Iraq were attacked with nuclear weapons.161 Five days later, speaking at another 
ceremony he made a thinly veiled reference to use whatever means necessary to defend 
any Arab state that is attacked by another country.162 Later that summer Saddam again 
stated that he had binary CW and believed it enough to deter Israel from attacking.163 
With Saddam’s increasing rhetoric and threats to use CW, intensive production of 
chemical munitions had restarted. That April, VX was produced at the Dhia plant 
although according to Iraqi officials, without any specific orders from the Ministry of 
Defence.164 According to the UNMOVIC Compendium: 
In addition to chemical munitions produced by the MSE during the Iran-
Iraq war, two new types of munitions that were under the development 
and testing by that time were included into the production schedule for 
1990. These included types of weapons considered as strategic by their 
nature, capable to deter potential foes from taking any steps against Iraq 
for fear of consequences. The perceived deterrent role of CW in 1990 
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concentrated more on new delivery means (the Al Hussein warhead and 
R-400 bomb) but not on new CW agents, except for the concept of ‘Iraqi 
binary’ for sarin.165 
With the 15 January UN imposed deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait 
approaching, Iraq was putting significant effort into agent weaponization and means of 
delivery. Iraq had shown that it had the technical skill to be able to produce lethal 
chemical agents. Now they had to make sure they had the delivery systems to back up 
their threats. 
 Prior to the deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, US Secretary of State 
James Baker met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva. Baker handed Aziz 
a letter from President George Bush describing probable US reprisals to an Iraqi non-
conventional weapons attack to be “the most terrible response.”166 Though there was no 
direct reference to the US using nuclear weapons in retaliation, which was consistent 
with the American policy of calculated ambiguity, it was widely taken as such. After 
Coalition forces liberated Kuwait and scattered the remnants of Iraq’s army, the 
atmosphere in Baghdad was one of triumph and victory. In Saddam’s eyes, he viewed 
the war as one where he stood up to the US and came out relatively unscathed. Baghdad 
was still standing, Iraq was not occupied and most importantly from his point of view, 
he was still in power.  
According to the ISG Report, Saddam believed that the “deployment of CW and 
the delegated authority to use them, contributed to the US not driving on to 
Baghdad.”167 This was yet another example of Saddam believing that chemical weapons 
saved Iraq and saved himself. Much the same as during the war with Iran, the regime 
believed that chemical weapons prevented Coalition forces from entering and occupying 
Baghdad. This is specious reasoning, as the Coalition simply did not have the mandate 
to enter and/or occupy Iraq. The mission as per UNSCR 660 demanded that Iraq 
withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they 
were located on 1 August 1990.168 The use of force was authorized under UNSCR 678 
if Iraq was found to be in non-compliance with the earlier Resolution, which ended up 
being the case. 
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 On 3 April 1991 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687, as already 
noted. Article 9b(i) states: 
The forming of a special commission which shall carry out immediate 
on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical and missile capabilities, 
based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional 
locations by the special commission itself.169 
It would not be until 9 June when UNSCOM’s first inspection of Iraqi chemical 
weapons facilities could take place. The first site inspected was the Muthanna State 
Establishment, which was declared as the primary chemical weapons R&D and 
munition-filling site.170 Over the next four years UNSCOM uncovered an increasingly 
tangled web of lies vis-à-vis the chemical programme. One of UNSCOM’s key findings 
was the discovery of the VX nerve agent production programme.171 While there are 
doubts as to the quality and quantity of agent, Iraq still attempted VX production, 
which, according to chemical weapons experts, is no small feat.172 Outside of Iraq, quite 
a bit was known of their chemical programme mostly due to the frequency of use during 
the war with Iran. One of the big surprises was not the size of the programme but the 
size of the stockpiles of weapons.173 Iraq had amassed a significant amount of chemical 
precursors, bulk agent and filled munitions prior to the end of Desert Storm. After 
inspectors went in and got a clear picture of what they were dealing with, material 
balances needed to be made and all of the precursors, equipment and munitions had to 
be accounted for. Following that, all of the remaining chemical weapons and associated 
materials were destroyed.  
That October, UNSCOM had developed a general policy for dealing with Iraq’s 
remaining chemical weapons. They were tasked with the following: 
1. All weapons and weapons systems (whether fully functional or not) 
including all their related subsystems and components were to be 
destroyed.  
2.  Equipment and materials:  
a. Equipment or material specially designed or used for prohibited 
under SCR 687 activities were be destroyed (or removed from Iraq if 
destruction would not be practically possible);  
 b. Dual purpose, multi-purpose or general purpose equipment or 
materials,  
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i. that were exclusively or primarily used (or intended to be 
used) in prohibited activities or activities related to prohibited 
items shall be destroyed (or removed from Iraq if destruction is 
not practically possible);  
ii. that were only in part used (or intended to be used) in 
prohibited activities related to prohibited items shall be 
destroyed unless the Special Commission upon specific written 
request from Iraq authorizes their use as an exception in 
activities not prohibited by Resolution 687 (1991).  
3.  Buildings   
a. Buildings that have distinctive features making them specifically 
suitable for prohibited activities related to prohibited items shall be 
destroyed (if it is not practically possible to destroy the building, its 
distinctive features shall be destroyed);  
b. Standard buildings shall be destroyed unless the Special 
Commission upon specific written request from Iraq authorizes their 
use as an exception in activities not prohibited by Resolution 687 
(1991).174  
 
According to UNSCOM documents, by the end of 1998, UNSCOM had supervised the 
destruction of the following proscribed items: 
! 38 537 filled and empty chemical munitions 
! 690 tons of bulk chemical agent 
! More than 3000 tons of chemical precursors  
! 426 pieces of chemical weapons production equipment 
! 91 pieces of related analytical instruments175 
This does not include the chemical weapons that Iraq allegedly destroyed after 
inspections began. It was in June 1991 when Saddam Hussein ordered the former 
deputy of the chemical programme, Dr. Mahmud Faraj Bilal to destroy all of their 
hidden CW (and BW) materials.176 This act would be the cause for concern with 
UNSCOM as they were interested in cataloguing and accounting for all aspects of the 
chemical programme. ISG reports that available evidence points to Iraq getting rid of its 
hidden chemical weapons and precursors, but retaining key documents and some dual-
use equipment.177 It is thought that Iraq did this in order to be able to restart its chemical 
programme after inspections and once sanctions were lifted. Unfortunately for them, by 
getting rid of the evidence and retaining the documentation, it gave UNSOCM 
inspectors a level of uncertainty regarding their disclosures. It would end up being a big 
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mistake for them and meant that the intrusive inspection regime they were faced with 
would continue. 
Over the next few years UNSCOM continued its inspection regime as outlined 
by UNSCR 687. By mid-1995 there had been approximately twenty-five chemical 
inspections conducted at multiple sites within Iraq. Throughout the inspections Iraq had, 
according to Graham Pearson, “shown a marked lack of transparency, disclosing 
information only when confronted with evidence by UNSCOM.”178 Iraqis were 
meticulous record keepers and it was not believed that they had destroyed all of their 
documentation relating to the chemical programme. This forced the inspectors down a 
different path. UNSCOM had begun to pursue this issue with the suppliers and their 
governments. If they could get a detailed and accurate list of inventory from the 
suppliers, they would be closer to the bottom of the proscribed chemical weapons 
programme. The big breakthrough occurred in August 1995 with the defection of 
Hussein Kamel. On 8 August Kamel left Iraq for Jordan. This was a major blow to the 
Iraqi regime as Kamel was not only the head of MIC, an organization responsible for 
the development and manufacture of proscribed weapons, he was also married to one of 
Saddam’s daughters. His defection set in motion a chain of events that would culminate 
in the “discovery” of a large cache of new and previously unseen documents.179 
Twelve days after Kamel’s defection, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf 
Ekéus was asked to accompany the head of the National Monitoring Directorate, 
Brigadier General Hussam Amin, to a location some forty kilometres southwest of 
Baghdad. This location was the Haidar House farm – one of Hussein Kamel’s 
properties. The chairman was taken to a building on the property and was shown dozens 
of metal boxes, all of which were filled with documents relating to Iraq’s proscribed 
weapons programmes.180 By all accounts, the boxes were placed there shortly after 
Kamel’s departure to make it look like he was the one responsible for Iraq’s proscribed 
weapons programmes. None of the boxes had any dust covering them and the lock on 
the building door was new. Though it seemed highly unlikely that Kamel had hidden 
these documents on this farm for the past four years, it proved to be a significant event. 
All told, there were roughly 1.5 million pages of documents.181  
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It was now clear that Iraq was interested in cooperating with UNSCOM at 
previously unseen levels. What they were attempting to do with this new discovery was 
to place 100% of the blame on the “traitor and criminal” Hussein Kamel. In the 
aftermath of that event, the Commission was able to bring under its control a massive 
amount of documentation and material directly linked to its proscribed programmes. 
While there were many gaps that still needed to be filled in, the discovery at the Haidar 
House farm proved to be a significant event in the unravelling of Iraq’s chemical 
weapons programme. 
 
THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME 
 Of Iraq’s three proscribed weapons programmes, the biological programme was 
the smallest in size and scale.182 It also had the most recent beginning. On 11 May 1972 
Iraq signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, years before there was any 
real interest in acquiring biological weapons.183 According to Iraqi declarations, interest 
in acquiring a biological warfare capability first occurred in 1974, when the Al Hasan 
Ibn al-Haytham Institute was created to conduct scientific, academic and applied 
research in the fields of chemistry, physics and microorganisms.184 Though the institute 
was under the direction and control of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research it was little more than a front for Iraq’s clandestine BW and CW 
programmes.185 In fact, since the early BW and CW programmes were both situated at 
the Al Hasan Institute, they would suffer the same early growing pains and ultimately 
the same fate when it was shut down in 1979, six months before Saddam Hussein 
ascended to the Presidency. Later that year, the Scientific and Technical Research 
Directorate (STRD) was created to replace Al Hasan as the front for the clandestine BW 
programme.186 Small-scale activities relating to BW took place at STRD, which 
eventually became known as the Technical Research Centre (TRC). It was not until 
1983 when Major General Nizar Attar, the Director General of Project 922, received 
approval from the Minister of Defence to include biological R&D within the framework 
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of CW activities.187 
 In 1985, the BW programme expanded to include R&D work, which was 
necessary for the production of agents on a laboratory scale.188 Heading up the 
biological research team was British-educated microbiologist Rihab Taha. Taha 
proposed that research on Bacillus anthracis, and Clostridium botulinum could be 
undertaken.189 The relative success that Iraq had in deploying CW against Iranian troops 
had altered their perception of the utility of non-conventional weapons. Over the next 
few years, Taha acquired reference strains of several pathogens from a number of 
sources. The American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) supplied quite a few different 
strains of B. anthracis, which was intended for use in their R&D programme.190 In 1987 
the BW programme moved from MSE to the TRC, Forensic Research Department (T-
3), at Salman Pak in May, forming the key R&D facility of Iraq’s former BW 
programme. The work was subsequently renewed at the new location in July 1987.191 
According to the UNMOVIC Compendium:  
Most major aspects of the BW programme were developed at Salman 
Pak, including the research into additional bacterial agents and fungal 
toxins, scaling up of the agent production, initial production of some 
agents, toxicity tests using a broad range of animals on site, and filling of 
munitions for some field tests.192 
 
 The following year, construction on the new facility at Al Hakam, 60 kilometers 
southwest of Baghdad was completed. Al Hakam became the chief biological warfare 
agent production site for anthrax, botulinum toxin and C. perfringens when it began 
operations in 1989.193 Also know as C. welchii in older literature, C. perfringens the 
causative agent of gas gangrene, a clostridial wound infection that damages muscle and 
impairs blood supply.194 The typical biological effects are hemolysis, dermonecrosis and 
death.195 The ISG Report states “Dr. Rihab Taha instructed the researchers to investigate 
the various strains and identify the most effective for use as a large-scale BW agent with 
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the intent of the research being the dissemination of C. perfringens as spores.”196 Iraq 
had produced 340 litres of ten times concentrated spores of C. perfringens between 
August and November 1990, though none of the agent was ever weaponized.197 
 Weaponization of BW agents began in earnest in 1990. According to the 
UNMOVIC Compendium, in May 1990, a 400 kg aerial bomb – the R-400 – was 
certified, by the Iraqi Air Force command as suitable for the delivery of chemical and 
biological weapons.198 After the invasion of Kuwait, Hussein Kamel ordered the 
production of 200 R-400 bombs as well as 25 Al Hussein warheads.199 These two 
delivery systems were chosen as they had already been used successfully in the 
chemical programme.  
 With hostilities looming, the regime decided to pursue full BW weaponization. 
ISG states, “frenetic and convulsive efforts to adapt new weapons and acquire and 
expand BW agent production replaced the years of orderly progress.”200 In November, 
the MSE facility started experimenting with made-for-aircraft auxiliary fuel tanks. 
Hussein Kamel advised Saddam Hussein that this would be the most effective method 
for delivering their biological slurries. The wording he used was, “Sir, the best way to 
transport this weapon and achieve the most harmful effects would come by using 
planes, like a crop duster, to scatter it. This is, Sir, a thousand times more harmful.”201 
Kamel had quite a bit of influence with Saddam and was able to get things done 
rapidly.202 As well as thinking about delivery system issues, there was a need for a 
considerable amount of biological agent. For a few years the BW production facilities 
were engaged in production of multiple agents in slurry form, which is a watery mixture 
with characteristics closely resembling mud.203 Slurry was easier to manufacture than 
finely milled powders. The process of drying BW agents like anthrax for aerosolization 
is technologically complex and Iraq had little to no success with the process.  
 When hostilities broke out in January 1991, Iraq’s biological programme had been 
in full production mode for a number of years. According to the ISG Report: 
By January 1991, reflecting the huge exertion of the previous months, 
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Iraq had produced large quantities of anthrax, botulinum toxin, 
Clostridium perfringens, aflatoxin, and small quantities of ricin, and had 
more than 180 BW weapons deployed to five hide sites. In addition, Al 
Hakam protected caches of bulk BW agent containers by moving them 
from site to site during the hostilities. The weapons and agent were 
guarded and ready for use. The Iraqi leadership decided policy for their 
use and targeting. Iraq states that the opening bombardment of 17 
January 1991 destroyed the only aircraft and spray tank ready for use. 
Despite this, work continued to complete another three tanks, with plans 
for a further eight in preparation.204  
Saddam had exercised considerable control over the biological weapons arsenal and was 
seemingly prepared to use any and all of his non-conventional weapons. He chose 
targets that he wanted to attack with BW. His first priority was Israel. Anything and 
everything was fair game, but Tel Aviv was to receive targeting priority.205 US forces 
were also targeted, as were the Saudi Arabian cities of Riyadh and Jeddah. If Saddam 
was going to authorize the release of BW agents, he was going to use the full force of 
his arsenal. By the end of the conflict, Iraq had not used any of its biological or 
chemical weapons against Israel, Coalition forces or Saudi cities. Regime officials, 
including Saddam, believed that the threat posed by their CBW arsenal and delivery 
systems, prevented Coalition forces from entering and occupying Baghdad.206 The 
preservation of the regime and himself as Iraqi President was his primary goal. Since 
the Coalition did not have the mandate to invade Iraq, the need to use CBW did not 
materialize. The threats were there, but in the end nothing came of it.  
 
The UNSCOM Years 
 The period immediately after the end of the First Gulf War was marked by 
continual Iraqi changes of opinion and intentions. As mentioned earlier, the chemical 
and missile programmes were known to western intelligence agencies, though the 
details regarding the size and scope of the programmes were less well known. There 
were some suspicions that Iraq was engaged in illegal nuclear activities and concerns 
that they were up to something on the biological side. Following Iraq’s acceptance of 
UNSCR 687, they had fifteen days to make a declaration regarding their proscribed 
weapons programmes. In a letter to UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, on 
18 April, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz denied Iraq ever having a biological 
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weapons programme. Shortly thereafter, Baghdad decided at the political level to take 
measures to obliterate the entire BW programme and admit work on research and 
development only.207  
 According to the 1997 Full, Final and Complete Declaration Iraq declared that it 
destroyed all bulk biological warfare agent and munitions as well as removed all traces 
of production and supporting records, in the summer of 1991.208 The destruction 
decision also covered munitions and remaining bulk agent. Implementation of the order 
began in June 1991 and continued until the end of July.209 The regime claimed that, 
“equipment was thoroughly decontaminated or burnt; facilities were scrubbed down 
with appropriate decontaminants, sewage pits were cleansed, filters burnt, seed stock 
destroyed, some equipment and materials were removed and chemicals were used to 
inactivate biological material held in bulk storage or in weapons.”210 When the first 
United Nations biological weapons inspection team arrived – led by British biologist 
David Kelly – in Iraq on 2 August, the cleanup had been completed and a somewhat 
adequate cover story was in place.211 
 When UNSCOM inspectors were finally able to begin inspecting Iraq’s suspected 
BW facilities in August 1991, no immediate evidence of bulk agent, filling equipment 
or chemical munitions were found.212 Fortunately, UNSCOM inspectors did not 
abandon their search for the smoking gun. UNSCOM 15 was the second BW inspection 
team in Iraq and was led by veteran US BW expert David Huxsoll. From 20 September 
to 3 October this team inspected ten different declared and undeclared BW sites 
including Al Hakam and Salman Pak. It was the single cell protein plant at Al Hakam 
that gave the inspectors some cause for concern as it was thought that the facility might 
have been intended as “the next stage in a BW programme.”213 There would only be one 
more BW inspection in 1991, and it did not uncover any relevant information. The 
following May Iraq provided its first Full, Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) of its 
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prohibited biological and missile programmes. In it they admitted to having had only a 
biological weapons programme for "defensive purposes only.”214 
 Since they had claimed that their biological programme that was purely defensive 
and since they took steps to destroy their munitions and bulk agent, inspectors were left 
with little in the way of concrete evidence. Some of the Iraqi scientists that were being 
interviewed were describing things that, to the UNSCOM inspectors, did not add up to a 
purely defensive BW programme. The only real evidence they had was what you could 
call “negative evidence”215 and they had to try and reconstruct the BW programme from 
a sanitized set of documents, missing equipment and components and deceptive 
interview data. The UNMOVIC Compendium states that: 
Through the period of UN inspections (1991-1996), Iraq changed its 
declarations several times. Although UN inspectors were able to verify 
much of what Iraq declared from a qualitative perspective, they were 
unable to do so from a quantitative perspective. Neither the UN nor the 
ISG have found any evidence of remaining bulk agent or filled BW 
munitions, however some personnel involved in the past BW programme 
did declare to the ISG a new location for destroyed and dumped agent.216 
 
What ended up tipping the balance was Iraq’s acceptance of UNSCR 715 on 26 
November 1993. This Resolution laid the out the framework for setting up the ongoing 
monitoring and verification of Iraqi compliance. Article 2 of UNSCR 715 stated that: 
In the first three months of the period under review, developments were 
not generally positive. Iraq remained adamant in its refusal to 
acknowledge, during the period covered by the report, its obligations 
under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder. 
However, in the last three months, there has been a positive change of 
attitude on the part of Iraq. The report, in order to be comprehensive, has 
to cover the entire period and should be read in that light.217 
 
At this point, Baghdad took steps to hide the remnants of its proscribed BW 
programme, but did not give up on the idea that it could and should be restarted once the 
inspection regime was over.218 The ISG Report states, “The overall strategic objective 
was to give the appearance of cooperation while preserving its previous intellectual 
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capital.”219 This was to be the focus for the Iraqi regime up to 1995 and the defection of 
Hussein Kamel.  
When Kamel defected, a great deal of information regarding the covert BW 
programme came to light. He was officially denounced as a traitor to the regime and 
every effort was made to place blame on him – to make him the proverbial fall guy. If 
Baghdad could convince UNSCOM that Kamel was unilaterally responsible for the 
maintenance of the BW programme, then maybe inspections would cease and sanctions 
would be lifted. The idea of having sanctions lifted would be one of the major focal 
points for the Iraqi regime. Having sanctions lifted would mean more money in from the 
sale of oil and it would be possible to attempt a restart of the covert BW programme. 
For the regime it was all-important that sanctions be lifted.220 And Baghdad knew that 
anything could happen once the money started flowing again and UNSCOM was out of 
Iraq.  
 
REGIME DECISION-MAKING 
 Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s all major decisions relating to the 
development of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons went through Saddam 
Hussein. The ISG Report states that, “Saddam dominated all Iraqi institutions by the 
early 1990s and increasingly administered by personal direction.”221 This is true for 
most authoritarian and dictatorial regimes and Saddam was a dictator in every sense of 
the word. Saddam took special interest in issues of state security and military matters. 
He was the sole decider of the regime’s strategic intent. He had consolidated his power 
in such a way that there were no real internal threats to his leadership. His ability to 
nurture fear and obedience in his subordinates was frightening. He made sure that he 
would stay involved in every aspect of the regime so much so that by the time of 
Operation Desert Storm his titles were, President, Prime Minister, Chairman of the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), General Secretary of the Ba’th Party, 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces as well as appointing himself “paramount 
sheikh” in hopes of dominating Iraq’s important and influential tribal system.222 His 
word was the only word that mattered.  
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Saddam thought of himself as the most recent in a line of great warrior-hero 
Iraqi leaders – Sargon of Akkad, Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar and Saladin, one who 
will stand up to and fight, the Persians, the Israelis, whomever.223 During the Iran-Iraq 
War Saddam had reconstructed Nebuchadnezzar’s palace in the ancient city of Babylon 
on the river Euphrates, right on top of the ancient foundation. Since the original 
brickwork bore inscriptions lauding Nebuchadnezzar, the 60 million odd new sandstone 
bricks would also contain similar inscriptions, such as, “In the era of Saddam Hussein, 
protector of Iraq, who rebuilt civilization and rebuilt Babylon.”224 He saw Iraq as the 
leading player in that part of the world, with himself firmly in control of a great modern 
empire.225 His vision was the only vision for Iraq. 
Iraq under Saddam had all the formal decision-making structures and staff of a 
modern state, president, national assembly, judiciary, civil service, but they were not 
involved in making or directing national strategic policy. In western-style democracies 
these institutions were the “organs of power” but in Saddam’s Iraq they were largely 
cosmetic – they gave the impression that Iraq was an evolved political state, complete 
with archetypal albeit nominal western democratic political institutions.226 Many Iraqi 
technocrats had been schooled in the British post-secondary education system. While 
there was a finance minister, a health minister among others, by western standards, 
Iraq’s institutions were largely ineffective and superfluous.227 Social control 
mechanisms tend to be important and a lot of the vestiges of a democratic society were 
inherited when the Ba’th Party came to power. The need for the Ba’thists to establish 
some form of political and social legitimacy was key, so they had elections, created 
parliament, among others. It was one of the many pillars of support for the regime 
similar to the old tribal relationships that had been the norm for centuries and these 
traditional tribal relationships were just as important as any modern structures, perhaps 
more important.228  
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Former ISG head Charles Duelfer believes that within Iraq there existed a 
number of parallel organizations that were all inextricably linked to the mechanisms of 
Iraq’s internal workings.229 He states that:  
In addition to the technocratic or bureaucratic organizations there was a 
parallel Ba’th Party organization where the influence of the leadership 
ran in parallel to all the other hierarchical levels. At the same time 
parallel to that were the security organizations. It was almost like you 
had a circulatory system with one set of vessels and then parallel to all 
those you have the Ba’th Party organs and parallel to all those you have 
these security organs and those other elements tended to be run by 
Saddam’s inner circle.230 
With these different groups all involved in the decision-making process, it is a little 
more difficult to trace exactly how things functioned in Baghdad. Western analysts 
would look at the situation in Iraq and immediately want to create a block diagram or a 
system of flow charts to try and explain how the regime worked. The problem with that 
is you would have to draw multiple charts to illustrate this phenomenon. According to 
Duelfer, “The difficulty would be to translate that which is obvious to an Iraqi to 
someone in the West and I would say that the Iraqis were always much better looking at 
us then we were at them.”231 
One of the problems with looking at regime decision-making in Iraq is the 
concept of mirror imaging. This is an institutional bias that can have a detrimental effect 
when trying to understand a particular set of phenomena. It is the tendency to assume 
that all actors in the international system will act in the same way and for largely the 
same reasons.232 You think that something cannot possibly be what someone says it is 
because that is not the way you would do it. In the case of Iraq and its NBC weapons 
programmes, mirror imaging caused UN inspectors and analysts quite a bit of concern. 
For example, looking at the way in which Iraq approached chemical and biological 
safety precautions was a problem the inspection teams encountered once they gained 
access to Iraq’s production facilities. They would see something that resembled a CW 
munitions filling station but it was bereft of basic safety protocols, ergo it must not be a 
                                                
229 See Appendix 6: Integrated Management of Iraq’s WMD Programmes. 
230 Interview with Charles Duelfer, 10 April 2008. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems,” in Planning 
the Unthinkable: How New Powers will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, ed. Peter R. 
Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 17. 
  
145 
filling station. This is based on the presumption that they had some concept of the health 
and safety aspect, which they clearly did not.233  
It was the same regarding the BW programme. Many of the facilities that were 
inspected were also lacking in safety protocols. One possible reason for this is that 
biosafety is less of a concern when working with slurries as opposed to finely milled 
powders.234 And Iraq had invested heavily in the production of slurries. According to 
Ewen Buchanan, “We were trying to expose these programmes by looking at them 
through a prism that was not applicable to Iraq at that age and stage.”235 As a result, 
facilities such as Al Hakam, which was initially passed off as a single cell protein 
production plant, caused problems as few clear fingerprints of an active BW R&D 
programme were found. 
As a result of western mirror imaging a significant knowledge gap can exist 
between some strategic cultures and our capacity to understand them.236 Saddam’s Iraq 
was no different. Iraq was still what would be classified as a developing nation when 
Saddam came to power. Iraq was a poor, under-developed country. Basic services were 
lacking. There were not any paved roads.237 This all changed. Saddam brought Iraq into 
the twentieth century. He nationalized the oil industry. He constructed roads. He created 
jobs. He built up the armed forces and almost single-handedly created Iraq’s large 
military-industrial complex.238 To judge Iraq’s progress by western standards is flawed, 
as it is not a fair comparison. But by the standard of the region, Saddam made Iraq a 
more advanced society.239  
One of the interesting things about the Iraqi regime was that in certain areas 
there did appear to be a formalized decision-making process. Iraq had inherited a highly 
organized and bureaucratic system from Britain, which was a remnant of the British 
Mandate of Mesopotamia after the First World War.240 According to Duelfer, this was 
most notable in the area of regime finance until it was subverted by the regime in the 
1970s.241 The “legitimate” financial system that Iraq used to support government 
ministries was highly bureaucratic and tightly controlled by the Presidential Diwan. ISG 
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states that the Presidential Diwan was set up in 1979 as a purely administrative body to 
research and study specific issues requested by the President, the Council of Ministers, 
the Economic Affairs Committee, and the RCC.242 The Diwan had a role to play in the 
regime’s illicit procurement activities, however, “Saddam approved and directed the 
illicit procurement relationships that Iraq had with other countries in order to improve 
Iraq’s military capabilities against regional threats.”243 
Following Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the ISG was able to procure a 
considerable amount of information relating to the “economic means, key actors and 
organizations, foreign suppliers, and procurement mechanisms used by Saddam to 
pursue his set of objectives: survival of himself, his Regime, and his legacy.”244 Much 
of the business inside Iraq was directed by Baghdad, though not Saddam personally, but 
ISG found that in some cases, certain firms and organizations had engaged in illicit 
activities without the government’s knowledge. This was the case with many Iraqi and 
foreign trade intermediaries’ methods that were used to procure UN-banned items.245 
Included within this section of the ISG Report are twelve annexes that are intended to 
provide more detail on the issues examined in the procurement chapter. These annexes 
range from translations of Iraq’s major trade protocols to a description of its banking 
system to companies suspected in illicit military-related trade with Iraq.246 While much 
information was obtained relating to regime finance, issues relating to decision-making 
of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes were less forthcoming. 
 The climate in which NBC weapons decisions were made changed considerably 
with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Before 1990 NBC decisions were made for national 
prestige concerns and tended to revolve around the nuclear programme. Baghdad paid 
little attention to comments made by the West concerning the development of NBC 
weapons, as many regime officials believed the effective use of chemical weapons was 
the sole reason they were not speaking Persian in the 1990s.247 After the Kuwait war the 
key operative international concern was the implementation of the ceasefire resolution, 
UNSCR 687, which obligated Iraq to fully account for its NBC programmes before 
relief on the sanctions would be allowed. This quickly became the focus of the regime 
and there was an evolution in the Iraqi approach with the objective being the lifting of 
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UN sanctions. Saddam had placed a great deal of his reputation on the production of 
these weapons and it was important that Iraq be able to reconstitute its proscribed 
weapons programmes at the earliest possible date.248 This would not be able to happen 
until sanctions were lifted and UN inspectors had signed off on Iraq’s compliance. 
 In terms of NBC weapons decision-making, there did not seem to be any sort of 
formalized process. The western construct of governmental decision-making did not 
exist. According to Steve Black: 
The thing we (ISG) never got a good handle on is some notion of an 
organized set of committees, or some sort of inter-agency process. It’s 
easy enough to make a wire diagram of who was in charge of what 
project but the formal decision-making was really amorphous. We don’t 
understand it, not because they weren’t willing to try to explain it. Stuff 
would get stove-piped upwards. There was not a WMD committee with a 
representative of each program, etc, who would sit together every other 
week and decide where the effort should go. They didn’t do it that way. 
It was impossible to explain how they made decisions, by using that sort 
of formalized construct.249 
Having inherited an administrative system from the British, many government officials 
were meticulous bureaucrats, or at least this was the case until this orderly process was 
subverted by the regime.250  
Saddam was a dictator, plain and simple. And in any dictatorship, the organs of 
democratic process – if present – will invariably be little more than window dressing. 
Saddam was the primary decision-maker in the regime and he was responsible for 
setting the regime’s strategic goals. That is not to say that other people were irrelevant. 
Since Saddam had little to no scientific and technical understanding of the various 
programmes, he relied on the opinions of a few of his favoured technocrats.251  
Of interest were Iraq’s R&D efforts into aflatoxin. For example, you might have 
a scientist whose area of research was aflatoxin and figured this was an easy way to get 
support for something the leadership did not understand and that did not seem to 
provide any real benefit to the CB programme.252 People in these programmes were 
maneuvering in the space that Saddam left open to work. Iraq under Saddam was a 
country that did not allow other people the autonomy to independently make decisions 
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apart from him. Many ideas were brought to Saddam’s attention, ideas which were 
usually dealt with at a much lower administrative level. According to Black, “There is a 
weird dynamic where little things wind up further up the chain but the big decisions get 
made at a very low level.”253 This was the situation in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
According to ISG, early in his career Saddam was very involved in the 
micromanagement of all aspects of government. Later on he became more withdrawn 
and less involved in the day-to-day running of regime affairs. Though Saddam ruled as 
a dictator, he did not involve himself with the minutiae of running the proscribed 
weapons programmes.254 Saddam would not have been interested nor able to make a 
rational decision regarding which method of uranium enrichment to follow or specific 
bomb designs or what pathogens to weaponize. He may have made comments, which 
were either implicit or explicit as to what he wanted, and it was up to his scientists and 
technocrats to come up with the solutions. Saddam did not delegate as he had others to 
do that for him. His son-in-law, Hussein Kamel was one of the most prominent of his 
managers and was a key figure in the administration of Iraq’s proscribed weapons 
programmes. 
 
Iraqi Economics 
For decades the economy of Iraq has been linked to the welfare of its energy 
sector, specifically oil production.255 Currently Iraq has proven oil reserves upwards of 
115 billion barrels meaning that it possesses the second largest oil reserves in the world 
behind Saudi Arabia.256 One year after the ascent of Saddam Hussein to the Presidency, 
Iraq’s income from the sale of oil was about $26 billion.257 During the latter stages of 
the war with Iran, Iraqi oil revenue was approximately $11 billion, well under half of its 
1980 level.258 Two years later, Saddam Hussein would initiate plans to invade 
neighboring oil-rich Kuwait, believing that along with the UAE, Kuwait had 
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intentionally flooded the market with a quantity of oil that exceeded the quotas fixed by 
OPEC. The drop in oil prices amounted to a net loss of $89 billion for Iraq.259 The 
regime also claimed that Kuwait had stolen oil valued at approximately $2.4 billion 
from Iraq via the setting up of oil installations in the southern section of the Iraqi 
Rumalia oil field.260 The regime was going to extract payment from Kuwait one way or 
another.  
The volatility in the price of oil caused significant economic issues for the 
regime in the 1980s. This was a problem as it was estimated that in 1989 the sale of oil 
comprised about 61% of Iraq’s GDP.261 This affected Iraq’s revenue stream, though it 
did not seem to have a discernable effect upon the amount of money going into the 
proscribed weapons programmes. Another issue of significance was that Saddam had 
grossly underestimated the financial cost of the eight-year war with Iran262 – a mistake 
he would make later on with the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The ISG Report states: 
Saddam ignored his economic advisors in the Ministries of Finance and 
Planning with respect to strategic planning. For example, Saddam 
entered the Iran-Iraq war heedless of Ministry warnings about the 
economic consequences. He had no plan or strategy for how the war was 
to be financed and generally displayed little interest in economic policy. 
He showed little concern about adjusting disastrous economic policies 
(such as those causing inflation) in the interests of social stability. He 
did, however, pay close attention to disbursements. He made sure he 
could take the credit for public sector pay raises or special allocations 
such as bonuses to particular sections of the Iraqi population. He took 
less interest in whether such outlays were affordable or their effect on 
fiscal management.263 
 
Beginning in 1991 strict economic sanctions were imposed by the UN Security 
Council limiting the import/export ability of the regime. Since Iraq was heavily 
dependent upon the export of oil, this became a significant issue. According to the ISG 
Report, GDP per capita fell from $2304 in 1989 to approximately $495 in 1995.264 This 
had a significant impact upon Iraqi society as it effectively destroyed any savings 
people may have had and pushed the once-prosperous Iraqi middle-class into crippling 
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poverty.265 During this time, Iraqi officials were desperate to have sanctions lifted and 
resume the unregulated sale of oil. They had exported a quantity of oil illegally, but it 
was far below their pre-sanctions OPEC quota. The Iraqi economy eventually stabilized 
in 1996 when the regime formally accepted UNSCR 986 and the establishment of the 
UN Oil for Food Programme.266  
The inspection regime set up by the UN after the acceptance of UNSCR 687 had 
been met with strong resistance and continual denial from the beginning. Iraqi 
government officials were trying to cooperate just enough so that inspectors could sign 
off on Iraqi compliance. This was the regime’s desired end result. Everything depended 
on sanctions being lifted. Restarting the chemical and biological weapons programmes 
was not going to be easy, especially considering the invasive nature of the UN 
inspection regime. This was key for the regime – get the UN to sign off on compliance, 
lift sanctions, carry on with the sale of oil and eventually restart the proscribed weapons 
programmes. Iraq had retained a significant amount of its scientific and technical 
expertise in research laboratories and universities.267 Restarting the programmes would 
have been completely dependent on the lifting of sanctions and having the inspectors 
out of Iraq. Charles Duelfer believes that in early 1991 firm guidance was given by 
Saddam to make the lifting of sanctions the highest priority. Duelfer also believes that 
this was the case because so much of Saddam’s reputation was tied to the production of 
WMD.268 
UNSCOM was resolute in its opinion that the On-Going Monitoring and 
Verification (OMV) regime that was required by Security Council Resolution 715 be 
quickly implemented. The resolution contained “specific provisions for the monitoring 
and verification of any eventual imports by Iraq, including lists of prohibited items as 
well as dual-use items.” 269 The Security Council also requested that UNSCOM and the 
IAEA develop a mechanism for monitoring any eventual sales or supplies to Iraq of 
items relevant to the implementation of provisions of Resolution 687.270A Senior 
UNSCOM official has stated that the regime was thinking that sooner or later the 
inspection regime would be removed and that is why they fought for so long against the 
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acceptance of a monitoring protocol.271 This would have made things even more 
difficult in restarting the weapons programmes. However, on a small-scale, the CB 
programmes could be reasonably well hidden from the inspectors. Former UNSCOM 
official Tim Trevan believes it would have been possible for them to restart their 
chemical and biological weapons programmes since Iraq had retained the scientific 
“know-how” and could have learned from their previous mistakes in weapons 
production.272 
In order to help conceal the regime’s expenditures on their proscribed weapons 
programmes, a special budgetary process was developed. This process was divided into 
two systems, the first was a formal governmental budget and the second was a 
supplemental budget that was controlled directly by Saddam and the Economic Affairs 
Committee.273 The supplemental budget used hard currency to finance Iraq’s illicit 
procurement programmes. The report estimates that the regime generated $10.9 billion 
in hard currency through illicit means from 1990 to 2003.274 The primary source of 
Iraq’s income came from their Bilateral Trade Protocols with neighboring states. For 
example, ISG claims that the Protocol with Jordan gave the regime an estimated $8 
billion in revenue from the illicit sale of oil.275 Though this was less in terms of total 
dollars earned from the sale of oil, it was enough to keep R&D into Iraq’s proscribed 
weapons programmes funded.  
 
Byzantine Bureaucratic Politics276 
Key players within the bureaucratic politics model are not passive actors in the 
policy-making process. Typically they do more than accept decisions from above and 
implement them. Saddam consulted a few long-serving advisors, but large deliberative 
bodies like the RCC, the Ba’th Party leadership, Cabinet Ministries, the military or the 
intelligence agencies and the industrial establishment were incidental to critical 
decisions. He chose to not give these organizations an active role in the policy process, 
instead preferring to direct policy via his own fiat.277 One man ruled with an iron fist 
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and was unilaterally responsible for directing overall regime strategy. Everything was 
autocratic at all levels.278 Decision-making in Iraq was amorphous and idiosyncratic and 
devoid of any formalized western-style logic and reasoning. It consisted of a complex 
web of personal interests, loyalty to the regime and fear of consequence.  
 According to Avinash Dixit, “Democratic and autocratic rulers alike must use a 
bureaucracy to implement policy.”279 Saddam placed a lot of importance on what some 
of his most senior advisors told him, most of whom were kept duly informed through a 
well-defined scientific and civil service. Most of his advisors, upon receiving approval 
to debate a particular military or foreign policy issue would spend their time trying to 
figure out what Saddam wanted to hear, as opposed to what may or may not be the most 
logical course of action. This was in fact commonplace in weapons-related issues, 
where no one wanted to be the bearer of unpleasant or unwanted news for fear of being 
ultimately blamed for its failure. In 1991, Saddam created a committee to serve as a 
deliberative body to provide political advice. The committee, called the Political 
Operations Room included Foreign Minister Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Al Samarra’i, 
Prime Minister Sa’dun Hamadi, Tariq Aziz and either Latif Nusayyif Jasim Al Dulaymi 
or Hamid Yusif Hammadi.280  
Prior to the creation of the Political Operations Room, Saddam had a system 
where he met with his ministers individually to discuss pressing political matters. In 
1996 Saddam had replaced the Political Operations Room with a new committee called 
the Committee of Four or simply “The Quartet”.281 The ISG estimates that:  
Neither the Political Operations Room nor the Quartet had a 
policymaking role. Instead, they offered advice, but only on issues 
referred to them by Saddam. They had none of the proactive or directive 
powers normally associated with such senior committees in the West or 
elsewhere. Moreover, they were weakened by the Byzantine 
administrative practices common to the higher levels of the Regime.282 
Other organizational bodies such as the RCC also debated policy issues, though it 
amounted to little more than a post hoc endorsement of Saddam’s already pre-
determined decision. 
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One of the central tenets of bureaucratic politics is that there is no single, unitary 
actor making strategic decisions, but many actors as players who: 
act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather 
according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and 
personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a single 
rational choice, but by the pulling and hauling that is politics.283 
In terms of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons decision-making, while Saddam 
had the final say in all decisions, his core group of advisors was involved in discussions 
to determine what the desired outcome of an issue should be. It was a matter of self-
preservation for many senior government officials, military leaders and bureaucrats that 
they provide Saddam with what they thought was a viable option, one that would bring 
glory to Iraq and its leader.  
Iraq had invested time and resources in at least three separate programmes to 
enrich uranium, EMIS, gas centrifuge technology and LIS. The gas centrifuge 
programme, run by Mahdi Obeidi, was under the direct supervision of Hussein Kamel. 
Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far was the head of Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons programme and the 
scientist charged with overseeing the EMIS enrichment programme. These two 
programmes were in effect competing with each other, though few would have known 
of the other’s existence. Intended competition that resulted from two competing and 
separate groups occurred in other areas of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes. For 
example, the regime had two competing ballistic missile programmes under Ra’id Jasim 
Isma’il Al Adhami and Muzhir Sadiq Saba’ Al Tamimi in 1994, as well as the 
development of two different binary CW rounds at MSE and TRC in the late 1980s.284 
This was particularly important for Kamel as he had a seat at the highest table 
and was one of the chief advisors to Saddam on military science and technology 
matters. It would have been in Kamel’s best interest to be the one to bring Saddam the 
news that they were successful in building a gas centrifuge capable of enriching 
uranium. With a high premium placed on the development of nuclear weapons, and the 
way in which Saddam chose to remunerate his loyal servants, being the de facto head of 
the programme that was able to enrich uranium would have meant cars, money and 
untold privilege within the regime.  
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Many governments, autocratic and democratic alike, have individuals that are 
closely involved in the creation and implementation of policy. Some have more freedom 
and latitude than others, but what is consistent, as Allison argues, is how interpretations 
of national, organizational and personal goals influence each individual’s outlook on a 
specific policy issue. Hussein Kamel was not a man of science, but he was a shrewd 
operator when it came to regime politics. Like many, Kamel operated without a specific 
set of strategic objectives. He was guided by his own personal agenda, which in many 
instances was intertwined with that of the regime. This is not to say that personal 
agendas are the sole motivating factor, however, different individuals will certainly 
have diverse reasons for their actions/opinions. 
The Iraqi regime did not operate as a stable western democracy, and as we have 
seen, many of the organs of government were largely superfluous to decision-making 
and policy formation. While there were debates at high levels between regime officials, 
Saddam would sometimes act unilaterally on a particular issue, without consulting 
anyone. More often, he relied on a few individuals to give him updates and details over 
weapons development issues. 
One of the key criticisms of the bureaucratic politics model is how the power of 
the chief executive is marginalized. Stephen Krasner states that: 
Bureaucratic theorists imply that it is exceedingly difficult if not 
impossible for political leaders to control the organizational web which 
surrounds them. Important decisions result from numerous smaller 
actions taken by individuals at different levels in the bureaucracy who 
have partially incompatible national, bureaucratic, political, and personal 
objectives.285 
Saddam did not solicit advice from many individuals on many issues and frequently the 
advice he did receive was based primarily on a sense of self-preservation and 
favoritism. Since no one wanted to bring Saddam bad news, the Iraqi President rarely 
had all the facts and this contributed to him making decisions that ended up being 
problematic. Former Iraqi defence scientist Imad ‘Abd-al-Latif Abd-al-Ridha claimed 
that key regime members habitually concealed from Saddam the truth regarding Iraq’s 
military and industrial capabilities.286 This deception was most likely motivated through 
each individual’s fear of loss – loss of privilege, loss of freedom and in some instances, 
loss of life. Abd-al-Ridha also stated that, “Saddam was like a computer, if he received 
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reliable information he would make good decisions, but if the inputs were flawed, the 
resulting policies would suffer.”287 Having all the facts is a pre-requisite for making 
sound, rational decisions.288 The ISG Report states that Saddam rarely had the whole 
story as none of his advisors or senior regime officials wanted to bring him bad or 
negative news for fear for their personal safety.289  
The regime’s decision to invade Kuwait prior to the acquisition of a nuclear 
weapon, which was estimated to be between four and six months290 made little sense 
from a western perspective. The crash programme was developed in August 1990 for 
the express purpose of diverting safeguarded reactor fuel towards the nuclear bomb 
programme.291 Had the decision to invade Kuwait been delayed long enough for PC-3 to 
fashion some sort of nuclear device, then the situation in the region would have changed 
dramatically. Instead, they pushed ahead with the invasion and occupation without the 
security of a functional and deployable nuclear device.  
Since the proposal of the bureaucratic politics decision-making model in the 
early 1970s, there has been both praise and criticism. For some, the model provided a 
further level of analysis into governmental decision-making – where many actors are 
involved in the policy process as opposed to a select few. This was in contrast to the 
rational actor model, which, over time, had become the preferred decision-making 
model, due primarily to its ability explain decision-making as the state acting as a 
unitary actor. The problem with the rational actor model according to Allison, is that: 
The ‘maker’ of a governmental policy is not one calculating decision-
maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political 
actors who differ substantially about what their government should do 
and who compete in attempting to affect both governmental decisions 
and the actions of the government.292  
The bureaucratic politics model, according to Edward Rhodes, represents a 
sophisticated effort to deal with the fact that the “simplistic rational unitary-actor 
models of state behaviour failed to predict the complex, frequently inconsistent or self-
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defeating behaviour that actually occurs.”293 While Iraq cannot be seen as a typical case 
of a bureaucratic government making well-informed decisions in the best interest of the 
state, many aspects of Allison’s model still ring true. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 The purpose of this case study was to provide some understanding and insight into 
the decisions Iraq took in trying to acquire NBC weapons. Iraq under Saddam Hussein 
was essentially a Middle Eastern autocracy turned military dictatorship. The regime did 
not operate in the same way that a stable western democracy would; Saddam ruled Iraq 
with an iron fist. Most Iraqi organs of government were largely non-functioning in any 
sort of decision-making or policy formation role. Saddam ruled with the advice of a few 
key advisors, some of whom wielded considerable influence with the Iraqi President. 
There were issues for debate between Saddam’s advisors, but instead of debating key 
points that could help him formulate rational policy, most of the time discussions 
revolved around what they thought Saddam was most interested in hearing. Fear of 
consequence was not the sole motivating factor here. Each individual was guided by his 
or her own personal set of beliefs. Since Saddam was acutely interested in non-
conventional weapons technology, any proposal put forward, either directly or through 
an intermediary (head of a programme) would be heard.  
 As previously stated, Saddam’s interest in science came from his association with 
the IAEC beginning in 1973. From the time he became President in 1979, he was 
interested in any research proposal that could benefit Iraq’s growing military-industrial 
complex. ISG states that, “There are multiple references to Saddam ordering MIC to 
pursue military technology ‘pet projects’ he had received from other government 
agencies, individual scientists or academics.”294 Saddam’s personalized and intricate 
administrative methods meant that control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
development and deployment was never far from his touch.295 Nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons, radiological dispersal devices, ballistic missiles, superguns and rail 
guns were all considered high-value commodities by the regime. Significant 
investments in resources and manpower were provided to scientific and technical 
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centres in the hope of developing a useable weapons programme. Both internal and 
external influences proved to be significant motivating factors in the regime’s decisions 
to acquire NBC weapons.296  
 Saddam perceived the threats from Iran and Israel to be very real and of primary 
concern to the security of Iraq. The specter of Israeli nuclear weapons and a large 
Iranian army convinced Saddam that he needed to possess ‘equatable’ weapons. The 
regime’s unwavering belief that the use of chemical weapons against attacking Iranian 
troops saved the regime from occupation was strong. Whether or not it was actually the 
case, senior regime officials were convinced of the utility of chemical weapons and that 
they could play a part in Iraq’s overall strategic planning.  
As well as the need for a strong external defence, he believed that there were 
significant internal threats to his leadership.297 Iraq is a conglomeration of Shia, Sunni 
and Kurdish peoples – all with differing agendas. Modern Iraq is still very much a tribal 
society. Most of Saddam’s inner circle was just like him, Sunni, Ba’thist and from the 
area around Tikrit.298 Traditional tribal relationships were just as important as any 
modern structures, perhaps even more important to him.299 This small element of Iraqi 
society had privilege and entitlement beyond the reach of the majority of Iraq’s citizens. 
It is of little surprise that the other groups within Iraq saw this consolidation of power 
by Saddam’s Tikriti associates as problematic from their perspective. These internal 
security concerns were of extreme importance to Saddam. Some believe that he saw 
internal threats greater than any external threat, throughout his entire presidency right 
up to Operation Iraqi Freedom.300  
 Chemical weapons played a large part in the subjugation of the Kurdish 
populations in northern Iraq. Thousands of Kurdish men, women and children were 
killed during the Anfal Campaign. These were fear and terror weapons. The regime had 
been convinced that these weapons were of high-value and could provide the tactical 
advantage they felt they needed. Joost Hiltermann believes that, “the Iraqi regime could 
not have systemically murdered this many Kurds if it had not been in a position to first 
flush them out of their villages – a feat it had signally failed to accomplish in the army’s 
perennial attempts to subdue the countryside, due to the difficult terrain and strong 
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peshmerga resistance.”301 Any potential threat to Saddam’s rule was dealt with swiftly 
and frequently in the most brutal fashion. 
 The bureaucratic politics model of decision-making helps to provide a unique 
view of decision-making inside the regime. Bureaucratic politics scholars point to a 
clearly defined set of principles that helps make up the decision-making model. In Iraq’s 
case, clearly defined principles were in short supply. Saddam chose to direct policy via 
his own fiat instead of allowing Iraq’s governmental and bureaucratic organizations to 
function in their traditional roles. This led to a very particular and idiosyncratic 
methodology of decision-making in military and political matters. Relying on a few key 
individuals kept the circle very small and relegated some of Iraq’s more capable 
scientists and bureaucrats to the sidelines. Within this insular environment, decisions 
relating to Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes were made.  
 Early in his tenure as president, Saddam exercised a great deal of control over all 
weapons-related issues. This changed after Desert Storm when he became more 
withdrawn and less involved in making daily weapons-related decisions, preferring to 
delegate authority to a few key advisors. The end product was still the same, as no one 
within Saddam’s inner coterie would have risked not implementing his ideas for fear of 
retribution. As a result, decisions that were made without the proper input from 
knowledgeable and capable scientists and bureaucrats ended up being flawed and 
ultimately problematic for the regime. 
 Since the refinement of the bureaucratic politics model there has been a distinct 
lack of empirical studies that have attempted to test this model and many of them have 
focused on individual crises as opposed to routine policy decisions. Deciding to develop 
a nuclear, biological or chemical weapons programme is hardly routine, but these 
decisions were not taken during any sort of crisis either. This particular model is useful 
for helping to understand a state such as Iraq, where a formalized methodology of 
decision-making was completely lacking in the weapons-development field.  
 Perfectly rational explanations for why the regime did what it did do not exist. 
This is where the bureaucratic politics model can be of some utility. Saddam’s personal 
leadership style stifled creativity and prevented people from providing him with facts-
based advice, for fear of incurring his displeasure. These are things that contributed to 
the regime’s ultimate failure to clandestinely develop their NBC weapons programmes 
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to a more complete capacity.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONNECTIONS 
Let us not become so preoccupied with weapons that we lose sight of the fact 
that war itself is the real villain and the scourge of mankind.1 
- Harry S. Truman 
   
The purpose of this chapter is to identify connections between nuclear weapons 
on the one hand and chemical and biological weapons on the other by synthesizing and 
expanding upon the findings from the United Kingdom and Iraq case studies. Each case 
study provides a unique example of a state seeking to acquire a non-conventional 
weapons capability. For some, nuclear weapons are seen to be the height of weapons 
technology and engineering and the retention of other non-conventional weapons 
capabilities is immaterial. The belief here is that if it is a strategic deterrent that is what 
is desirable then nothing is more effective than a modern nuclear arsenal. However, 
different states have differing criteria for wanting to possess non-conventional weapons. 
Issues as wide-ranging as national/international prestige, addressing national defence or 
regional security matters, strategic concerns, economic aspects, military utility and the 
maintenance of important international relationships or agreements are all factors in 
determining why some states decide to pursue nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons.2  
In order to draw out the connections the chapter is organized into four separate 
sections, to act as filters. This was done to elicit a broader range of connections from the 
case studies and in so doing additional historical data gathered during my research has 
also been included to elaborate upon these points. It should be noted that the boundaries 
between the categories are not always clearly delineated and therefore some of the 
connections could fit into more than one of the four sections. The first section is on 
strategic issues and strategic cultures. States’ thoughts and opinions on NBC armament 
are influenced by its independent strategic culture. The importance placed on possessing 
NBC weapons varies from state to state, and was a significant factor in both the UK and 
Iraq case studies. The next section is on political considerations. Decisions taken to 
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develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in both the UK and Iraq were made 
for several reasons. Defence and security, national prestige and external political factors 
all come into play here. Following this section is an analysis of economic factors. The 
allocation of men, money and materiel between and within the weapons programmes 
had a discernable effect in the UK in particular. Due to Iraq’s considerable oil and gas 
revenues, money was less of a concern, though there was a shortage of skilled scientific 
and technical personnel. The final section deals with what I have termed future 
challenges. This section looks at the connections between nuclear weapons and CBW 
from a research and development angle. Potential problems over the development of 
new types of weaponry are addressed here. The chapter concludes with a summary of 
the findings.  
From the early days of the Second World War British interest in the military 
application of nuclear energy was significant. Prime Minister Winston Churchill saw it 
as a potential war-winning weapon that needed to be broadly researched and developed 
so that a better understanding of its application could be known. The establishment of 
Tube Alloys during the autumn of 1941 set in motion a multi-year process of research 
into atomic energy that eventually culminated with the first British nuclear detonation in 
late 1952. 
Chemical and biological weapons occupied a somewhat different place within 
British military thinking. The large-scale application of gas during the First World War 
influenced policy-makers within the UK during this period. It had become important for 
Britain to possess a wartime chemical weapons capability for tactical reasons as well as 
providing their own troops with a sense of retribution. As Albert Palazzo explains, in 
the wake of the first gas attack during the Battle of Second Ypres in April 1915, “the 
support of the troops demanded a response; left unattended, British morale would 
inevitably decline if the Germans exploited their chemical advantage.”3 Donald Richter 
writes, “To the British especially, poison gas seemed less chivalrous, less sporting, less 
gentlemanly than any other weapon in history and adjectives like ‘dastardly’ and 
‘heinous’ found new currency.”4 Though, as Richter point out, it did not take the Allies 
long to retaliate in kind.5 
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Early British thinking on biological weapons, according to Brian Balmer, 
“shifted along with the dominant conceptions of the threat in the scientific and policy 
area.”6 The fear of a German – and later Soviet – attack was indeed a motivating factor 
and helped to convince the British that they should possess a biological weapons 
capability. Firstly though, the scientific community needed to further their 
understanding of how biological agents, manufactured on a large-scale, could be 
manipulated into affecting life processes. The learning curve was steep and much work 
had to be done before the UK could develop biological weapons. 
The situation in Iraq during the 1980s was similar to the British experience some 
forty years earlier. The sway that nuclear weapons held over Saddam was considerable.7 
He was fascinated by science, especially nuclear science and it was very important for 
him that Iraq developed a nuclear capability. First, Saddam believed nuclear weapons 
would have provided Iraq with an effective deterrent, which would have altered the 
nature of its relationships in the Middle East, especially between Israel and Iran – Iraq’s 
two primary rivals. Second, the thought of being the first country in the Arab world to 
have a nuclear capability gave him an immense feeling of national prestige and 
intellectual superiority.8 Saddam saw the potential for Iraq to occupy a unique position 
not only in the Arab World, but internationally as well.9 While Iraq was unable to 
develop a nuclear weapon, it was more successful in acquiring a ballistic missile as well 
as a CBW capability.  
 
STRATEGIC ISSUES & STRATEGIC CULTURES  
 Security is often given as the rationale as to why states want to acquire nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons. This is reflected in the realist assumption that states 
are primarily concerned with their survival. As Kenneth Waltz explains, “Only if 
survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and 
power.”10 Nuclear weapons in particular have long been regarded as being an essential 
component in the defence of the United Kingdom. Britain’s reasons for wanting an 
independent nuclear weapons programme were more complicated than one might 
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8 Interview with Charles Duelfer, 10 April 2008. See also, Al J. Venter, Allah’s Bomb: The Islamic Quest 
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9 Interview with a Senior UNSCOM Official, 31 March 2008. 
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expect. The strategic partnership that the UK shared with the US during the Second 
World War in political and military matters was very important to the British, however 
the relationship suffered after the war. The Attlee and Churchill governments believed 
that it was in Britain’s best interest to reestablish its strategic partnership and that the 
creation of a made-in-Britain, deliverable nuclear weapon would assist greatly. 
Prior to the Hurricane test in 1952, considerable effort was put into investigating 
the role chemical and biological weapons could play. Having a chemical and biological 
weapons capability could have provided the UK with a tactical and strategic deterrent 
option. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union had supplanted Nazi Germany as the 
predominant security threat to the democratized states of the West. At the time the 
Soviets were suspected of increasing involvement in chemical and biological warfare 
research and development (R&D) and it was important that the UK be able to deter or 
respond to these threats.11  What emerged out of this period was the conviction that 
Britain must possess a similar retaliatory capability. Carter and Pearson state that, “the 
need for the capability to retaliate-in-kind with chemical weapons remained, and 
undoubtedly any such retaliation in future needed to be with nerve agents.”12  
Retaliation-in-kind would was a considerable force in influencing British postwar 
interest in chemical and biological weapons.13  
In Iraq, non-conventional weapons occupied a central place in Iraqi strategic 
planning. Nuclear weapons in particular received an elevated priority. As mentioned 
previously, Saddam was President of the IAEC from 1973 to 1979 and was fascinated 
with nuclear power. For Saddam, nuclear weapons provided more than an effective 
deterrent; they represented an ideal, the greatness and legitimacy of Iraq as a regional 
and global power. Saddam saw, in Iraq, the capability of being the dominant player in 
the Middle East – a bulwark against the “Persians” and a military rival to Israel.14 For 
Saddam nuclear weapons were primarily about prestige. He believed that Iraq, due 
much in part to its past glories, should occupy a lofty position within the region.15 
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Volume 141, Number 1 (February 1996): 61. 
13 See page 105, note 297. 
14 Interview with Charles Duelfer, 10 April 2008. 
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Nuclear weapons were the way to elevate Iraq to a new position of hegemony within the 
region.  
The thought of conducting operations with chemical and biological weapons did 
not create a strong feeling of moral opprobrium within the regime, even though Iraq was 
a state party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.16 As stated earlier, many individuals within 
positions of power, both militarily and politically, believed that chemical weapons had 
saved Iraq from being overrun by Iran during their eight-year war. Whether or not this 
was actually the case is immaterial. Saddam and many of his regime officials believed 
this was the truth. Chemical weapons occupied a special place within the minds of 
Saddam and his subordinates. Chemical weapons offered a tactical advantage to states 
wishing to use them, especially if an adversary did not possess a similar weapon or 
adequate defences against it. Iraq possessed different types of chemical munitions and 
had committed atrocities and created mass casualties against Iranian troops as well as 
some Kurdish populations, internally. This begs the question of why did Iraq choose to 
not use chemical weapons against Coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm in 
1991? This will be addressed in the upcoming section on deterrence. 
 
Hedging One’s Bets 
From a strategic standpoint, biological weapons can offer a different set of 
advantages than chemical weapons. For Saddam biological weapons were an instrument 
of terror. Iraqi research into biological agents showed some interesting developments. 
ISG reported significant R&D into aflatoxin (Agent C) that began in 1988, based on 
previous non-military work of Dr. ‘Imad Dhiyab.17 Initial weapons tests were conducted 
in November 1989 using 122mm rockets.18 The choice of aflatoxin as a biological 
weapon is a strange one. As the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show, 
exposure to aflatoxin is known to cause both chronic and acute hepatocellular injury. 
Statistics show that from an outbreak in Kenya, acute aflatoxin poisoning results in liver 
failure and death in up to 40% of cases.19 Richard Spertzel questions the utility of 
                                                
16 Iraq deposited the instrument of ratification on 8 September 1931. “Protocol for the Prohibition of the 
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 
June 1925.” Federation of American Scientists, accessed 13 May 2010, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/geneva/text/geneva1.htm.  
17 ISG Report, III, Biological Programme, 22. 
18 Ibid. 
19 “Environmental Hazards & Health Effects – Health Studies, Aflatoxin.” Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, accessed 24 April 2010, http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/hsb/aflatoxin/. 
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having an agent that presents symptoms years after exposure.20 It is hard to see the 
interest the regime had in funding aflatoxin research, as it does not seem to be a logical 
choice for a weaponizable agent. It could however, be introduced into a population only 
to have people dying years later from liver failure. This is a long-term method to inflict 
fatalities upon a specific population; it is not an effective short-term biological 
weapon.21 Brian Jones believes that: 
Aflatoxin has been dismissed by most as an ineffective agent, having 
only low acute toxicity and a long-term carcinogenic effect. However, 
the toxin does have strong immunosuppressant properties and as such 
could be of real interest to an offensive BW programme. Depression of 
the immune system by aflatoxin occurs within the incubation timescale 
of several disease causing microorganisms. Thus it could be used to 
enhance the effect of otherwise innocuous agents or to increase the 
susceptibility of a population to naturally occurring disease. For 
deployed troops that could be very important. The modulation of the 
immune system in general and an interest in aflatoxin and other 
mycotoxins could be relevant to more advanced concepts of use and 
agent development.22  
Former UNSCOM Commissioner A. J. J. Ooms believed that the regime had developed 
aflatoxin for precisely this reason. As Ooms explained, “Aflatoxin causes fatal liver 
cancer after a period of five or six years. Because of this delay, it has no military 
significance whatsoever. Therefore, the only possible conclusion is that the Iraqis have 
developed aflatoxin as a weapon of genocide against the Kurds.”23 The way in which 
Saddam viewed internal threats to the regime it must be said that it is difficult to rule 
out whether or not this was part of the regime’s plan to deal with the Kurdish question.24 
Possessing a deliverable biological weapon would have given Saddam 
considerable leverage within Iraq as well as the region in general. More specifically, 
Israel is an unofficially recognized nuclear weapon possessor state and its dealings with 
a BW capable Iraq would have been very different. This is the key point here. Saddam 
knew the destabilizing effect that BW would have on the region. He was quoted as 
saying, “We are aware if such a method (BW) were used, the situation would become 
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21 Interview with Jonathan Tucker, 4 April 2008. 
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uncontrollable.”25 However, that did not stop the regime from continuing to support its 
clandestine BW programme. During the same telecast Saddam claimed that: 
As to whether scientists have done research on this or that sort of germ, I 
do not give a guarantee in this matter, and I do not deny it… I mean 
conventional scientific research, not germ warfare. I mean using germs 
for scientific purposes. I am aware that conducting research on germs for 
military purposes amounts to using them as a weapon.26 
It is difficult to know whether Saddam actually believed in what he was quoted as 
saying. Rhetoric aside, what is clear is the fact that the regime had decided to invest in 
research into biological weapons with the express desire of acquiring a biological 
weapons capability. Saddam saw chemical and biological weapons as being able to 
provide security against a nuclear-armed Israel and a much larger conventional military 
power in Iran. 
 Another connection that came out of the Iraq case study centres on an oft-
repeated axiom made by then-President of Iran Hojjat o-Eslam Akbar Hashemi-
Rafsanjani in reference to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. 
Rafsanjani claimed that in response to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against his 
country: 
Chemical and biological weapons are a poor man’s atomic bombs and 
can be easily produced. We should at least consider them for our 
defence… Although the use of such weapons is inhumane, the (Iran-Iraq) 
war taught us that international laws are only drops of ink on paper.27 
The concept of the “poor man’s atomic bomb” has resonated throughout parts of the 
Middle East. In a speech to the Arab Socialist Union National Congress in Cairo on 17 
February 1972, President of Egypt Anwar Sadat suggested that, “The only reply to 
biological warfare is that we too should use biological warfare.”28 The presence of a 
nuclear-armed Israel has been destabilizing in the region for decades. Seth Carus states 
                                                
25 Full text of remarks during a meeting in Mosul on 12 April 1990 between President Saddam Hussein, 
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, the US ambassador to Iraq and US Senators Robert Dole, Howard 
Metzenbaum, Frank Murkowski, James McClure and Alan Simpson, broadcast as read by an announcer 
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26 Ibid. 
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28 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 
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that, “From this perspective, biological warfare is not a desired instrument of war 
fighting; but it is, however, essential to prevent its use by an enemy.”29 
In November 1996 the Syrian Ambassador to Cairo, Issa Darwish, was reported 
as saying that Syria would retaliate with CW if Israel attacked it with nuclear 
weapons.30 The Ambassador issued a denial the following day, stating that they (Syria) 
“do not possess weapons of mass destruction and do not threaten anyone with them.”31 
Though Syria has never officially admitted that it possesses CW comments like this lead 
one to believe that chemical weapons are seen as a necessary and legitimate deterrent to 
Israeli nuclear weapons. As long as these types of weapons are seen as an effective 
counter to either a nuclear-armed opponent or one with overwhelming conventional 
forces, there will be considerable interest in them. Colin Gray believes that, “The 
quintessential tool of the strategically disadvantaged who desperately requires an 
asymmetrical edge, lies in the basket of WMD options.”32 A state that possesses a non-
conventional weapons capability in a region rife with security issues – according to 
western perceptions – presents a destabilizing force. But from the perspective of the 
proliferator, it is about prestige, national defence and a deterrent capability against a 
potentially superior adversary. Looking at the strategic culture of a particular state can 
help shed some light on the question of why states want to acquire these types of 
weapons. 
 
Deterrence: Threats and Responses 
Another issue that emerged from my research is how states’ concepts of 
deterrence have developed and changed over time. Thomas Schelling argues that, 
“thinking about deterrence has evolved over the decades in the hopes of meeting and 
deterring different types of threats.”33 This is noticeable when looking at the United 
States during the early years of the Cold War. In a speech before the Council of Foreign 
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Relations, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles outlined the priorities of President 
Eisenhower’s New Look national security policy. In his speech Dulles said that: 
Local defences must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive 
retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot 
always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. Otherwise, for example, 
a potential aggressor, who is glutted with manpower, might be tempted 
to attack in confidence that resistance would be confined to manpower. 
He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority was 
decisive.34  
This was a departure from the Truman administration’s policy of containment, which 
Eisenhower and Dulles believed was not an effective policy in the face of Soviet 
aggression in Eastern Europe.35 The cornerstone of New Look was the United States 
National Security Council document NSC 162/2 of 30 October 1953 where it was held 
that the US would need to have "a strong military posture, with emphasis on the 
capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power."36 This 
was significant as it was widely taken to mean that the US would reserve the right to 
respond to any sort of attack with all options available, including nuclear weapons, 
regardless of the nature of the Soviet incursion. This was a blanket declaration stating 
that if the Soviets attacked any NATO interest with conventional, chemical or nuclear 
weapons, the response will be swift and most likely nuclear. This line of thinking would 
become obsolete. Marc Trachtenberg believes that as the decade wore on, the strategy 
of massive retaliation was viewed increasingly as bankrupt – even at the highest levels 
of the (Eisenhower) administration.37  
As early as 1954, some strategic thinkers had begun to question the efficacy of 
the doctrine of massive retaliation in regard to localized or peripheral conflicts.38 As 
Klaus Knorr explains:  
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If the threat of massive reprisal failed to deter relatively minor and 
ambiguous aggression, and had to be made good, the enormity of our 
response would be out of all proportion to the challenge. The gross 
disproportionality between means and ends would prove inhibiting for 
moral and political reasons, and the threat of massive retaliation would 
suffer in credibility.39  
As a result, the concept of limited war was given a new impetus. Robert Osgood defines 
limited war as, “one in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which they fight 
to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not demand the utmost military effort of 
which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated 
settlement.”40 Henry Kissinger argued that a limited war, “reflects an attempt to affect 
the opponent’s will, not to crush it, to make the conditions to be imposed seem more 
attractive than continued resistance, to strive for specific goals and not for complete 
annihilation.”41 Clausewitz believed that wars with limited aims could be undertaken if 
the military defeat of an enemy is not possible or if in fact it is not the stated purpose of 
the conflict.42 He states that, “the nature of the political aim, the scale of demands put 
forward by either side, and the total political situation of one’s own side, are all factors 
that in practice must decisively influence the conduct of war.”43 Limited war supplanted 
massive retaliation as the pre-eminent strategic doctrine for the US and its allies.44 
Examples of limited wars in the postwar period were not uncommon. Hostilities 
broke out in the former colony of British Malaya in 1948. During the first week of June, 
three European rubber plantation managers were killed at Sungai Siput, Perak by troops 
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of the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA).45 Through waging a guerrilla 
campaign, the MRLA insurgents, never numbering more that 6000 at any one time, had 
effectively tied up approximately 300 000 Security Forces personnel, including regular 
troops, police and home guard.46 In 1953, discussions between the War Office, Air 
Ministry and Ministry of Supply had agreed to conduct airborne trials – Codenamed 
Operation Crusoe – by using non-lethal chemical agents to determine whether: 
BBC gas dispersed from improvised break-up bombs can present an 
effective barrier to the passage of determined opponents in Malayan 
terrain, and to determine the required spacing of the bombs to produce 
the effect.47 
The conclusions of the operation were that BBC would not stop a determined man who 
was aware of the physiological characteristics of the agent and the degree of the 
contamination.48 
 During the 1950-53 Korean War the US, through the United Nations, faced 
multiple Chinese and North Korean accusations of deploying chemical and biological 
warfare agents in the theatre.49 These ranged from allegations of three US B-29 bombers 
dropping gas bombs over an area of Nampo City, causing 1379 casualties,50 to the 
introduction of insects infected with plague, cholera and other infectious diseases.51 
These allegations proved to be false and attempted to discredit the US-led war effort 
while also promoting, as William Stueck explains, “the ongoing hate-America campaign 
at home amid an increasingly weary population.”52 Though fraudulent, allegations like 
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these are, according to Milton Leitenberg, “extremely detrimental to efforts to maintain 
the international norms against use of such weapons, and hence, it is anything but a 
trivial propaganda issue.”53  
As a result of these postwar limited war engagements a new US-based strategic 
doctrine arose. The doctrine of flexible response first came into prominence during the 
administration of US President John Kennedy.54 This proposed that there was a need to 
have a credible deterrent in order to match non-nuclear escalation. This essentially gave 
the President multiple options during a time of crisis, which was seen to be a more 
favourable course of action. Martin van Creveld states that, “the purpose of flexible 
response was to safeguard the continued existence of conventional forces, which led to 
massive investments in newer types of military technology.”55 The Cuban Missile Crisis 
of October 1962 saw the escalation of hostilities between the US and USSR over the 
placement of nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba. The Kennedy administration had 
examined every possible option in order to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the 
situation, though some members of his inner circle were convinced that the nuclear 
option was the most comprehensive response.56 The key is that by possessing a greater 
range of options, the overall credibility of the United States’ deterrence posture would 
be enhanced, while minimizing the potential for a nuclear weapons strike. During the 
crisis, biological weapons are said to have had an elevated operational role within US 
military planning.57 US medium bombers were deployed to the region, equipped with 
payloads of Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), an infectious alphavirus that causes 
encephalitis in horses and humans.58 VEE was one of seven antipersonnel BW agents 
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produced and stockpiled by the US.59 The biological agents were not used during the 
crisis, though as Miller, Engleman and Broad state this showed an, “emerging ability to 
conduct a new kind of warfare, that had potential repercussions far beyond Cuba.”60  
 
The 1963 Decision and Flexible Response 
The British government’s decision to discontinue offensive R&D of chemical 
weapons was taken in July 1956 and was made for a number of reasons, part political, 
part economic and part pragmatic.61 Four years after the decision was taken, questions 
concerning the efficacy of chemical weapons had begun to surface.62 As a result, two 
independent committees were appointed to study the potential utility of chemical and 
biological warfare. The first committee was an operational assessment conducted by the 
Chiefs of Staff.63 The Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence Sir Solly 
Zuckerman set up the second committee, chaired by Sir Alexander Todd.64 Known as 
the Todd Panel, this small group was, “to consider the potentialities in warfare of 
biological and chemical agents, and to make recommendations about the scope of the 
programme devoted to their study in the UK.”65 Both the Todd Panel and Tri-service 
Operational Assessment reports, delivered to the Chiefs of Staff, were considered to be 
“too complex” and yet another subcommittee of the DRPC was formed, charged with 
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preparing a “single, simplified short paper.”66 The subcommittee concluded that, “due to 
recent scientific advances, a reappraisal of current UK policy on chemical and 
biological warfare is warranted.”67 The report concluded that there was no need for a 
strategic offensive capability for either chemical or biological weapons, though they did 
suggest that chemical weapons could prove, in certain circumstances, to be a decisive 
weapon in a limited war engagement.68 
Following this, a Chiefs of Staff Joint Planning Committee report from October 
1962 stated: 
CW could be an effective means of delaying the enemy in a period 
before nuclear weapons are used. Although tactical nuclear weapons 
might be more effective in producing delay, there is risk of escalation. 
We agree that the use of CW might well keep the battle under control 
and provide a means of delaying the enemy and gaining time for 
negotiations.69  
There was an operational need for a reassessment of the current policy – which was last 
reviewed in 1958 – due to recent advances in military and civil science, specifically 
chemical weapons as well as changes in the strategic climate.  
That November, there was discussion as to the practicalities of chemical warfare 
in view of British defence planning. A note by Secretary J. K. Watkins of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee read:  
We would be free to use CW in retaliation and, in view of the access 
which our potential enemies might have to Soviet technology, we 
consider that we should equip ourselves with a retaliatory capability with 
lethal and, when available, incapacitating agents. The research both into 
a suitable agent and a weapon delivery system would assist training and 
provide a practical background to the research and development for our 
defensive capability.70 
Interest in developing an offensive capability for both lethal and incapacitating 
chemical agents was considerable. In fact, some 240 chemical compounds were tested 
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for use as possible chemical agents between August 1961 and December 1963.71 The 
perception that chemical agents could prove to be decisive in a limited war had gained 
traction. In November 1962 the DPRC concluded that while in limited war chemical 
weapons might prove decisive, “the employment of a lethal agent is likely to be 
unacceptable politically,” while “the employment of an incapacitating agent may not be 
so circumscribed.”72 
A memorandum by the Minister of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, from 16 April 
1963 laid out MoD’s thoughts on the reacquisition of a limited chemical warfare 
capability; it read: 
I propose therefore to authorise, subject to the normal discussion with the 
Treasury, the increase in research and development on lethal and 
incapacitation chemical agents and the means for their dissemination (at 
a cost of £0.624m spread over 5 years) of a lethal chemical agent, the 
acceleration of our production of defensive equipment (at a total cost of 
£17.5m over the next 5 years instead of the next 10 as planned) and a 
small increase in research on biological agents, (costing £0.37m over 5 
years) together with large scale trials (costing £0.1m a year for 3 years). 
If a successful incapacitating agent is developed we should produce a 
certain amount of this also.73 
On 3 May 1963, the Cabinet Defence Committee chaired by Prime Minister Harold 
MacMillan took the decision to reacquire a limited offensive chemical warfare 
capability.74 According to Macmillan, Britain’s priorities would be threefold; “first was 
to continue research in order to keep up to date with technique and with American 
information; second, the development of offensive capability as a deterrent against such 
agents being used against us; third, defensive measures.”75 This was a significant 
decision as it provided a specific set of conditions in which chemical weapons could be 
used. The key point is that Britain would reacquire a limited offensive capability as 
opposed to restarting a full-scale research, development and production programme.  
The decision to reacquire a limited offensive chemical weapons capability was 
influenced through British experiences in Malaya, Korea and Borneo, as well as the 
advent of the flexible response concept. The significance of this is that chemical 
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weapons were seen to be something that could in effect prolong the non-nuclear phase 
of battle, which is an important component of flexible response.76 The question of the 
UK using nuclear weapons against Indonesian forces in the rainforest of North Borneo 
did not seem logical. Sir Arthur Snelling, raised this point in a memorandum from 
March 1963, “Do we conceive it possible that our supreme national interests should be 
at stake in the Far East to such an extent as to necessitate the unilateral usage of nuclear 
weapons in that area?”77 The answer to this question was, “no.” As Christopher Tuck 
states, “the wider political costs associated with an escalation to undeniable operations 
and limited war made such options a last resort.”78 
The significance of the 1963 decision to reacquire a limited offensive CW 
capability is such that it shows how changes in the strategic environment can effect a 
government’s views on NBC weapons. Escalating the confrontation with Indonesia was 
too high a political price for Britain as it can be argued that its national interests and 
security were never at stake and to risk nuclear war over this issue would have been 
unacceptable. Because of events such as this, for a brief period, chemical warfare had 
reentered the debate as it was thought that these weapons could provide Britain with a 
non-nuclear war fighting option.79 As Carter and Pearson explain, “The 1963 proposal 
did not result in the reacquisition of either large scale production facilities or chemical 
weapons for the Armed Forces.”80 John Walker argues, “Despite the research, no 
decision was taken at Ministerial level to implement the 1963 decision to reacquire an 
offensive CW programme in full on either lethal or incapacitating agents.”81 
As mentioned, one of the key points of flexible response is the extension of the 
non-nuclear phase of combat. The example of the British in North Borneo showed how 
chemical weapons could provide a non-nuclear option in a limited war engagement. 
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This concept formed a fundamental part of NATO’s strategic doctrine, primarily 
through denial operations. According to US Army Field Manual (FM) 5-102: 
A denial measure is an action to deny the enemy the use of space, 
personnel, or facilities. It may include destruction, removal, 
contamination, or obstacle construction. Denial operations have always 
been an important facet that, in many cases, determined the outcome of 
wars. Denial operations over the years have ranged from the siege of 
forts or castles to the destruction of ball bearing plants.82 
Terrain denial in particular had formed part of NATO’s plans for the defence of Europe 
for decades. The battlefield application of chemical agents was widely considered, as 
Soviet forces greatly outnumbered NATO troops in Europe. By using chemical weapons 
to establish preferential transport corridors for Soviet troops to move through, mobile 
“kill-zones” would be created to deny the Soviets the ability to move their forces of 
their own accord.83 Seeing a utility for chemical weapons, NATO had incorporated 
them into its strategic doctrine.  
Document MC 14/3 stated that NATO should rely principally upon its 
conventional and nuclear forces for deterrence, but should also possess the capability to 
employ effectively:84 
a. Lethal CW agents in retaliations, on a limited scale  
b. Passive defensive measures against CW  
c. Passive defensive measures against BW 
This is another example of how chemical weapons can provide a non-conventional war 
fighting option and prolong the non-nuclear phase of combat, which, in the event of 
Soviet aggression would have been necessary as full, conventional mobilization takes 
time.85 The doctrine of flexible response was formally adopted by the UK through 
NATO ministerial acceptance of MC 14/3 on 14 December 1967.86 
Currently the belief that a military has to be flexible and able to adapt has been a 
focal point for successive US administrations since Operation Desert Storm. Flexible 
response – or what former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has called a 
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capabilities-based approach – focuses less on who might threaten, or where, and more 
on how the threat will evolve and what is needed to deter and defend against such 
threats.87 
 
Retaliatory Capabilities 
British chemical and biological weapons aspirations during the postwar period 
were influenced in part by the idea that you must possess a “like-for-like” deterrent 
capability. The belief was that in order to prevent attacks with chemical or biological 
weapons, you needed to possess similar weapons capable of an in-kind retaliatory strike. 
Many individuals thought that conventional weapons were not adequate enough to 
prevent the USSR from launching a chemical or biological attack against the UK and 
that a British retaliatory capability was a must.88 After the defeats of Germany and 
Japan, the USSR emerged as the West’s primary postwar adversary. It was this indirect 
conflict that spurred the UK defence industry to undertake significant R&D 
programmes into new types of weapons. At the eighth meeting of the Cabinet Defence 
Committee in 1952 discussions revolved around the need for like-for-like deterrent 
capabilities. The minutes of the meeting read, “The Allies should not take up a position 
which would deprive them of their ability to use chemical or bacteriological warfare in 
retaliation if this were to their advantage.”89  It was accepted at the time that the Soviet 
Union was able to launch a nuclear or chemical weapons attack against the UK, while it 
was suspected, though not confirmed, that they also possessed a biological weapons 
capability as well.90  
Writing in 1956, Minister of Defence Walter Monckton stated that, “The policy 
of this country as a signatory of the Geneva Protocol has never been to prepare to 
initiate the use of chemical weapons in war, but rather to be prepared to retaliate in kind 
if attacked by chemical weapons.”91 This was the prevailing thought in the UK right up 
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until it renounced its offensive chemical weapons programme. It was clear from 
Monckton’s comments that the MoD did not see the necessity of retaining either the 
offensive programme or its stockpile of mustard and tabun munitions.92 The MoD 
seemed to believe that the current British atomic (and future thermonuclear) arsenal as 
well as the massive US nuclear and chemical programmes would provide enough of a 
deterrent capability against perceived Soviet aggression in Europe.93 It is thought that 
the destructive power of early fission weapons did not provide the nuclear weapon 
states with as comprehensive a deterrent as was preferred. As John Baylis explains that, 
“once both sides had sufficient nuclear (fusion) weapons to annihilate the other, there 
would be no need to build more.”94 The 1952 US detonation of Ivy Mike, a 10.4 Mt 
fusion bomb dramatically changed the global strategic landscape. The sheer destructive 
capability of a thermonuclear weapon convinced UK policy-makers that the future of 
British strategic deterrence would be tied directly to the success of the Grapple test in 
the autumn of 1957. 
The end of the Cold War has rendered much of the West’s nuclear capability 
obsolete as an effective deterrent against the emerging threat of sub-state terrorist 
organizations. As a result, a few important questions need to be raised. First, do nuclear 
weapons still provide an effective deterrent capability in an ever-changing security 
climate? Can large, sub-state terrorist organizations be deterred by nuclear weapons 
when they pose a completely different set of strategic, tactical and logistical problems? 
Colin Gray argues that, “We can be certain that WMD have a prosperous future as a 
dimension to future warfare, because for many belligerents, or states and groups 
contemplating belligerency, there are no superior alternatives available to them.”95 
Policy-makers have a difficult task ahead in mapping out a suitable response to the 
threats posed by these types of potential proliferators. 
It is a commonly held belief that states desire certain types of weapons to help 
deter regional threats. For decades Iraq adhered to this fundamental strategic concept. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Iraqi thoughts on deterrence were invariably focused 
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on two countries – Iran and Israel. Israel has been an unofficial nuclear power since 
1970 and has remained deliberately ambiguous since.96 Caught between a nuclear-
armed power in Israel and a state with much larger conventional forces in Iran, Saddam 
Hussein saw in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, a potentially valuable 
military and political instrument. The eight-year war with Iran proved to be a case study 
in proscribed weapons procurement for Hussein’s regime.  
After some early successes, Iraqi defensive positions were under constant threat 
of being overrun by Iranian forces. These poorly trained and ill-equipped troops were 
deployed in human wave attacks designed to overrun Iraqi positions through sheer 
numbers. In response to this Major General Maher 'Abd Rashid, while commanding the 
Iraqi Third Corps around Basra, commented that poison gas would be extremely 
difficult to use in a close-combat situation, but added, “if you gave me some insecticide 
that I could squirt at this swarm of mosquitoes, I would use it so that they would be 
exterminated, thus benefiting humanity by saving the world from these pests."97 If these 
types of attacks had proven successful, Iranian troops would have had little difficulty in 
capturing Iraqi positions, albeit with significant loss of life. The ground offensives 
would have been a difficult enterprise for the Iraqi High Command to effectively 
counter. Chemical weapons provided Iraq with an effective force multiplier against 
Iranian human wave attacks.  
For the UK, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons provided both a 
retaliation-in-kind deterrent and an initiatory capability against possible Soviet 
aggression in Europe. Eventually, with the acquisition of a thermonuclear weapon, the 
need for chemical and biological weapons seemed less.98 Iraq, however, was a different 
case. Saddam saw threats both internally from the Kurds and Shia and externally from 
Israel and Iran. Different weapons provided different capabilities for the regime. 
Chemical weapons were used in large quantities in the Anfal campaign and on Iranian 
soldiers and civilians during the war. The regime’s BW programme was notable. 
According to the UNMOVIC Compendium, Iraq stated that its BW programme was a 
stopgap measure because of the long lead-time involved in the development of a nuclear 
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programme and there was a need for a deterrent.99 Here is a clearly defined link between 
nuclear and biological weapons. The regime felt it needed to possess a non-conventional 
strategic deterrent and due to multiple reasons acquiring a nuclear weapon was not very 
likely. Biological weapons could have provided Iraq with the strategic deterrent it 
clearly wanted. Hussein Kamel was in favour of acquiring a deliverable biological 
weapon that could be deployed against multiple targets inside Israel.100 Resources were 
put towards this end, but for the regime, specifically Saddam, nuclear weapons would 
have provided the ultimate in strategic deterrence. Had the regime managed to acquire a 
nuclear deterrent capability, it would have dramatically altered the strategic and political 
landscape in the Middle East.  
 
Security Assurances 
The threat of military retaliation is not the sole method for deterring internal or 
external threats. Distinct from this is the concept of a negative security assurance 
(NSA). The idea of an NSA has become a fundamental part of the regime established by 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In 1978, the First Special Session of the General 
Assembly devoted to Disarmament took place in New York from 23 May to 30 June 
and was the largest, most representative meeting of nations ever convened to consider 
the question of disarmament. This was a significant event as it was the first time in 
which the international community was able to achieve a consensus on a comprehensive 
disarmament strategy.  
The resulting document contained a list of provisions, including Article 32, 
which reads: 
All States, in particular nuclear weapon States, should consider various 
proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear 
weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting 
the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, 
as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or 
the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of 
those States and international peace and security.101 
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The five recognized nuclear weapons states have all declared their commitment to the 
concept of negative security assurances.102  
In the US for example, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report is intended to 
provide a “roadmap for implementing President Obama’s agenda for reducing nuclear 
risks to the United States, our allies and partners, and the international community.”103 
The report states that: 
In case of countries not covered by this assurance – states that possess 
nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations – there remains a narrow range of contingencies 
in which US nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a 
conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and 
partners. The United States is therefore not prepared at the present time 
to adopt a universal policy that the “sole purpose” of US nuclear 
weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States and our allies and 
partners, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy 
could be safely adopted.104 
This contrasts considerably with the previous administration’s policy of 
deliberate ambiguity in response to possible WMD attacks. The 2002 US National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that, “the United States will 
continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force –
including through resort to all of our options – to the use of WMD against the United 
States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”105 Both of these documents make 
reference to the possibility of a nuclear reprisal in the wake of a chemical or biological 
weapons attack. This is a common example of a direct connection between nuclear 
weapons and chemical and biological weapons. There are differences in the wording of 
both reports, however, the current US administration seems much more interested in 
helping to create a system where the threat of nuclear retaliation is essentially a non-
issue. The proliferation of non-conventional weapons is clearly a priority for President 
Obama as well, but the mechanism in place is a much different one when contrasted to 
that of the previous President.  
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 The problem with these NSA is whether they are or are not viewed as being 
credible. Critics of nuclear weapons believe that it would be difficult to justify the use 
of nuclear weapons in any capacity.106 A deterrent is only valuable if the threat is 
deemed to be legitimate. In January 2006, French President Jacques Chirac openly 
declared that, "The leaders of states who would use terrorist means against us, as well as 
those who would envision using . . . weapons of mass destruction, must understand that 
they would lay themselves open to a firm and fitting response on our part.”107 Chirac’s 
thinly veiled threat came at a time when American allies were being targeted by 
multiple terrorist organizations, with deadly attacks occurring in Indonesia, Turkey, 
Spain, India and the UK. It was Chirac’s belief that France needed to restate its 
retaliatory posture implicitly in the hope of preventing attacks against its vital interests. 
Four years earlier, British Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon, commented that 
the UK was prepared to use nuclear weapons against states such as Iraq if they were to 
use weapons of mass destruction against British interests.108 Britain’s nuclear posture is 
deeply intertwined with NATO. The Alliance’s current Strategic Concept of April 1999 
reaffirms its commitment to the governance of the Alliance's security and defence 
policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its 
collective defence arrangements, and will be kept under review in the light of the 
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evolving security environment.109 The Strategic Concept is due to be reassessed in late 
2010.110 
 
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Both domestic and international political issues can play a role in shaping 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons policy decisions. The US Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA) was a key piece of legislation throughout the early years of the British nuclear 
weapons programme. It became a criminal offence for Americans to share nuclear 
information with any other state – irrespective of military or political affiliation. This 
meant that Canada and Britain, two of the biggest contributors to the wartime 
Manhattan Project, were denied access to information on the atomic bomb project. 
Military, scientific and political collaboration had reached a high-water mark during the 
Second World War, typified by the high level meetings in 1942-43 between Churchill 
and Roosevelt as well as specific agreements made between the two. In terms of nuclear 
collaboration, this all changed in August 1946 with the creation of the AEA, which 
prevented the transfer of information between the US and UK. This was a significant 
blow to US-UK scientific collaboration, but it would not prove to be the end. The 
relationship that the British had with the Americans was a complicated one, but one that 
was very important to both sides. When nuclear cooperation with the US ended, in order 
to reestablish the special relationship between the two, the UK must try and acquire a 
nuclear weapons capability. 
Interestingly enough, this did not seem to cause problems in other areas of 
scientific collaboration between the wartime allies. August 1946, the very same month 
that President Truman signed the AEA into law, saw the founding meeting of the 
Tripartite Conference on collaborative research and development of chemical and 
biological agents and weapons, between the USA, UK and Canada.111 At this time, 
R&D into biological agents and biological warfare had begun to receive a greater 
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priority in terms of scientific and political interest, on par with nuclear weapons.112 As 
Brian Balmer explains, “more money and a great deal of political and military support 
had been injected into the postwar biological warfare research programme.”113 The 
discontinuation of atomic collaboration with the US was a crucial factor in the elevation 
of BW in strategic importance for the UK.  
Though there were a number of unresolved issues concerning development, such 
as agent selection, weaponization, delivery and anticipated effects, many, including the 
Chiefs of Staff, thought that biological weapons could provide the UK with a strategic 
deterrent in the immediate postwar period. A report by the Inter-Service Sub-Committee 
on Biological Warfare from March 1947 stated: 
The potentialities of Biological Warfare and its possible imminence 
indicate the vital need for rapid progress in research especially on 
defensive measures, to safeguard the security of this country. We were 
advised by the former Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee that research on 
Biological Warfare is of the highest priority and in the same category as 
research on atomic energy and research on guided missiles. Furthermore, 
the Deputy Chiefs of Staff considered that every endeavour should be 
made to advance research into Biological Warfare particularly as 
comparatively little effort in this field would achieve considerable results 
compared with equivalent expenditure in other fields.114 
This is not to say that developing a biological weapons capability was an inevitable 
conclusion. Unlike chemical weapons, the large-scale dissemination of biological 
weapons had never been attempted. Scientists were developing a growing knowledge 
base of the effects particular agents may have if released, but post-event understanding 
of a biological warfare attack was simply unknown. At this early stage, most of the 
interest in BW was in the theoretical application of biological agents as weapons of war, 
as this type of novel warfare had yet to be fully operationalized. However, it was going 
to be Britain’s best chance at acquiring a weapon of strategic significance in the wake of 
the AEA. 
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The Chiefs of Staff were convinced that a biological weapon, “comparable in 
strategic effect with the atomic bomb” could and should be developed.115 The associated 
costs of producing a biological bomb were significantly lower than producing a nuclear 
weapon. The nuclear programme was operating on the ten-year principle that there 
would not be a war until 1957 and the planning process was directed to achieve an 
operational NW capability by then.116 The Air Staff had a more aggressive target of 
1955 for the entry into service of the anti-personnel biological bomb.117 Either way it 
would take approximately ten years before either of the weapons would be serviceable. 
According to Balmer, “The fates of these two types of killing were not automatically 
coincident but instead were being knitted together through these various discussions, 
calculations and investigations.”118 Eventually the biological bomb programme was 
scrapped and Britain became the world’s third nuclear power in 1952 with the success 
of the Hurricane test off the coast of Australia.  
For the British there was nothing particularly alluring in having a CBW 
capability; the decisions were based on perceived necessity and military utility. 
Different factors entered into the equation when looking at nuclear decisions. Nuclear 
weapons provided the UK with benefits that chemical and biological weapons could 
not. For Britain, the ultimate prize was the reestablishment of the US-UK strategic 
partnership and the acquisition of an independent nuclear weapons capability was seen 
as a necessary component in the facilitation of this process. Once Britain acquired 
nuclear weapons, interest in offensive uses of chemical and biological weapons 
diminished, until 1963 and the decision to reestablish a limited chemical weapons 
retaliatory capability.119  
In recent years, much has been made of former Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s 
comments about putting a “Bloody Union Jack” on top of a made-in-Britain nuclear 
weapon. National prestige concerns have been previously viewed as critical to the 
development of the British nuclear weapons programme.120 While it was something that 
the Attlee government was conscious of, it appears to have exerted little influence in the 
decision to develop nuclear weapons. The reestablishment of the close wartime 
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collaboration that Britain shared with the US in political and military affairs was the 
driving force behind the nuclear programme.121 
In a similar vein, military utility and necessity were not the sole driving forces 
behind Iraq’s nuclear programme. National prestige was a significant factor in Iraq’s 
desire to develop NBC weapons. Nuclear weapons in particular were viewed by the 
regime as being the pinnacle of military science and technology. At that time no Arab 
state possessed nuclear weapons. Saddam’s view of himself and Iraq was such that it 
made sense for the regime to have nuclear weapons. Iraq’s history was full of scientific 
innovation and advancement and Saddam saw nuclear weapons as part of the natural 
progression of Iraq’s position in the international system. When the Israeli Air Force 
destroyed the Osirak reactor during Operation Babylon, the possibility of the regime 
developing plutonium-based nuclear weapons was greatly reduced. Saddam’s personal 
ego was not going to allow Iraq to be without weapons that could elevate the status of 
the regime within the Middle East and the larger Arab world.122  
 The previous year hostilities between Iraq and Iran had broken out. Chemical 
weapons were being used by Iraq’s military against invading Iranian troops. There is 
little doubt that the regime saw concrete utility for the application of chemical warfare. 
What is less clear is how the regime saw biological weapons and the potential to wage 
indiscriminate germ warfare against its enemies. As mentioned earlier, Iraq’s BW 
programme was expanded in 1985 to include R&D work, which was viewed as 
necessary for the production of agents on a laboratory scale.123 Under the guidance of 
British-educated microbiologist Rihab Taha, R&D into a few different pathogens was 
undertaken, including anthrax, botulinum toxin and Clostridium perfringens.124 If the 
nuclear option were not available to the regime, then biological weapons would provide 
Iraq with a non-conventional deterrent capability.  
This was similar to the conditions in the UK during the immediate postwar 
period when the AEA came into being. Britain was temporarily shut out from nuclear 
collaboration with the US. It makes sense that when one option is removed, then interest 
in acquiring what is perceived to be the next best thing will develop. For both the UK 
and Iraq, this meant biological weapons. The belief that biological weapons could be 
utilized as a credible strategic deterrent was strong in both cases. For the UK, the 
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Defence Research Policy Committee, the Air Staff and the Chiefs of Staff thought this, 
though little was understood about using biology for weapons.125 For Iraq, biological 
weapons represented a significant technological achievement and one that could 
potentially deter future Israeli or Iranian aggression.  
 
Individuals of Influence 
Another area that can provide evidence of connections between nuclear weapons 
and CBW centres on key personnel. Due to the Iraqi regime’s desire for secrecy, few 
individuals had qualitative knowledge on more than one of the weapons programmes. 
Hussein Kamel, the head of MIC, was the minister in charge of the chemical and 
biological weapons programmes. Kamel was also intimately involved with the highly 
secretive gas centrifuge programme, which fell outside the direct control of the IAEC. 
Kamel himself did not have any technical understanding of nuclear energy issues, nor 
did he have a formal decision-making role in technical matters.126 The programme’s 
chief scientist, Mahdi Obeidi, made these decisions.127 Kamel had a unique perspective 
on the three programmes as very few individuals had tacit knowledge about what was 
going on in the other programmes. Many high-ranking regime officials and Saddam’s 
inner coterie all would have been aware of the existence of the NBC programmes, but 
their knowledge of programme specifics would not have been very significant. Kamel’s 
relationship with Saddam and his effectiveness as a manager meant that he was 
rewarded with key regime positions. His ability to procure resources and his access to 
Saddam made him the logical choice as the person responsible for the gas centrifuge 
programme. Obeidi provided the scientific expertise and Kamel provided the 
clandestine programme with money, men and facilities in which to work. 
 There may be cases of other individuals that were involved in some facet of the 
NW and CBW programmes. As previously mentioned, chemists, physicists, 
mathematicians and certain types of engineers could have been employed in different 
areas of any of the three programmes. Most aspects of the programmes were highly 
secretive and compartmentalized which meant that individuals working on certain 
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biological agents, chemical weapons, delivery systems or enrichment programmes were 
less likely to be fully aware of what else was occurring around them. Outside of Saddam 
and a few ministers, the circle of information was very small.  
 The situation in the UK was much the same. A core group of government 
officials and military personnel were aware of the existence of the nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons programmes. The way in which Cabinet decisions were made 
meant that a small yet key group of ministers and advisors were involved in the 
formation and direction of policy. Outside of policy-making circles, a select number of 
advisory panels or committees were formed to deal with specific programmes or issues 
within the programmes. The Defence Research Policy Committee was established in 
1947, under the auspices of the MoD. Its terms of reference were to: 
Formulate a coherent scientific policy covering the whole range of 
defence research, paying due consideration to the priorities to be 
observed in research and the effort to be devoted to each objective, and 
relating the progress of scientific development both at home and abroad 
to the operational requirements formulated by the Chiefs of Staff.128  
As E. C. Williams explains, “the functions of the DRPC were to advise the Minister of 
Defence and the Chiefs of Staff on matters concerned with the formulation of scientific 
policy in the defence field and also to advise on the allocation and distribution of 
scientific resources between fields and between Services.”129 The DRPC was purely an 
advisory body and did not have any executive authority.  
Sir Henry Tizard, the MoD’s Chief Scientific Adviser was installed as the first 
chairman of the DRPC. Tizard was also the chairman of an ad hoc committee of 
scientists that had compiled a report entitled Future Developments in Weapons and 
Methods of War on behalf of the wartime coalition government. Tizard’s report 
addressed nuclear, biological and chemical weapons concerns, though they had been 
forbidden access to information on the wartime Manhattan Project.130 The DRPC was 
less involved in the nuclear programme as it fell under the control of the Ministry of 
Supply. As Margaret Gowing explains, “the atomic energy project was already regarded 
as something whose self-contained and elevated status was above debate: other 
departments and organizations could become involved in its problems only in order to 
                                                
128 Memorandum, Cabinet Defence Committee, Central Direction of Scientific Effort. Report by the 
Chiefs of Staff, DO (46) 82, 2 July 1946. TNA AVIA 54/952. 
129 E. C. Williams, “Science and Defence,” Public Administration, Volume 34, Number 3 (September 
1956): 260. 
130 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War, Report by Sir 
Henry Tizard’s ‘Ad Hoc’ Committee, 16 June 1945. TNA CAB 121/271. 
  
189 
help, never to question.”131 Tizard and the DRPC would not play much of a part in the 
facilitation of the early British nuclear programme. 
As a result of the DRPC being excluded from influencing the atomic 
programme, Tizard was keen to promote chemical and biological weapons as potential 
alternatives to nuclear weapons. According to Agar and Balmer, “from the DRPC’s 
inception in 1947 two interlinked features can bee seen: a continuing effort to secure 
greater flows of information about atomic projects and sympathy toward proposals for 
CW and BW research and development.”132 This is an interesting connection. Because 
the DRPC had little to no influence in nuclear weapons matters, prior to 1954, when the 
administration of the atomic programme was reformed, they saw an opportunity to 
promote other types of non-conventional weapons as competitors to nuclear weapons. 
Both chemical and biological weapons were promoted, beginning in 1947, with the 
enthusiasm for BW starting to decline in mid-1950.133 Chemical weapons lasted a bit 
longer, until July 1956, when the Cabinet Defence Committee took the decision to 
renounce its offensive CW capability.134 Having been brought into the atomic sphere in 
1954, the DRPC would continue in this capacity until 1963 when it was replaced by 
three new administrative bodies.135 The situation the DRPC found itself in from its 
inception, where it was excluded from exerting any influence over nuclear matters, 
meant that they would try and promote chemical and biological weapons as viable 
alternatives to nuclear weapons. Within the CBW field, the DRPC had real influence 
and as we have seen, was more than willing to exert said influence over British defence 
policy decisions. 
The examples of Hussein Kamel, the DRPC and Sir Henry Tizard show that a 
certain individuals or small advisory groups can have some level of influence relating to 
aspects of a nuclear, biological or chemical weapons programme. Until his defection in 
1995, Kamel had the ear of Saddam and was able to maneuver himself into a unique and 
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influential position within the regime. Being the person in charge of the clandestine 
biological and chemical programmes as well as the gas centrifuge enrichment 
programme meant that he was able to influence the direction of the programmes, and it 
was his desire to be the one who was able to provide the regime with it’s much sought 
after non-conventional weapons capability.136 While Tizard and the DRPC were not 
able to influence nuclear policy – at least until 1954 – they were able to offer scientific 
and technical advice and direction on CBW weapons issues and promoted this 
technology as an alternative to nuclear weapons, until it was wound up in 1963. Key 
individuals, advisory boards and policy groups can all have some influence on NBC 
weapons issues and Hussein Kamel and the DRPC provide good examples of exactly 
this. 
 
ECONOMICS AND FINANCES  
There are a number of issues that can influence a state’s attempts at acquiring a 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons capability. Access to fissile material, chemical 
precursors and biological pathogens, specialized equipment along with detailed 
technical knowledge of the particular agents/weapons is of extreme importance to any 
state pursuing NBC weapons. Having a substantial pool of well-trained and scientific 
and technical personnel capable of contributing to a weapons programme is also 
important. It takes a lot of resources to be able to research and develop a nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons capability, let alone all three. Highly industrialized 
states like the USA and the former Soviet Union had large, well-developed NBC 
programmes as well as sizeable conventional forces. For example, it is estimated that 
over a ten-year period beginning in 1972, the amount Soviet nuclear weapons had 
increased threefold an estimated 12 to 14% of Soviet gross national product137 (GNP) 
was devoted to defence, as compared to 8% in the United States.138  
For a country recently out of a devastating world war, economic considerations 
were of the highest concern. Iraq on the other hand, had its own concerns – somewhat 
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different from those of the UK. Iraq, being an oil rich nation and part of OPEC139 was in 
a financially different position as compared with some of its Middle East neighbours. 
From 1980 to 1991, Iraq was in a constant state of battle-readiness due to its eight-year 
war with Iran and its incursion into Kuwait in 1990; consequently defence spending was 
high. The Iran-Iraq War cost an estimated $54.7 billion US in arms purchases alone.140 
Lots of money was flowing into the army as well as into the regime’s weapons 
development programmes. Though Iraq had harnessed its greater scientific and 
technical communities as well as allocating vast amounts of money, they still were not 
able to develop a nuclear programme or a comprehensive BW programme.  
 
Scientific Communities 
Iraq possessed a well-trained and well-educated scientific community.141 Many 
of their top scientists working in the weapons programmes were educated and trained in 
the West.142 Of the pre-Desert Storm nuclear, biological and chemical programmes, the 
nuclear programme was the largest in terms of size and scope. Many facilities were 
utilized, including the Al Safa’a EMIS Plant at Tarmiya, Tuwaitha Nuclear Research 
Center as well as Al Rashdiya, the site of Iraq’s centrifuge programme. It was thought 
that the nuclear programme comprised several thousand staff prior to the invasion of 
Kuwait.143 According to ISG:  
Efforts that could preserve the progress and talent that had been 
developed up to the 1991 war included keeping the nuclear cadre 
engaged in a variety of projects, such as rebuilding of Iraq’s 
infrastructure. However the nuclear program was ended and the 
intellectual capital decayed in the succeeding years.144 
The ability of the regime to reconstitute the nuclear programme after Desert Storm was 
severely hampered, even though great pains were taken to deceive IAEA inspectors as 
to its existence.  
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 In terms of personnel involved in the chemical programme, it has been estimated 
that from 1981 to 1991, between 1500 and 2000 individuals participated, including 60 
PhD specialists, some 200 engineers and about 600 technicians, who operated 
equipment.145 Interestingly, about 80% of the PhD specialists and 40% of the 
engineering force were either educated or trained in foreign countries. Out of the three 
programmes, the biological programme was the smallest in size and scope. It is thought, 
from data gathered from interviewees, that about 100 people were involved directly in 
the BW programme and of this 100 only about 25 or so were key personnel involved in 
research, production, field-testing or weaponization.146 The biological programme, 
being the smallest and also the last one to be pursued, was allocated a relatively small 
share of over-all resources.147 Since these were clandestine programmes, it must be said 
that there is some difficulty in ascertaining the exact numbers of individuals working in 
each of the weapons programmes. According to the ISG Report: 
The precise population of participants in Iraq’s WMD programs is 
impossible to quantify. A senior Iraqi official associated with the pre-
1991 program stated that the numbers of WMD-associated scientists 
reported in Iraq’s declarations to the UN were grossly inflated to confuse 
inspectors… There probably were no more than approximately 1100 
scientists and possibly as few as 600 with core expertise specific to 
WMD research, development and production requirements. However 
none of these figures can be verified.148  
Though precise numbers cannot be accurately verified, Iraq’s NBC programmes were 
well funded and staffed with the best and brightest individuals their scientific 
community had.  
 It is also unclear as to the effect the sizes of each of the weapons programmes 
had on each other. Certain types of scientists and technicians could have been engaged 
in any of the three programmes. Mathematicians, physicists, chemical engineers and 
many different types of technical personnel would have been in high demand. Since the 
nuclear programme was considered to be of the highest value, one can presume that it 
received a sizeable amount of skilled and competent individuals. As a result, the nuclear 
programme was very professional in its organization and conduct.149 Unfortunately little 
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documentary evidence exists highlighting the cross-programme competition for top 
scientific personnel. 
Britain’s scientific community was strongly utilized during the period of NBC 
weapons development. The personnel requirements were enormous. The atomic energy 
programme alone needed large numbers of highly qualified scientists and engineers, 
who had to be supported by many other kinds of workers – draughtsmen, technicians, 
craftsmen, executives, clerks, typists, storekeepers, drivers, labourers and so on.150 
Margaret Gowing states: 
The staff within the atomic project had to be built up, organized and 
trained at a time of national manpower shortage, in competition with 
various other urgent postwar demands, and without direction of 
labour; this meant that people had to be attracted to join the project 
and, once in, retained.151 
Highly trained individuals were difficult to come by for the British nuclear programme 
in the early years. Pay scales were not in line with the rest of British industry and as a 
result recruitment drives were frequently coming up short. The numbers of individuals 
needed to fill out manpower requirements did pose a problem as private sector firms 
were competing with the civil service for the best and brightest scientific and technical 
minds.152  
The nuclear programme was not only competing with the chemical and 
biological programmes for suitably qualified personnel, it was competing with British 
industry. There were many employment opportunities for young, enterprising scientists 
in the postwar period. The nuclear energy project was but one. Gowing also states that: 
Outside the project’s own confines, large demands were made on 
manpower in other parts of the Ministry of Supply, such as the chemical 
and engineering inspectorates and the headquarters administrative 
branches; in the Ministry of Works, which was in charge of the project’s 
huge civil engineering and construction programme; in Government 
scientific establishments such as the Chemical Research Laboratory; and 
in industry, both the building and construction industry and the firms – 
notably ICI153 – which carried out research and development contracts or 
supplied materials and components.154  
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By the time of the Hurricane test, it is estimated that the total strength of the workforce 
involved with the nuclear weapons programme was 15 000, including industrial 
employees and non-industrial ancillary staff.155 The numbers of individuals involved 
with the programme steadily increased up to the Hurricane test.  
The economic situation in Britain during the postwar period was such that 
specific problems arose that impinged upon the ability of the nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons programmes to prosper. There was a shortage of trained scientists 
and technicians required for each of the programmes. Infrastructure was a problem in 
the beginning with significant investment required to build nuclear reactors, laboratories 
and processing facilities. Housing was a major concern as well. After the war there was 
a critical shortage of housing, not only for people working near these facilities, which 
were often located in fairly remote locations, but for the larger civilian population of the 
UK as well. The first few years after the end of the war were extremely difficult for a 
large percentage of the population. But by 1950, the welfare state was created and the 
housing crisis had largely abated, due to a massive investment of capital.  
There is little doubt that from 1946 onwards, the development of a nuclear 
weapons programme was the principal concern from the perspective of the British 
government in regard to the defence industry. British involvement in the Manhattan 
Project was considerable and after the Trinity tests in New Mexico and the atomic 
bombing of Japan, many British scientists returned to the UK. Some of the repatriated 
scientists had become familiar in areas such as theoretical physics, bomb design and 
implosion techniques.156 Many of these individuals would form the core group of 
nuclear scientists that would have the responsibility of developing a deliverable British 
nuclear weapon.  
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Opportunity Costs 
In terms of opportunity costs, the postwar development of nuclear weapons in 
the UK came at a price.157 The financial and social implications of the Second World 
War meant that some tough decisions needed to be made. Food and petrol rationing was 
still in place in the early 1950s and Britain had started to repay its massive war debts. 
Significant investment was made into creating Britain’s “cradle to grave” state-run, 
social security system.158 Britain was no longer in a position financially, to maintain the 
wartime size of its conventional forces. With the emergence of the Soviet Union as the 
predominant security threat, the need for a comprehensive strategic deterrent was never 
higher. Unfortunately, Britain had been shut out of nuclear collaboration with its 
wartime ally the United States. With the threat of Soviet incursions into Western Europe 
and Britain’s shrinking defence budget, decisions needed to be made in how best to 
provide the UK with a strategic deterrent option. One would think that finding money 
for the fledgling nuclear programme would have been difficult during this time, but this 
was not the case – over £100 million was spent on the nuclear programme between 
1946 and 1952. With a significant amount of money, labour and material going into the 
nuclear programme, it was not unforeseen that there would be spending cuts in other 
military programmes.159 As Margaret Gowing explains, “All in all, sufficient resources 
for the project had been procured at some cost – small in total but important at the 
margin – to the rest of the economy. But they had been barely adequate.”160  
With the success of the Hurricane test in 1952, Britain joined the nuclear club. 
With the importance of biological weapons already in decline, the offensive production 
of chemical weapons was soon to find a similar fate. Four years after Hurricane, on 10 
July 1956, Prime Minister Anthony Eden and the Cabinet Defence Committee took the 
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decision to discontinue offensive production of chemical weapons. A memorandum by 
the Minister of Defence dated 4 July stated: 
One cannot predict what situation would face the Government of the day 
if war broke out and an enemy used chemical weapons but I feel myself 
that our possession of nuclear weapons and the massive American 
nuclear armoury together with their chemical warfare potential justify us 
in or present economic circumstances in abandoning our own capacity to 
wage offensive chemical warfare.161 
At this point, the UK already had a modest stockpile of Blue Danube nuclear 
weapons162 and was some fifteen months away from the successful testing of a 
thermonuclear weapon.163 The size of the Britain’s conventional forces as well as other 
programmes were in the process of being scaled back. British defence expenditures 
decreased from 10.5% of GNP in 1952-53 to 9% in 1955-56.164 The offensive 
component of the chemical weapons programme was a casualty of the economic state of 
the UK and fate of the biological weapons programme was inextricably tied to its larger 
relative. Research would still continue in these two fields until 1963, but the focus 
would be primarily defence-based.  
The offensive chemical and biological weapons programmes were casualties of 
Britain becoming a nuclear weapon state. With austerity measures in place and the 
creation of a comprehensive social welfare state needing significant resources, defence 
spending was bound to become a casualty of the times. N. J. McCamley states, “All 
other military expenditure was secondary to Britain’s quest for nuclear weapons.”165 
Personnel reductions in the armed services were continuing throughout this period as 
well. Keeping men in the field was costly and not the best use of resources. Spending 
£100 million on a nuclear weapons programme however was. The success of the nuclear 
programme helped to reestablish the special relationship between the wartime allies and 
provided the UK with a strategic deterrent option that it did not previously possess. This 
example shows us how the existence of nuclear weapons can influence decisions on 
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chemical and biological weapons from an economic perspective. Maybe if the UK had 
emerged from the most destructive war in human history less financially crippled, the 
decision to discontinue the offensive components of the chemical and biological 
weapons programmes may not have needed to be taken. This was not the case and once 
the UK became a nuclear weapon state, it was only a matter of time until CBW issues 
were relegated to sidelines. 
The situation in Iraq was much different. In terms of opportunity costs, it is less 
clear as to the extent in which they played in Iraq’s decisions to research and develop 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Lots of capital was invested in the nuclear 
programme, including the purchase of the Osirak research reactor, as well as the many 
different attempts at uranium enrichment, and exploring the production and separation 
of plutonium. Resources were allocated to the different teams in hope that one of them 
would be able to enrich uranium successfully.166 The chemical and biological 
programmes were under the auspices of the Military Industrial Commission, run by 
Hussein Kamel. According to one senior UNSCOM Official, Kamel was a powerful and 
influential member of the regime, able to procure substantial funding for these 
programmes, including the gas centrifuge programme, much to the dismay of many 
senior military figures.167 
Many politicians and military commanders of the regime firmly believed that the 
introduction of chemical weapons against the Iranians was the most significant point of 
the war and was the sole reason they were able to repel repeated human wave attacks.168 
Iraq had put some effort into creating a binary chemical warhead to be fitted onto the al-
Hussein missile as well as binary bombs.169 Not a binary where two inert chemicals 
would mix in-flight to create a toxic compound to be released upon impact, Iraq’s 
warhead consisted of someone filling the warhead with the compounds prior to the 
missile’s launch.170 ISG had found that Iraq had used its pre-Desert Storm stockpiles of 
152mm and 155mm high-explosive artillery rounds as well as the 122mm SAKR-18 
high-explosive artillery rockets as chemical improvised explosive devices (IED) during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.171 It is possible that the insurgents who constructed the IED 
did not know that they were using old Desert Storm chemical rounds. Not limited to 
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first generation chemical agents, Iraq was successful in engineering both G-agents as 
well as VX nerve agent. During the war with Iran, the agents used were sufficiently 
toxic, but lacked stability, which made them more difficult to handle. This was not seen 
to be a significant problem as the agents were being produced and then shipped to the 
front shortly there after. They were not thinking about creating huge stockpiles of 
agents, therefore it was not that important that they have chemical agents that remain 
effective when stored over long periods of time. 
Looking at the nuclear programme, one can see that there was some competition 
between the programmes created to consider the uranium enrichment question. It was 
important for the heads of each of the programmes to be able to be the one to inform 
Saddam that they had successfully solved the enrichment problem. Success in one 
programme could mean personal wealth and prosperity, without fear of reprisal.172 
Failure was not an option. Saddam’s inability to receive negative news was well known 
inside Iraq and as a result he rarely received it. This caused a considerable problem as 
Saddam was frequently making weapons-related decisions without complete 
information. This helps to explain some of the anachronistic weapons-related decisions 
that were made. In essence what you had were different groups, acting independent of 
each other, trying to solve the same problem.173 The resources that went to the laser 
enrichment programme could have been put to better use. Iraq’s eventual success with 
calutrons reinforces the thinking that older, less sophisticated technology was the way 
forward for the nuclear programme. It is unlikely that the individual scientists working 
in each of the enrichment programmes had much knowledge of the competing 
programmes. They were most likely aware that other programmes existed and that it 
was in their best interests to achieve a modicum of success.  
Financial constraints as well as a lack of highly trained personnel did not seem 
to inhibit the regime’s NBC ambitions. The methods employed by the regime had a 
bigger effect upon the ultimate success or failure of the programmes. The culture of fear 
that surrounded the scientific community was considerable. Many senior programme 
scientists were arrested and jailed due to their perceived failure to develop NBC 
weapons. Individuals caught expressing doubt over the possibility of programme 
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success would run the risk of being accused of being unpatriotic.174 Such accusations 
were more than enough to incur prison time in Saddam’s Iraq.175  
 During the 1980s the Iraqi regime was investing in nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons research and development. The ISG Report states that, “given Iraq’s 
large oil revenues of the 1970s and early 1980s, Saddam was able to ambitiously pursue 
a state-controlled economy without having to choose between solvency and other 
priorities, such as health and welfare programmes, infrastructure development and 
development of his armed forces.”176 The eight-year war with Iran devastated the 
economy, resulting in Saddam trying to create growth through strange economic 
reforms such as abolishing universal employment labour laws and the privatization of 
key government industries.177 This however did not impact upon the regime’s NBC 
ambitions. It was still a priority for the regime, particularly Saddam, to be in possession 
of a non-conventional weapons capability. The economy suffered, as did the Iraqi 
middle-class, as a direct result of Saddam’s unusual and sometimes draconian reforms. 
The proscribed weapons programmes did not. The Invasion of Kuwait and subsequent 
conflict further depleted Iraq’s oil wealth. Gradually it became increasingly more 
difficult for the regime to reconstitute their proscribed weapons programmes. 
Interestingly, while the regime favoured a nuclear programme first and foremost, this 
did not impact that much on the levels of support that the chemical and biological 
programmes received. Saddam remained convinced that Iraq needed to possess a non-
conventional weapons capability and he was prepared to allocate whatever resources 
were needed to see these plans through. 
 
FUTURE CHALLENGES 
The emergence of new types of non-conventional or asymmetric threats has 
created a new set of challenges. NATO experiences in the Afghanistan theatre of 
operations have brought the issue of hardened and deeply buried targets (HDBT) to the 
fore. A US Department of Defense report defines HDBT as, “an adversary’s threatening 
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and well protected assets in structures ranging from hardened surface bunker complexes 
to deep tunnels.”178 These facilities can be used for a multitude of purposes ranging 
from leadership shelters, command and control centres, personnel housing, and they can 
provide a secure facility for chemical and biological weapons laboratories and weapons 
stockpiles. Figures obtained through the US intelligence community estimates that there 
are currently more than 10 000 HDBT worldwide and anticipates a significant increase 
in that number in the coming decade.179 
Interest in different types of weapons has, at certain times, risen in profile. The 
current situation in Afghanistan had brought the debate over new types of earth 
penetrating weapons (EPW), both nuclear and non-nuclear into prominence. The 2001 
Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets states that a 
nuclear weapon can destroy chemical or biological agents that underground facilities 
may house without spreading the agent further.180 There are currently both conventional 
and nuclear EPW in the US Nuclear Weapon Enduring Stockpile.181 According to 
physicist Robert Nelson, the problem with developing an EPW that is capable of 
penetrating to significant depths is the strength of the missile casing. If the impact 
velocity of the warhead is greater than a few kilometres per second, the casing will 
deform and possibly even melt prior to detonation, thereby limiting the possible 
effectiveness of such a weapon.182  
The defeat of chemical and biological agents has been the driving force behind 
another new type of weapon that could potentially pose some problems in the arms 
control field. According to Barry Schneider, at least eight agent defeat weapons 
programmes are in progress (as of 2006) that are designed to neutralize enemy chemical 
and biological assets, including the US Thermobaric and Agent Defeat Weapons 
programmes.183 The Defence Threat Reduction Agency and the US Navy have initiated 
an Agent Defeat Warhead (ADW) demonstration programme to develop a kinetic 
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penetrating weapon combined with a low-pressure incendiary warhead.184 The primary 
objective of the ADW programme is to develop air-deliverable warhead technologies 
that could deny an enemy the use of CBW, while causing minimal collateral damage.185 
Other weapons that utilize heat and blast properties could cause unwanted damage in 
terms of casualties and property. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Thomas Ricks 
states that, “Its (ADW) mission is to produce the first truly new weapon of the post-
Cold War era, a bomb whose effectiveness is to be measured by how many people it 
doesn’t kill – while it destroys stockpiles of horror weapons.”186 Currently, the US relies 
on the use of conventional warheads as the sole means of defeating an enemy’s CB 
agent capability.  
The development of a new weapon such as one that has an agent defeat 
capability is of significant concern because it could codify expanding mission sets for 
nuclear weapons. Taken from the US Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report of February 2010:  
The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological 
capabilities among states and non-state actors can threaten our ability to 
defend US and allied interests, promote peace and security, ensure 
regional stability, and protect our citizens. Further, the use of a nuclear 
weapon or a biological attack would have global ramifications. 
Preventing the proliferation and use of such weapons is therefore a top 
national priority for which many federal agencies have important 
responsibilities. As the ability to create and employ weapons of mass 
destruction spreads globally, so must our combined efforts to detect, 
interdict, and contain the effects of these weapons. Deterrence of such 
threats and defence against them can be enhanced through measures 
aimed at better understanding potential threats, securing and reducing 
dangerous materials wherever possible, monitoring and tracking lethal 
agents and materials and their means of delivers, and where relevant, 
defeating the agents themselves.187  
These threats are to be dealt with using a combination of old and new technologies as 
opposed to the threat of nuclear retaliation, though there will remain a small set of 
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possibilities in which a nuclear response would be deemed appropriate.188 Importantly, 
the United States has pledged to not develop new nuclear warheads. Existing life 
extension programmes will use only nuclear components based on previously tested 
designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military 
capabilities.189 Former Ministry of Defence Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
Michael Quinlan stated that: 
the range of circumstances in which, and of purposes for which, the 
availability of specialized operational capability of this kind would be 
crucial for either use or deterrence is too narrow and improbable to 
warrant incurring the political costs of developing new types of weapon 
at a time when the international community is looking, especially in the 
non-proliferation context, for further reduction in the salience of nuclear 
weapons.190 
 
 The feasibility of new types of nuclear weapons being developed has decreased 
with the election of President Barack Obama. His administration was quick to distance 
itself from the controversial policy decisions of his predecessor. Having said that, 
President Obama refuses to rule out the possibility of the US deploying nuclear 
weapons against a hostile state, one that threatens US interests.191 While funding for 
new weapon designs is likely to continue, the new administration’s desire to develop a 
novel type of weapon that could have ramifications for current international agreements 
is less clear.192 This phenomenon is not exclusive to the US, as other states with foreign 
policy concerns, such as Russia, could be tempted to embark down this slippery slope.  
Another potential challenge is how to prevent states from acquiring nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons. For years the Iraqi regime successfully hid parts of its 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes from the international 
community. Even after Desert Storm and the acceptance of Security Council Resolution 
687, the regime was guilty of trying to deceive UN inspectors that it had given up its 
proscribed weapons capabilities. Due to the persistence of the Special Commission’s 
Executive Chairman and the diligence of the inspection teams, the tangled web of 
deception that was created had gradually unraveled. The IAEA however, failed to 
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identify Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme and was ready to sign off on Iraqi 
compliance, but not before some serious questions were raised and a tense four-day 
standoff with Iraqi forces in the parking lot of the Nuclear Design Centre after 
discovering documentation relating to Iraq's nuclear weaponization programme.193  
The significance of this is that it somewhat mirrors the current situation in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. When it became apparent that Iraq was not going to be able to 
construct a deliverable nuclear device, interest in other types of non-conventional 
weapons prospered. Iraq’s usage of chemical weapons in the 1980s was widespread. 
Biological weapons were being pursued as well, even though Iraq had signed the BWC 
in 1972.194 Iran has signed and ratified the BWC, the CWC as well as the NPT, though 
it does not necessarily mean that Iran is honoring its treaty obligations. If a non-
conventional weapons capability is of a high enough priority, and even if international 
agreements are in place, some states will do what they can to acquire the technology. As 
we have seen, the United Kingdom in the immediate postwar period was keenly 
interested in investigating the utility of biological and new types of chemical weapons 
when nuclear collaboration with the USA had stopped. This is a crucial point. As 
evidenced by both the UK and Iraq, two polar type case studies, when the first-choice 
weapon system is unlikely to be realized, another type of technology is bound to take its 
place. Britain was ultimately successful in developing a nuclear weapon, and for a 
period of time BW had received a heightened priority within British defence planning. 
Iraq was not successful in its nuclear ambitions, but chemical and biological weapons – 
primarily CW – played an important role in regime politics up to Operation Desert 
Storm and beyond. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to identify connections between nuclear 
weapons on the one hand and biological and chemical on the other, using the UK and 
Iraq case studies as a basis of comparison. These weapons are intrinsically connected to 
each other on multiple levels, such as financial constraints, resource allocation or 
competition, and thoughts on national defence and regional security. Israel sees the 
retention of a nuclear arsenal – an unofficial, but widely acknowledged arsenal – as key 
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to their significant national defence concerns. France decided to embark upon a nuclear 
programme in 1954 as a way of reasserting its influence in the international system195 
after a crushing defeat and subsequent five year occupation at the hands of Nazi 
Germany in the Second World War, coupled with the humiliating loss of French 
Indochina and the Suez Crisis of 1956.196 Syrian opinions on chemical weapons have 
been directly influenced by a nuclear-armed Israel.197 South Africa’s weapons 
programmes developed out of the growing communist threat in Angola and 
Mozambique.198 This was no different in the United Kingdom or Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq. Both states had their own reasons for pursuing nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons. 
The findings that came out of the case studies have been organized into four 
subsections: strategic issues, political considerations, economic factors and future 
challenges. These four areas proved useful in helping to focus the analysis of 
interconnections between nuclear weapons on one side and CBW on another. There 
proved to be more interconnections within the strategic issues section than any other, 
although it should be said that some of the findings could have slotted into one or more 
of the sections and these categories should not be seen as being exclusive. A state’s 
strategic concerns play a large part in its decisions to develop NBC weapons. Political 
and economic factors frequently overlap with strategic concerns and in some instances 
such as the 1956 decision to discontinue offensive R&D into CBW all three play a part 
in the government’s decision-making process. 
Strategic issues proved to be the richest source of examples of interconnections 
between NW and CBW and my data set incorporated some additional examples to 
reflect this. Clearly, a state’s strategic concerns as well as its strategic culture provide 
significant motivation for developing NBC weapons. Iraq’s principal strategic concerns 
were Iran and Israel. The development of Iraq’s CBW programmes was viewed as 
necessary to deter a nuclear-armed Israel and a much larger enemy in Iran. Iraq’s BW 
programme was in essence a stopgap measure due to the anticipated long lead-time it 
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would take for the regime to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Once nuclear 
weapons development became unlikely, biological weapons were promoted as 
something that could help deter a possible Israeli nuclear strike. This ties in directly to 
the concept of BW as being the “poor man’s atomic bomb.” Since a nuclear capability is 
out of the reach of many states, biological and chemical weapons are seen to provide a 
state with a non-conventional weapon deterrent. Syria, for example, is thought to see 
chemical weapons as a possible deterrent against Israeli aggression, much the same as 
Saddam’s regime did. The existence of Israeli nuclear weapons has given cause for the 
legitimization of CBW in the Middle East.  
 In the UK, chemical and biological weapons were thought to be able to provide 
Britain with a deterrent capability in light of the growing Soviet threat in Eastern 
Europe during the immediate postwar period. Biological weapons in particular were 
elevated in importance from 1946 until the early 1950s, when it was apparent that 
Britain was going to successfully detonate its first fission weapon. This in turn led to the 
1956 decision to discontinue the offensive chemical weapons programme. Britain was 
going to rely on its growing stockpile of nuclear weapons as its strategic deterrent. The 
issue of chemical weapons utility came back into question in the early 1960s due to 
significant advances in CW – namely the V-agents – as well as the changing strategic 
environment. The doctrine of flexible response came into prominence at this time as 
well as Britain’s involvement in limited war engagements in Asia. One of the tenets of 
flexible response was the prolongation of the non-nuclear phase of combat, in which 
chemical weapons were believed to be of some value. The thought of British nuclear 
weapons being deployed against Indonesian forces in the rainforest of North Borneo 
was not acceptable, which may have been a factor in the 1963 decision to reacquire a 
limited, retaliatory offensive CW capability. It was not only in the rainforest of 
Southeast Asia that chemical weapons were thought to be of use. Terrain denial was a 
key component of NATO’s strategic defence of Europe for decades.  
 Not strictly bound by the case studies, a few other examples of interconnections 
came to the fore, two of which involve the former Soviet Union. The 1970s bore 
witness to a number of bilateral arms negotiations between the US and USSR. The 
BWC came into being in 1972 a few short months before the two superpowers agreed to 
the terms of SALT I. The US was keen to complete the BWC negotiations in 1971 once 
the Soviet Union accepted the principle of a separate ban on BW. This hurried process 
unfortunately ended up weakening the BWC in favour of a more robust SALT I 
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agreement. Another interesting example is how the Soviet nuclear arsenal acted as a 
barrier shield for its considerable biological R&D programme. Having thousands of 
nuclear warheads provided the biological programme the latitude to invest into BW 
issues and also mitigated US and western accusations about its prohibited BW activities. 
Also of note is how security assurances have evolved to include chemical and biological 
weapons. According to recent US domestic policy, there are a “narrow range of 
contingencies” in which nuclear weapons can play a role in deterring a potential CBW 
attack. By doing this it is hoped that states considering acquiring CBW will be deterred 
from doing so. Former French President Jacques Chirac and former British Secretary of 
State for Defence Geoff Hoon have echoed this belief.  
One of the findings that filtered out of the political side of the case studies was 
the introduction of specific government legislation by the United States – the Atomic 
Energy Act – which made it a criminal offense for Americans to share atomic 
information with other states, including the UK. This piece of legislation had a big 
impact upon British decision-making at the time and as a result the importance of 
biological weapons rose considerably. Here you had the withdrawal of cooperation in 
atomic issues increasing the interest in biological weapons.  
The concept of national prestige as a factor for states looking to develop NBC 
weapons is the other key finding. National prestige has been mentioned as a factor in 
Britain’s decision to develop a nuclear weapons programme.199 While it is likely that 
Britain having an independent nuclear programme exerted modest influence in the 
decision, what is more significant was Britain’s desire to reestablish the level of 
collaboration on political and military affairs it enjoyed with the US during the Second 
World War. Being able to develop a full-scale nuclear programme was a key part in the 
process of reestablishing the strategic relationship with the US. This was different for 
Iraq as national prestige exerted a considerable influence on the regime’s decisions to 
develop NBC weapons.  
 A small number of key individuals inside the UK defence establishment as well 
as the Iraqi regime had varying levels of influence within each state’s NBC weapons 
programmes. In Iraq the key person was Hussein Kamel. As minister of MIC Kamel 
was directly responsible for the CB programmes as well as overseeing the gas 
centrifuge enrichment programme. Few, if any, within Iraq would have had a similar 
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level of influence over the three programmes. Kamel’s skills as a programme manager 
and his position close to Saddam meant that he was a key player within an increasingly 
insular environment. In the UK it is difficult to see many individuals that were involved 
in the three weapons programmes in any capacity. As the MoD’s Chief Scientific 
Adviser and first chairman of the DRPC, Sir Henry Tizard was in a position to help 
influence government policy on NBC weapons, although the DRPC’s role in nuclear 
issues was not extensive. As such, Tizard and the DRPC were strong supporters of 
CBW as an alternative to nuclear weapons, which was consistent with the overall 
agenda of the DRPC. 
In terms of economics and finances the key findings centered on opportunity 
costs, key personnel and committees and the competition for resources (men, money 
and materiel). In the UK, the offensive CBW programmes were casualties of the nuclear 
weapons programme. While the reasons for cancelling the offensive CBW capability 
were largely economic, spending money on another strategic deterrent option when the 
country was still recovering financially from the Second World War was not considered 
to be sound fiscal policy. Nuclear weapons provided the UK with a strategic deterrent 
that neither chemical nor biological weapons could have. Even if the costs of the 
offensive CBW programmes were not high, the economic climate dictated that nuclear 
weapons, the Royal Navy as well as a downsized conventional army would be enough 
to guarantee Britain’s security and protect its overseas interests. 
Trying to develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes 
concurrently, places certain conditions upon resources. Trained scientific and technical 
personnel, money, facilities and equipment are in demand. Iraq had a limited scientific 
and technical community to draw from, though the regime did not have a problem 
allocating resources to each of the programmes prior to Desert Storm. In postwar 
Britain, money was not as abundant and as a result certain programmes – both civilian 
and military – were stressed. However, over £100 million was spent on the nuclear 
programme between 1946-52 as well as the CBW programmes and the maintenance of 
the Royal Navy and standing army. Clearly money was not a limitation for the atomic 
energy project.200 In the end the allocation of resources, while problematic, did not 
prove to be the decisive factor in either the UK or Iraq’s decisions to develop their 
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respective programmes. As we have seen, the reasons behind the decisions are more 
complicated and more nuanced than merely the availability of resources. 
A few current and future challenges arose out of the analysis. The possibility of 
developing new types of nuclear weapons to counter the perceived CBW threat had 
gained some traction during the previous US administration. The existence of hardened 
and deeply buried targets in the Afghanistan theatre has proven to be difficult for NATO 
forces to adequately navigate. It is quite possible that there could be a renewed 
operational utility for new and different types of weapons that would assist in defeating 
such obstacles. While the development of new agent defeat and lower yield nuclear 
weapons do not seem to be a priority for the Obama administration, it is not 
inconceivable to think that this could change depending one’s current strategic 
environment.  
The acquisition of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons through either 
covert purchase or by developing a clandestine programme, presents a considerable 
international security risk. States looking to develop NBC weapons do so for a variety 
of external and domestic factors, some of which can be complex in nature. It is unlikely 
that an all-encompassing explanation for why states seek these types of weapons would 
be applicable for all cases.201 By using the United Kingdom and Iraq as case studies, 
one can see that there are tangible links between NW and CBW that are demonstrable in 
both democratic and dictatorial states. Since different states make decisions for differing 
reasons, it is important to try to understand the reasons behind the decisions to acquire 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. 
                                                
201 Gray, Another Bloody Century, 160. 
  
209 
CONCLUSIONS 
The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are 
likely to see.1 
- Winston Churchill, 2 March 1944 
 
The purpose of this dissertation has been to understand why states want NBC 
weapons, and bring to light interconnections between nuclear weapons and CBW. Two 
historical case studies were used, the United Kingdom and Iraq, which helped to draw 
out many examples of how decisions to develop nuclear weapons influenced decisions 
on developing or keeping CBW. How and why states make decisions to develop these 
weapons are numerous and different states make decisions for different reasons. Having 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons for the purpose of use is not always a state’s 
ultimate goal.  
For the UK, nuclear weapons provided a strategic deterrent against possible 
Soviet aggression in Europe. More significantly the British nuclear weapons programme 
ensured future collaboration between London and Washington in military and political 
matters. This ranged from R&D into new types of delivery systems as well as a 
coordinated targeting system in the event of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. And 
when nuclear collaboration was not possible due to certain pieces of US domestic 
legislation other types of weapons technology, most notably biological, rose to the 
forefront. Even though little was known regarding the uncertainties of biological 
warfare agents, and the probabilities of failure were high, it was hoped that a strategic 
biological weapon would be in service by 1957 with the understanding that it would be 
comparable in strategic effect with the atomic bomb. This never materialized and 
biological weapons were soon to drift out of prominence. Chemical weapons provided 
Britain with a defensive capability during the Second World War. There was a real fear 
that there would be an attempt at an amphibious German invasion of the south England 
coast. As a result, plans were drawn up by the Air Ministry to contaminate possible 
landing sites with mustard. Nuclear weapons are seen to be the ultimate in military 
engineering and technology. They are technologically sophisticated and catastrophically 
dangerous, which makes them all the more appealing to states looking for a strong 
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deterrent capability or wanting something more. For Britain in the 1950s, nuclear 
weapons were a means to an end and the end has not always been about dropping 
bombs on the USSR, but as a major deterrent to war.2 Its objective was the 
reestablishment of US-UK military and political collaboration at the highest levels of 
power. 
 Iraq during the 1980s had tried to actualize all three programmes 
simultaneously. Substantial amounts of money and resources were needed to start its 
nuclear weapons programme. With the loss of the Osirak research reactor, it became 
increasingly unlikely that Iraq would be able to reconstitute its plutonium-based civil 
nuclear power programme. Saddam Hussein had placed high priority on being able to 
develop a nuclear weapon. Only one of Iraq’s two primary regional rivals – Israel – 
possessed nuclear weapons. Iran did not, though currently there are concerns over its 
alleged civil nuclear energy programme. Very few states have been able to develop a 
deliverable nuclear weapon and this was always going to be a difficult enterprise for the 
Iraqi scientific community. Chemical weapons were used extensively by the regime for 
the better part of a decade, starting with the Iran-Iraq War. Many threats were issued 
outlining plans to use non-conventional weapons against Israel as well as coalition 
forces prior to Desert Storm in 1991. While it remains to be seen whether or not one can 
effectively deter a potential nuclear weapons attack with the threat of chemical or 
biological weapons, the simple fact is that Saddam believed in the utility of these 
weapons and was committed to the further R&D of the proscribed programmes in the 
aftermath of Desert Storm and in the face of UNSCOM inspections.  
For Saddam, simply having a large standing army and ballistic missile capability 
was not enough. There was a certain attraction that NBC weapons held. As Kanan 
Makiya explains: 
The meaning of mere possession of weapons of mass destruction – as 
distinguished from normal armaments designed for combat that has goals 
and a military strategy associated with it – originates in the firm 
intentionality to use them in whatever ultimate situation; hence, 
possession alone of weapons expressly designed for the wholesale 
slaughter of noncombatants is a perfectly adequate indication of criminal 
intent on the part of any government irrespective of its politics.3  
                                                
2 John R. Walker, British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban: 1954-1973 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 11. 
3 Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1989), 287. 
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Prestige and regional security concerns were the cornerstones of the regime’s 
interest in non-conventional weapons technology. Saddam was of the belief – as were 
many other senior regime officials – that chemical weapons saved Iraq during the war 
with Iran as well as preventing Israel from launching air strikes in the build up to Desert 
Storm. Once nuclear weapons were off the table, biological and chemical weapons 
would fill the perceived void in Iraqi strategic defence planning. The most significant 
thing that the Iraq case shows us is that chemical and biological weapons are seen to be 
of use when nuclear weapons are not an option. Substantial resources were put into 
Iraq’s proscribed CBW programmes during the 1980s and they continued to pose a 
significant security risk decades later. 
The paths to NBC weapons acquisition can be technically difficult and 
financially taxing for even the most technologically advanced states.4 The problems 
multiply for less technologically advanced states with smaller scientific communities 
and also where resources (raw materials, infrastructure, money) are less available. This 
impinged upon the regime’s abilities to develop a full NBC weapons capability. Britain 
largely did not have such concerns insofar as the scientific expertise in British 
laboratories and universities was of a high calibre. The numbers of individuals that were 
needed did pose somewhat of a problem as private sector firms ended up competing 
with the civil service for the best candidates. This however did not impact upon 
Britain’s abilities to research and develop a nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
capability.5 
 
Points of Note 
 A number of key points have arisen from this dissertation relating to how NW 
and CBW can influence each other, inspired from evidence gathered in the case studies. 
First is how nuclear disarmament could reduce the possibility of CBW proliferation. 
Some states see NBC weapons as a component necessary for strategic defence, 
especially in light of a similarly armed adversary. In the postwar period the Soviet 
Union was suspected of involvement in NBC R&D, suspicions that were confirmed 
with the detonation of their first nuclear weapon in 1949, years before the West thought 
possible. Britain at the time had embarked down the path of trying to develop a nuclear 
programme in spite of the discontinuation of collaboration with the US in atomic issues. 
                                                
4 See Appendix 8: Technical Routes to NBC Acquisition. 
5 Refer to Chapter Three for a more detailed analysis. 
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At the same time Britain was investigating the utility of biological weapons as an 
alternative to nuclear weapons, as creating a full-scale nuclear programme had a long 
lead-time and required significant investment of resources. Shortly after the end of the 
Second World War the Soviet Union had replaced Nazi Germany as the predominant 
military threat to the West. The threat of Soviet aggression was very prevalent within 
the UK, especially after the 1949 Soviet nuclear test that Britain felt it needed to possess 
a strategic weapon capable of deterring Soviet aggression. In the aftermath of the 1946 
Atomic Energy Agreement, it was thought that biological weapons could fill this void. 
It is quite possible that Britain may not have felt the need to develop a non-conventional 
strategic capability, if the Soviets had not either. If no one possessed nuclear weapons, 
then it is possible that the potential for CBW proliferation would be greatly diminished.  
The flip side of this is how nuclear disarmament could promote CBW 
proliferation. If a particular state believes that possessing a non-conventional armament 
is crucial to its defence and security, then there is the possibility that it will attempt to 
acquire a capability. Nuclear weapons are thought to be the most desired out of the three 
types of weapons. If it is not possible for a state to possess nuclear weapons then it is 
very likely that it could turn to chemical or biological weapons to fulfill its strategic 
needs, as was the case in Iraq. This leads directly into the concept of CBW being “the 
poor man’s atomic bomb.” This idea gained traction through the belief that you could 
use CBW to deter nuclear weapons. Iraq, Syria, Egypt, all of these states has at one time 
thought this – chemical and biological weapons can provide a deterrent capability 
against a nuclear-armed state. Whether this is actually the case remains to be seen. What 
is a real concern is that some states see CBW as being able to provide a level of 
deterrence against an enemy that possesses nuclear weapons. The key here is if it was 
not possible for a state to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, then the alternative could 
mean a CBW capability. States desire these types of weapons for a multitude of reasons 
and it is conceivable that if nuclear weapons were off the table, then CBW becomes 
much more attractive. As we have seen, this was the case in both the United Kingdom 
and Iraq.  
 Further to this point, can successful nuclear anti-proliferation create possible 
incentives for CBW armament? This is key. Iraq was not able to develop a full-scale 
nuclear programme but it was much more successful in chemical and biological warfare 
development. This was much the same as in the UK some forty years earlier when the 
Atomic Energy Act prevented nuclear collaboration with other states, which in turn 
  
213 
helped to elevate the importance of biological weapons within British strategic 
planning, albeit for a relatively short period. Preventing more states from acquiring 
nuclear weapons might lead them to try and acquire other types of non-conventional 
weapons. This is not to suggest that any state should have the right to develop nuclear 
weapons. It is meant to show that chemical and biological weapons could be attractive 
alternatives if nuclear weapons development is not possible. Brad Roberts states: 
What is required is a larger antiproliferation strategy encompassing a 
comprehensive set of political, economic, military, and diplomatic 
policies aimed not just at halting the spread of weapons but at coping 
with the consequences of their proliferation, shaping the will to acquire 
as much as the means to acquire, and working toward deproliferation 
where it is a serious prospect.6 
 
Based on evidence from the case studies, we see how nuclear weapons can 
justify the existence of CBW. One needs to look no further than the general response in 
the Middle East, most notably from Syria and Iraq, towards Israel’s suspected nuclear 
arsenal. Israel’s nuclear weapons helped foster the justification of CBW armament in 
the region. Unable to acquire nuclear weapons from themselves, Iraq believed that 
CBW could act as a deterrent against an Israeli nuclear attack. What is significant about 
this is that it is likely that Iran views non-conventional armament in much the same 
way. There are a lot of questions surrounding Iran’s alleged civil nuclear energy 
programme and the fear is that Iran is interested in acquiring nuclear weapons – 
something that Iraq was not able to do.  
On the other hand, knowing that states will try to acquire whatever weapons 
capability they can helps justify the retention and possibly the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Despite calls for Israel to come clean regarding their alleged nuclear weapons 
programme, one must think that it would be reluctant to renounce its programme in light 
of past and present regional threats. This creates a real proliferation problem in the 
Middle East. Some Arabic states claim that they see CBW as providing a deterrent 
against Israel’s nuclear weapons. One must ask the question of whether any of these 
states would give up its desire to acquire CBW if Israel had begun the process of 
nuclear disarmament? Even so, it is remains unlikely that Israel would entertain the 
notion of nuclear disarmament. 
                                                
6 Brad Roberts, “From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation,” International Security, Volume 18, Number 
1 (Summer 1993): 163. 
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Another key point is how the possession of nuclear weapons may facilitate the 
acquisition of CBW. For some, nuclear weapons are seen to be the pinnacle of military 
technology and engineering, and the retention of other non-conventional weapons 
capabilities is superfluous. The belief here is that if it is a strategic deterrent that is 
desired then nothing is more effective than a modern nuclear arsenal. However, 
different states have differing criteria for wanting to possess non-conventional weapons. 
States desire these types of weapons for many reasons and it is not to say that once a 
state has nuclear weapons it will not be interested in chemical or biological weapons. 
Possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily denote a lack of interest in other 
types of non-conventional weapons. These weapons are terror weapons and can be used 
to subdue a specific population, similar to Iraq’s subjugation of its Kurds. These 
weapons have a different utility to nuclear weapons and if a state possesses NW, there 
would be little stopping them from trying to develop chemical or biological weapons. 
This depends entirely on a state’s strategic culture and its outlook on non-conventional 
weapons. Understanding the nuances of an adversary’s strategic culture can be 
beneficial to understanding its decisions to develop nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons. 
 The existence of chemical and biological weapons can promote interest in 
developing new types of conventional and nuclear technology designed to defeat CBW 
agents and weapons. Interest in the US Navy’s Agent Defeat Warhead as well as the 
debate on the efficacy of nuclear earth penetrating weapons continues, though it has 
lessened somewhat over the past few years due in part over US Congress’ refusal to 
approve expenditure on R&D into ‘bunker buster’ technology.7 And according to the 
2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United States has pledged to not develop new 
nuclear warheads, citing that they will use only nuclear components based on previously 
tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military 
capabilities.8  
                                                
7 Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 179. 
8 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, 39. This is a considerable 
change from the Bush administration’s opinions on weapons technology, when in 2006 the National 
Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction report stated that, “our intent and actions 
should deter a potential adversary from considering the initial or subsequent use of WMD. Adversaries 
must believe they will suffer severe consequences and that their objectives will be denied if they threaten 
or resort to the use of WMD. Deterrence of WMD in the current era requires that US Armed Forces 
possess a broad set of military capabilities to prevent an adversary from attacking with WMD and to 
protect against attacks.” Report by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, 13 February 2006), 17. 
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While it is unlikely that there will be a reversal of current policy, it is not to say 
that it cannot happen. The decision taken in 1956 to discontinue the offensive chemical 
weapons programme was due primarily to economic pressures. Fast-forward to May 
1963 and a new British government took the decision to reacquire a limited offensive 
chemical weapons capability, including both lethal and incapacitating agents. This was 
due to recent advances in chemical weapons development as well as the changing 
international strategic environment. This was when flexible response began to replace 
massive retaliation as the predominant strategic doctrine of the UK. One of the key 
points in flexible response was the expansion of the non-nuclear phase of combat. 
Chemical weapons were thought to be able to provide Britain a tactical war fighting 
capability in either a limited war engagement or in a global war against the Soviet 
Union. This shows that weapons policy can be created or reversed depending on the 
weapon’s utility and the current strategic climate. States will want to know that they are 
adequately prepared and equipped to deal with a whole range of conventional and 
asymmetric threats. This may include creating policies for NBC weapons development 
if the current climate dictates. 
 
Areas for Future Research 
Economic considerations were left largely unresolved by the case studies. It is 
not clear as to the overall impact the British and Iraqi economic states played in their 
respective abilities to develop NBC weapons programmes. A more erudite study on the 
economics of each state would be required and was well outside the boundaries of this 
research project. It would be especially interesting to see a comprehensive resource 
allocation for Iraq’s NBC programmes. However, this may be difficult given the 
regime’s proclivity for overly bureaucratic administrative processes in terms of regime 
finance, as well as its illicit procurement activities. 
During the data collection phase of this project, the research led to some 
significant findings/connections that centre on the Cold War relationship between the 
US and USSR. It was during this period that the two countries entered into a number of 
important bilateral arms control agreements including the 1963 Atmospheric Test Ban 
(ATB) and continuing with the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and up to the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, which 
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was designed, as David Hoffman argues, to “make the Cold War manageable and less 
threatening.”9 The creation of the BWC did little to prevent the Soviets from expanding 
their military BW programme and violating their treaty obligations in the process. The 
US in fact, had accused the Soviets of violating treaty obligations as early as 1980 in 
light of the 1979 outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk and had started to demand 
verification of Soviet activities. There could be any number of reasons as to why the 
Soviets were interested in possessing such a comprehensive BW capability. There was a 
strong element of distrust of the US repudiation of offensive biological weapons 
production that convinced them that they could not trust that the US was serious in their 
efforts at disarming and that it must have been a ploy to get the Soviets to disarm. 
Interestingly, the existence of the immense Cold War Soviet nuclear arsenal gave their 
military-industrial complex the latitude to sink large amounts of capital into their 
clandestine BW programme. Nuclear weapons provided the USSR with a strong and 
credible strategic deterrent, strong enough to prevent serious accusations about their 
clandestine activities from being pursued by the accusers.10 This is significant as it 
highlights an example of how the possession of nuclear weapons can contribute to the 
escalation of R&D into other types of non-conventional weapons. Situations such as this 
make it difficult to appreciate why a state takes a particular decision to try and acquire a 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons capability, which is all the more reason that 
states need to have a better understanding of their opponent’s strategic culture.11 
The example of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons programme providing the 
BW programme latitude to invest in R&D is another potential area of future research. It 
would be necessary to have a greater understanding of Soviet/Russian strategic culture 
as well as their views on NBC weapons, which is likely different from the UK or US. A 
better understanding of why the Soviets placed such an emphasis on BW when they 
possessed thousands of nuclear warheads is somewhat of a mystery. This could in turn 
provide further insight into why states decide to acquire or develop nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons. 
                                                
9 David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous 
Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 20. 
10 Interview with Brian Jones, 4 December 2008. 
11 For analyses of the Soviet BW programmes, see, Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The 
Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World – Told from the 
Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Delta, 1999); Igor V. Domaradskij with Wendy Orent, 
Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biological War Machine (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2003); 
David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous 
Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2009). 
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Another issue that presents a significant challenge to the problem of state-level 
acquisition of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons concerns dual-use technology. 
This presents a problem on multiple levels. As we saw with Iraq in the 1980s, there was 
a covert nuclear weapons programme, which was concealed by the legitimate, state-run 
civil nuclear energy programme. Not that having a nuclear energy programme is a 
necessary precursor to developing a nuclear weapons programme, but clandestine 
activities inside Iraq were well hidden from the IAEA under the premise that their 
nuclear-related activities were necessary for the maintenance of their energy 
programme. Currently this situation is mirrored in events occurring in Iran, where its 
government is claiming its right to develop a peaceful, civil nuclear energy programme. 
Iran has long been suspected of violating its treaty obligations under the NPT and as a 
result international sanctions have been implemented at various points. While it cannot 
be said for sure that Iran is trying to enrich uranium to the 90% level needed for nuclear 
weapons development, it is clear that its intent is considerably less noble than what is 
stated. Concealing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme is considerably more 
difficult than hiding a CBW programme due to the resources and facilities required. In 
light of this, a potential research project could focus on a comparative analysis between 
nuclear and CBW dual-use proliferation problems. 
 Since its introduction the there has been a distinct lack of empirical studies that 
have attempted to test the bureaucratic politics model. A few of the studies have ended 
up focusing on individual crises as opposed to routine policy decisions. Deciding to 
develop a nuclear, biological or chemical weapons programme is hardly routine, but 
many decisions are not taken during any sort of crisis. It would be interesting to apply 
the bureaucratic politics model to a specific set of decisions on NBC weapons 
technology, that were made in the United Kingdom. A brief glimpse in to the decision 
to develop an atomic weapons programme was highlighted in the UK case study. The 
initial findings would suggest that bureaucratic politics could provide a different level of 
analysis on British decision-making and NBC weapons policy. A more thorough 
examination of British decisions and the bureaucratic politics model would be 
interesting.  
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Summary 
Preventing states from acquiring nuclear, biological and chemical armaments 
presents a substantial challenge for the democratic states of the West. Brad Roberts 
writes that, “Since the advent of the nuclear era in 1945, Americans and others have 
been debating whether or how it might be possible to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.”12 The threat of retaliation and 
economic sanctions are two things that can help prevent this from happening. The 
creation of broad-based international treaties and regimes are yet another tool to help 
deter states from trying to develop NBC weapons programmes. Unfortunately, states 
like Iraq and North Korea have demonstrated how simple a matter it is to hide an illicit 
weapons programme under the cover of a legitimate, and internationally inspected, civil 
programme. Nevertheless there is a need to ensure that appropriate resources are 
dedicated to the nonproliferation of chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear 
weapons. 
This dissertation set out to demonstrate the interconnections between nuclear 
weapons and chemical/biological weapons. There are some tangible linkages between 
the two ranging from strategic deterrence concerns to increased competition for 
resources as illustrated by the UK and Iraq case studies. Nuclear weapons and CBW are 
intrinsically linked to each other because they can rationalize the other’s existence. If 
nuclear weapons are not available to a state then it is possible that CBW will be pursued 
and if a state has acquired NW it does not necessarily mean that it will rule out pursuing 
a CBW capability. Reasons why states want these types of weapons are numerous and 
sometimes complicated. Disarmament and anti-proliferation measures, while 
respectable, can often create other issues that are more difficult to navigate. 
Unfortunately it is not as simple as banning nuclear weapons or CBW. This is a 
complex set of problems and one that is unlikely to subside in the near future. What this 
all means is that while nuclear proliferation remains at the apex of international interest 
and concern, CBW proliferation should be neither ignored nor discounted. 
 
 
                                                
12 Brad Roberts, “Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New,” in Avoiding the Abyss: Progress, 
Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in Combating the WMD Threat, ed. Barry R. Schneider and Jim A. Davis. 
(Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 75. 
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APPENDIX 5: BRITISH NUCLEAR TESTS, 1952-58 
Test 
Series Test Name Location Date Yield 
Explosion 
Conditions 
 Hurricane Monte Bello (off Trimouille Island) 3/10/52 25 kt 
Ocean surface burst 
(HMS Plym) 
Totem Test 1 Emu Field 15/10/53 10 kt Tower 
Totem Test 2 Emu Field 27/10/53 8 kt Tower 
Mosaic G1 Monte Bello (off Trimouille Island) 16/05/56 15 kt Tower 
Mosaic G2 Monte Bello (off Alpha Island)  19/06/56 60 kt Tower 
Buffalo One Tree, Round 1 Maralinga (One Tree) 27/09/56 15 kt Tower 
Buffalo Marcoo, Round 2 Maralinga (Marcoo) 4/10/56 1.5 kt Ground 
Buffalo Kite, Round 3 Maralinga (Kite) 11/10/56 3 kt Airburst over land 
Buffalo Breakaway, Round 4 Maralinga (Breakaway) 22/10/56 10 kt Tower 
Grapple Grapple 1/Short Granite Malden Island 15/05/57 
200-
300 kt Airburst over ocean 
Grapple Grapple 2/Orange Herald Malden Island 31/05/57 720 kt Airburst over ocean 
Grapple Grapple 3/Purple Granite Malden Island 19/06/57 150 kt Airburst over ocean 
Antler Round 1 Maralinga (Tadje) 14/09/57 1 kt Tower 
Antler Round 2 Maralinga (Biak) 25/09/57 6 kt Tower 
Antler Round 3 Maralinga (Taranaki) 9/10/57 25 kt Balloon-burst over land 
Grapple 
X Round A 
Christmas Island 
(southern tip) 8/11/57 1.8 Mt Airburst over ocean 
Grapple 
Y Grapple Y 
Christmas Island 
(southern tip) 28/04/58 2 Mt Airburst over ocean 
Grapple 
Z Pendant 2 
Christmas Island 
(southern tip) 22/08/58 24 kt 
Balloon-burst over 
land 
Grapple 
Z Flagpole 1 
Christmas Island 
(southern tip) 2/09/58 
1.21 
Mt Airburst over ocean 
Grapple 
Z Halliard 1 
Christmas Island 
(southern tip) 11/09/58 0.8 Mt Airburst over ocean 
Grapple 
Z Burgee 2 
Christmas Island 
(southern tip) 23/09/58 25 kt 
Balloon-burst over 
land  
Source: Britain's Nuclear Weapons – British Nuclear Testing 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html (accessed 29 November 2009); Lorna Arnold, Britain and 
the H-Bomb (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) 176-191. 
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Source: United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Compendium of      
Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes in the Chemical, Biological and Missile areas, June 2007, Chapter 
7, 1045. 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
 
 
Source: WTRG Economics, Oil Price History and Analysis, http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm 
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APPENDIX 8: TECHNICAL ROUTES TO NBC WEAPONS CAPABILITY 
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